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 Increasing trade of renewable energy products has significantly contributed to 
reducing the costs of renewable energy sources, but at the same time, it has generated 
protectionist policies, which may negatively affect the trend of the cost reduction. 
Although a few recent studies examined the rise of renewable energy protectionism and 
trade disputes, they are limited in addressing the conflict between the original goal of 
traditional renewable energy policies and the new protectionist policies under the 
globalized renewable energy industry. To fill this gap, this dissertation explores how the 
globalized renewable energy industry has changed national renewable energy policies. 
Through three analyses, three aspects of the globalized renewable energy industry are 
examined: the rise of multinational corporations, international interactions among actors, 
and the changes of the global and domestic market conditions. First analysis investigates 
how multinational renewable energy corporations have affected national policies. A 
content analysis of the annual reports of 15 solar photovoltaic multinational corporation 
 
shows that solar multinationals have been influenced by national policies and have 
adapted to the changes rather than having attempted to change national policies. Second 
analysis examines how diverse actors have framed renewable energy trade issues through 
a network analysis of the Chinese solar panel issue in the United States. The result shows 
that the Chinese solar panel issue was framed differently from the traditional 
environmental frame of renewable energy, being dominated by multinational 
corporations headquartered in other countries. Third analysis explores what has caused 
the increasing diversity in national renewable energy policies through the case studies of 
the U.S. and South Korea. The result reveals that the globalization of solar industry has 
affected the diversification of solar policies in two countries by generating both 
challenges, which needed to be addressed by new and additional policies, and 
opportunities, which strengthened the political power of domestic solar industries. The 
three analyses show that the globalized renewable energy industry has led to the 
diversification of national renewable energy policies by increasing international 
interactions between actors and by introducing both challenges and opportunities to 
domestic renewable energy industries. This research contributes to the literature on trade 
and the environment by analyzing a new pattern of the conflicts between traditional 
environmental policies and “green” protectionist policies. It also contributes to the 
literature on protectionism by adding an empirical case of green protectionism, one of the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Policy problem and research question 
 Renewable energy has expanded rapidly in recent years. Worldwide renewable 
power capacity has increased from 1,037 GW in 2006 to 1,985 GW in 2015.1 New 
investment in clean energy has expanded from $41 billion in 2004 to $272 billion in 
2014.2 Much of this expansion has been based on governmental support, via policy 
requirements, subsidies, R&D funding, or other mechanisms. Governments have 
promoted the use of renewable energy to address various energy and environmental 
issues they face such as climate change mitigation, energy security, and air pollution. As 
the costs of renewable energy sources have historically been higher than conventional 
energy sources, support policies were essential for the promotion of renewable energy. In 
this vein, the number and the variety of renewable energy policies have sharply increased 
around the world. For instance, as of early 2015, 145 countries have adopted renewable 
energy support policies—more than 9 times of that in 2005, which was only 15 
countries.3  
 Recently, different types of renewable energy policies from the support policies 
have been introduced in a number of countries (Table 1). While the support policies serve 
                                                        
1 Whiteman, Adrian, Tobias Rinke, Javier Esparrago and Samah Elsayed. Renewables 
Capacity Statistics 2016. Masdar City: IRENA, 2016. 
http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_RE_Capacity_Statistics
_2016.pdf. 
2 Liebreich, Michael, “Global Trends in Clean Energy Investment”, Bloomberg EMEA 
Summit, London, October 12, 2015. 
3 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, Renewables 2015: Global 
Status Report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat. 2015. http://www.ren21.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/REN12-GSR2015_Onlinebook_low1.pdf. 
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the goal to increase the share of renewable energy in national energy mix, these new 
policies do not serve this goal. Rather, the purpose of these policies is to protect domestic 
renewable energy industry. The U.S. and the EU adopted policy measures to address 
solar panels imported from China since these imported panels injured domestic industry. 
Domestic content requirement, which requires renewable energy developers to use 
domestic products, has been adopted by a few countries including Canada and India. 
 
Table 1. Selected new types of renewable energy policies. 
 Country Policy 
Timing of 
implementation 
Anti-dumping U.S. Tariff on Chinese solar panels October, 2012 
EU Minimum price for solar panels       
from China 






Canada Guaranteed, long-term pricing for 
renewable energy from facility that 
contain domestic content 
September, 
2009 
India Requirements for solar power 
developers to purchase domestic 
products to enter into power purchase 
agreement 
January 2010 
Italy Provision of incentive if contents are 
from within the EU 
March, 2011 
 
 The rise of these policies has caused international trade disputes. Nine dispute 
cases have been submitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) related to renewable 
energy policies as of October 10, 2016 (Table 2). Among them, five cases are related to 
domestic content requirement; the complaint countries argued that domestic content 
requirement of respondent countries were less favorable to imported goods, which was 
the violation of the WTO rules. Canada had to revise its policy since the WTO concluded 
that its domestic content requirement violated the WTO rules. China claimed the U.S. 
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countervailing and anti-dumping measures on Chinese solar panels. As the U.S. 
government found that Chinese solar panels were dumped by using huge governmental 
supports, the U.S. imposed tariff on them. China reacted to it by arguing that there was no 
sufficient evidence of unfair subsidization. On January 16, 2015, the WTO upheld some 




Table 2. International trade disputes on renewable energy policy. 
Dispute 
number 
Respondent Complaint Request date At issue Current status 
DS 412 Canada Japan 
(USA) 
(EU) 
Sep. 13, 2010 
(Sep. 24, 2010) 
(Sep. 27, 2010) 
Domestic content 
requirements in the 
feed-in tariff program 
Implementati
on notified by 
respondent 
DS 419 China USA 
(EU) 
(Japan) 
Dec. 22, 2010 
(Jan. 12, 2011) 
(Jan. 17, 2011) 






DS 426 Canada EU Aug. 11, 2011 Domestic content 
requirements in the 
feed-in tariff program 
Implementati
on notified by 
respondent 







Nov. 5, 2012 
(Nov. 16, 2012) 
(Nov. 19, 2012) 





DS 437 USA China May 25, 2012 Imposition of 
countervailing duty 
measures by the U.S. 





DS 449 USA China Sep. 17, 2012 Countervailing and 
anti-dumping 
measures on certain 





DS 456 India USA 
(Japan) 
(Australia) 
Feb. 6, 2013 
Feb. 13, 2013 






DS 473 EU Argentina 
(Russia) 
(Indonesia) 
Dec. 19, 2013 
(Jan. 9, 2014) 










Source: WTO, “Index of Dispute Issues”, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm (accessed 





 These new types of renewable energy policies conflict with the original goal of 
renewable energy policies because they increase the cost of renewable energy. For 
instance, domestic content requirement would increase the cost for renewable energy 
installation by interrupting developers to use low-priced imported products. Increasing 
trade of renewable energy products has contributed to reducing the cost of renewable 
energy, but it led governments to introduce the measures to protect domestic renewable 
energy industry, which could slow down the increasing trend of renewable energy 
installation. 
 Previous studies on renewable energy policy tend to focus on traditional 
renewable energy policies, which are mostly support policies.4 Since they investigated 
how support policies contributed to the growth of renewable energy, these studies barely 
addressed the recent rise of non-traditional renewable energy policies. Although a few 
recent studies examined the rise of renewable energy protectionism and trade disputes, 
they are limited in revealing why new types of renewable energy policies have 
                                                        
4 Bird, Lori, Mark Bolinger, Troy Gagliano, Ryan Wiser, Matthew Brown, and Brian 
Parsons. "Policies and market factors driving wind power development in the United 
States," Energy Policy 33, no. 11 (2005): 1397-1407; Gan, Lin, Gunnar S. Eskeland, and 
Hans H. Kolshus. "Green electricity market development: Lessons from Europe and the 
US." Energy Policy 35, no. 1 (2007): 144-155.; Johnson, A., & Jacobsson, S. 
“Inducement and blocking mechanism in the development of a new industry: the case of 
renewable energy technology in Sweden” In R. Coombs, G. Ken, A. Richard, & V. 
Walsh (Eds.), Technology and the Market: Demand, Users, and Innovation. 
(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001), 89–111.; Moe, Espen. "Vested 
interests, energy efficiency and renewables in Japan," Energy Policy 40 (2012): 260-273.; 
Zhao, Zhen-Yu, Jian Zuo, Lei-Lei Fan, and George Zillante. "Impacts of renewable 
energy regulations on the structure of power generation in China–a critical analysis," 
Renewable Energy 36, no. 1 (2011): 24-30. 
 6 
increasingly introduced recently despite the conflict between the original goal of 
traditional renewable energy policies and the new policies.5  
 This research aims to understand why the new types of renewable energy policies 
have been introduced. Multiple possible reasons of the rise of these non-traditional 
renewable energy policies can be suggested. First, it can be argued that there is an 
inherent conflict between renewable energy supports and the global trade regime.6 The 
rise of the trade disputes on renewables, however, is a recent trend, although renewable 
energy supports have been implemented for decades. Second, the rising concern on 
climate change can be suggested as the cause of renewable energy protectionism. It is, 
however, natural that the concern on climate change encourages traditional renewable 
energy policies rather than non-traditional policies. Another possible reason is the global 
financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. It can be argued that the global financial crisis might 
increase overall protectionist measures. A number of studies showed that there was no 
significant increase of protectionist measures after the global financial crisis.7 However, 
                                                        
5 Caprotti, Federico. "Golden sun, green economy: market security and the US/EU-China 
‘solar trade war’." Asian Geographer 32, no. 2 (2015): 99-115.; Carbaugh, Bob, and M. 
St Brown. "Industrial policy and renewable energy: Trade conflicts." Journal of 
International and Global Economic Studies 5, no. 1 (2012): 1-16.; Lewis, Joanna I. "The 
rise of renewable energy protectionism: Emerging trade conflicts and implications for 
low carbon development." Global Environmental Politics (2014); 10-35.; Voituriez, 
Tancrède, and Xin Wang. "Real challenges behind the EU–China PV trade dispute 
settlement." Climate Policy 15, no. 5 (2015): 670-677.; Dunford, Michael, Kyoung H. 
Lee, Weidong Liu, and Godfrey Yeung. "Geographical interdependence, international 
trade and economic dynamics: The Chinese and German solar energy industries." 
European Urban and Regional Studies (2013): 3-13. 
6 Lewis, Joanna I. "The rise of renewable energy protectionism: Emerging trade conflicts 
and implications for low carbon development." Global Environmental Politics (2014); 
10-35. 
7 Kee, Hiau Looi, Cristina Neagu, and Alessandro Nicita. "Is protectionism on the rise? 
Assessing national trade policies during the crisis of 2008." Review of Economics and 
Statistics 95, no. 1 (2013): 342-346. 
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some argued that “murky” type of protectionist measures have increasingly used by 
governments.8 For instance, Aggarwal and Evenett revealed that the countries with more 
policies discriminating foreign interests tended to use more policies covered by weak or 
no WTO rule after the global financial crisis.9 The rise of new types of renewable energy 
policies can be explained as a part of this trend. However, the rise of murky 
protectionism does not tell the cause of the increasing new and additional renewable 
energy policies. To understand the cause, another causal variables need to be considered. 
 In this context, the globalization of renewable energy industry can be suggested as 
a reason for the rise of the new types of renewable energy policies. As domestic 
renewable energy industries have internationally connected through global value chains 
of renewable energy products, the conditions of domestic renewable energy markets as 
well as of the global market have significantly changed. These changes of market 
conditions are expected to generate the necessity of new policies. Moreover, the 
globalization of renewable energy industry has generated many multinational 
corporations, which have resources and capabilities to influence policies in multiple 
countries. This globalization of renewable energy industry is a recent phenomenon. 
Therefore, it can be considered as a reason of the rise of new types of renewable energy 
policies, which is also a recent phenomenon. Few studies have been conducted on the 
connection of the globalization of renewable energy industry and the rise of non-
traditional renewable energy policies. 
                                                        
8 Evenett, Simon J., and John Whalley. "18. Resist green protectionism–or pay the price 
at Copenhagen." The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism and the Crisis: 
Recommendations for the G20 (2009): 93-98. 
9 Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Simon J. Evenett. "Industrial policy choice during the crisis 
era." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28, no. 2 (2012): 261-283. 
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 In this sense, the central research question of this research is: How has the 
globalized renewable energy industry changed national renewable energy policies? The 
globalized renewable energy industry refers to the creation of global value chains of 
renewable energy products in this research. While previous studies focus either on 
traditional renewable energy policies or on non-traditional renewable energy policies, this 
research investigates the change of all the national policies on renewables to find out the 
mechanism of policy change on renewable energy. In this vein, national renewable 
energy policies refer to both traditional and non-traditional renewable energy policies in 
this research.  
 
Global energy market and renewable energy 
 In recent decades, fossil fuels have been the most dominant energy sources in the 
global energy market. Although the total share of coal, oil, and natural gas in the global 
energy supply has decreased to 81% in 2014 from 86% in 1975, they are still dominant 
energy sources (Figure 1). Natural gas and coal have replaced the decreased share of oil. 
Renewables has accounted for 12-14% share of the global energy supply.10 Compared to 
1975, the share of renewables has increased only by 1% in 2014.  
 
                                                        
10 According to the definition of renewable energy in the IEA’s Renewables Information 
2016, renewable energy is “derived from natural processes that are replenished 
constantly.” Renewable energy includes hydroelectricity, geothermal, solar photovoltaic, 
solar thermal, tide, wave, ocean, wind, solid biofuels, biogases, liquid biofuels and 
renewable municipal waste. 
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Figure 1. Worldwide total primary energy supply by source, 1975-2014. 
 
Source: IEA Statistics, http://www.iea.org/statistics/ 
 
 Although the share of renewables has been stable, some renewable energy sources 
have enormously grown in recent years. While the annual average growth rates of 
conventional energy sources from 2004 to 2014 are 1-3%, those of biofuels, solar 
photovoltaic (PV), and wind energy are 9-52% (Figure 2). Natural gas has received much 
attention as a “bridge fuel” for climate mitigation in recent years due to its least carbon 
intensity among fossil fuels, but the average annual growth rate is only 2% in recent 10 
years.  
 
25% 25% 26% 25% 24% 23% 26% 28% 28%
45% 43% 38% 37% 37% 37% 35% 32% 32%
16% 17%
18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 21% 21%
2% 3% 5% 6% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5%



















Figure 2. Global average annual growth rate by energy source, 2004-2014. 
 
 
Note: The rates of all energy, coal, oil, natural gas, and nuclear are based on the total 
primary energy supply of each energy source. The rates of the other energy sources are 
based on the electricity generation of each energy source.  
Source: IEA Statistics, http://www.iea.org/statistics/ 
 
 
 This rapid growth of renewable energy sources is expected to be accelerated. 
Even without additional policies, renewable energy sources are expected to take the 
decrease of the share of coal in power generation by 2040. The World Energy Outlook of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) projected that the share of solar PV and wind 
energy in electricity generation would increase to 4% and 7% in 2040 from 1% and 3% in 
2014 if current policies are continued (Figure 3). If announced policies, targets, 
commitments such as climate pledges are implemented as well as current policies, the 
share of solar PV and wind energy would increase to 5% and 10%, respectively. Under 
the 450 scenario, which targets average global temperature increase to 2 degrees in 2100, 
the share of total renewables becomes more than half of the total power generation. 
 














Figure 3. Power generation by source in the Current Policies, New Policies, and 450 
Scenarios, 2040. 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2016, IEA. 
 
 
 These projections by policy scenarios show that renewable energy installation is 
significantly influenced by policies. In effect, renewable energy policies have led the rise 
of renewable energy by driving the cost-down of renewables. For instance, in 2015, the 
global average capital cost of solar PV has decreased to less than the half of the cost in 
2010. According to the IEA, the supports for renewable energy in many countries after 
2010 have led this massive cost-down in 5 years, which was expected to take 15 years.11 
 Other than policies, many other factors have influenced the rise of renewable 
energy. Technology development, accumulated experience of installation, competition 
and increased scale of deployment have contributed to the cost-down of renewable 
energy. International trade of renewable energy products has been another driver of 
renewable energy deployment by driving down costs. 
                                                        






















































International trade and the globalization of renewable energy industry 
  International trade of renewable energy products has sharply increased in recent 
years (Figure 4). The worldwide exports value of photosensitive semiconductor devices, 
which include solar photovoltaic cells, has increased to 57,868 million US dollars in 2015 
from 20,416 million US dollars in 2006. The value of exports has dropped in 2012 
because the export of China has reduced under the policies to restrict flooding of Chinese 
solar cells in a number of countries. After this drop, the trade value has increased again. 
The exports of wind energy products have also increased. The worldwide exports of 
wind-powered electric generating sets has become more than twice in 2015 compared to 
2006.   
 
Figure 4. International trade of renewable energy products, 2006-2015. 





































Photosensitive semiconductor devices Wind-powered electric generating sets
 13 
 Increasing trade of renewable energy products has contributed to reducing the 
cost of renewable energy by dropping the prices of the products. The overall prices of 
crystalline silicon solar modules have decreased in recent years. The prices of the 
modules have declined to 1.0-2.2 USD/watt from 1.5-2.9 USD/watt (Figure 5). The price 
gap between the modules from Japan and Western countries and those from China and 
emerging economies shows that the solar modules from China and emerging economies 
have contributed to dropping the prices of solar modules in the U.S. and Europe. The 
prices of wind turbine have also decreased since 2009 (Figure 6). Since wind turbine 
manufacturers from emerging countries including China have expanded production 
capacity, the competition between manufacturers has led to downward pressure to prices 
of wind turbines in recent years.12   
 
Figure 5. Market prices of solar PV modules, 2009 Q4-2012 Q1. 
 
                                                        
12 Taylor, Michael, Kathleen Daniel, Andrei Ilas and Eun Young So. Renewable Power 
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Europe High efficiency c-Si
Europe Japanese/Western c-Si
Europe Chinese major c-Si
Europe Emerging economies c-Si
US High efficiency c-Si
US Japanese/Western c-Si
US Chinese major c-Si
US Emerging economies c-Si
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Source: Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series, Volume 1: Power Sector, 
Issue 4/5: Solar Photovoltaics, IRENA, June 2012.  
 
Figure 6. Wind turbine prices in Europe, 2004-2012. 
 
Source: Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series, Volume 1: Power Sector, 




 With the increase of international trade, global value chains have been created for 
main renewable energy products such as solar modules and wind turbines. The industries 
of renewable energy products have decoupled from installation. In other words, a country 
with large renewable energy installation capacity does not necessarily have a large 
renewable energy industry.  
 Table 3 shows this decoupling of industry from installation. The share of China in 
the solar PV capacity is 19%, while the aggregated market share of the five Chinese 
module manufacturers is 28%. On the other hand, some countries with high solar PV 
capacity, most of which are European countries, do not have even one of the top 10 solar 





















manufacturers are not exactly the top 10 countries in terms of wind power capacity. For 
instance, Denmark has Vestas, which has 12% of market share in wind turbine market, 




Table 3. Top 10 manufacturers in solar PV and wind power, 2015. 
a. Top 10 solar PV module manufacturers and top 10 countries in solar PV capacity 
Rank 












1 Trina 7 China 1 China 43.5 (19) 
2 JA Solar 7 China 2 Germany  39.7 (17) 






3 Japan 34.4 (15) 
4 Canadian Solar 5 Canada 4 USA 25.6 (11) 
5 First Solar 5 USA 5 Italy 18.9 (8) 
6 Jinko Solar 5 China 6 UK 9.1 (4)  
7 Yingli Green Energy 5 China 7 France 6.6 (3) 
8 Motech 4 Taiwan 8 Spain 5.4 (2) 
9 NeoSolar 4 Taiwan 9 India 5.2 (2) 
10 Suntech 4 China 10 Australia 5.1 (2) 
   Rest of companies 47    Rest of the world 77 (34) 
   Total 100    Total 227 (100%) 
 











1 Goldwind 13 China 1 China 145 (34) 
2 Vestas 12 Denmark 2 USA 74 (17) 
3 GE Wind 10 USA 3 Germany 45 (10) 
4 Siemens 8 Germany 4 India 25 (6) 
5 Gamesa 5 Spain 5 Spain 23 (5) 
6 Enercon 5 Germany 6 UK 14 (3) 
7 United Power 5 China 7 Canada 11 (3) 
8 Mingyang 4 China 8 France 10 (2) 
9 Envision 4 China 9 Italy 9 (2) 
10 CSIC 
Haizhuang 
3 China 10 Brazil 9 (2) 
Rest of companies 31  Rest of the world 68 (16) 
Total 100  Total 433 (100) 
Source: Renewable Energy World, “2015 Top Ten PV Cell Manufacturers”, 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2016/04/2015-top-ten-pv-cell-
manufacturers.html; Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st century, 
“Renewables 2016: Global Status Report” 
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 This globalization of renewable energy industry affects global renewable energy 
development in various ways. It brings the cost-down of renewable energy products since 
the global corporations could have an economy of scale by increasing manufacturing 
capacity according to the global demand or can move their manufacturing plants to other 
countries for cost-down. In terms of the effect on national policies, the global renewable 
energy corporations may be able to influence the policies in multiple countries. They may 
do it as an individual actor, or by collaborating with other multinational and domestic 
actors. Moreover, the rise of the global corporations may change the conditions of 
domestic renewable energy markets as well as those of the global renewable energy 
market. These aspects are considered as the aspects of the globalization of renewable 
energy industry in this research. 
 
Rise of diverse corporate actors and diversified interests 
 As the renewable energy industry has grown, many actors have entered into the 
industry. This has created and changed the value chain of renewable energy. Figure 7 
shows the solar PV value chain. Since many corporations have entered into the solar PV 
industry, the value chain has been created and developed. Some corporations are 
vertically integrated; they conduct most of the businesses in the value chain. For instance, 
many cell and module manufacturers have expanded to downstream business such as 
project development and engineering, procurement and construction recently. However, 
many other smaller corporations are specialized in one or two sectors of the value chain. 
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Figure 7. Solar PV value chain. 
 
  
 This diversity in solar businesses has led to the differences in perceptions of the 
external environment among solar corporations. Most notably, the external environment 
of upstream solar PV corporations is different from that of downstream solar PV 
corporations. For instance, transmission and interconnection rights, approvals and permits 
for building power plants are important parts of the external environment of the 
downstream corporation. However, these are not significant issues for the upstream 
corporations. In this sense, each corporation has different policy needs based on the type 
of solar business of it is involved in. Under these circumstances, the solar PV industry 
has become engaged in more policy issues as the value chain of solar PV has developed 
and expanded, addressing diversifying policy needs of each corporation. 
 Due to these diversified interests of solar corporations, some policy issues cause 
conflicts of interests even within solar PV industry. For instance, the tariff on Chinese 
solar panels in the U.S. caused debates between upstream and downstream solar PV 
corporations. Since the tariff would reduce the imports of low-priced Chinese solar 
panels, the upstream corporations were supportive for the introduction of the tariff. 
However, the reduction of Chinese solar panels was expected to harm the downstream 
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corporations by increasing overall cost of solar panels. This difference has caused the 
conflict of interests in the U.S. solar PV industry. 
 The development of the solar PV value chain has expanded and diversified solar 
PV industry’s interests and policy needs. Moreover, it also generated the conflicts of 
interests between corporations within solar PV industry. This has changed the 
interactions between industry and policies in renewable energy field. These changes of 
interactions are analyzed throughout this research.  
 
Global political economy and renewable energy  
 Renewable energy does not exist in a vacuum. In recent years, various 
international and domestic political factors have affected the development of renewable 
energy. The global financial crisis was one of the most influential events affecting 
renewable energy development. Rising exports of Chinese products has been another 
factor to affect renewable energy development.  
 In 2009, a year after the global financial crisis, global total final energy 
consumption was reduced by 1% compared to 2008, which was the first time reduction 
since 1981.13 However, this did not last long; it started increasing again in 2010. 
Moreover, this momentary reduction of energy consumption did not significantly affect 
the growth of renewable energy. The consumption of renewable energy sources has 
dramatically increased every year in the most recent ten years including the years of the 
global financial crisis. 
                                                        
13 International Energy Agency, “Statistics,” http://www.iea.org/statistics/ (accessed 
March 30, 2017) 
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 Discouraged energy investment caused by the global financial crisis has been a 
much more critical effect on renewable energy development. In 2009, energy investment 
dropped in most regions of the world. Many energy projects were slowed, postponed, or 
cancelled. The investment in renewable energy has slowed in 2008, and the spending for 
renewable energy in the first quarter of 2009 dropped by 42% compared to the first 
quarter of 2008.14 This dramatic drop was caused by the lack of project finances and the 
reduced economic incentives to invest in renewables due to low fossil fuel prices.15 
  Rising exports of Chinese products introduced increasing international trade 
conflicts in recent years. In particular, the conflicts between the United States and China 
became more significant as the U.S. trade deficit with China increased in recent decades. 
The gap between imports and exports in the U.S. with China has widened to $240 billion 
in 2009 from $112 billion in 2000.16 This has led to much debate on the imports from 
China in the United States. The report of the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics showed that the number of newspaper articles mentioning the U.S. trade 
deficit with China has dramatically increased in 2005-2007, and in 2010.17  
 Under these circumstances, the trade disputes between the U.S. and China have 
risen. By the end of 2016, 10 cases were submitted to the WTO by China with the U.S., 
                                                        
14 International Energy Agency, The Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis on 
Global Energy Investment, IEA Background paper for the G8 Energy Ministers’ Meeting, 
May 24-25, 2009. 
15 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, Paris: IEA. 2009. 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2009/WEO2009.pdf. 
16 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Jared C. Woollacott. Trade Disputes Between China and 
the United States: Growing Pains so Far, Worse Ahead? Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Working Paper Series, December 2010. 
17 Ibid., p48. 
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and 20 cases were submitted by the U.S. with China.18 The submission of disputes started 
increasing in 2007 (Figure 8). The U.S. submitted 1-3 disputes with China every year 
from 2007 to 2012. China also submitted disputes every year since 2007 till 2013 except 
the year of 2010. One of the drivers of these disputes was the increasing unemployment 
in the U.S., which has led the U.S. government to attempt to preserve American industry 
and jobs.  
 
Figure 8. WTO disputes between the U.S. and China, 2002-2016. 
 
Source: World Trade Organization 
 
 Renewable energy products were one of the goods that caused trade disputes 
between the U.S. and China. The dispute on Chinese solar products emerged in 2012, 
when several other trade disputes were ongoing between China and the U.S. The issue of 
solar products was discussed with the issues of other goods. Therefore, the overall trade 
                                                        
18 World Trade Organization, “Disputes by country/territory.” 
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conflict between the U.S. and China has affected how solar product trade issue was 
framed and was solved in both countries.     
 The global financial crisis and the rise of China in the global economy have 
changed the external environment of renewable energy development. The effects of the 
global financial crisis were mostly negative, but the effects of the rise of China were 
more complicated since the effects were different among actors as well as among 
countries. These complicated effects are discussed in each analysis of this research. 
 
Research design  
 Among renewable energy sources, this research focuses on solar PV. Solar PV is 
the most substantially growing field in renewable energy in recent years. With this 
growth, a global value chain was created since many solar PV corporations have 
expanded their business overseas. This led solar PV industry to be more globalized 
compared to the other renewable energy industries. To examine the case of the most 
globalized renewable energy industry enables to understand what will happen for the 
other renewable energy sources as the industries of them become globalized. 
 This research consists of three separate analyses (Table 4). Each analysis focuses 
on a different aspect of the globalization of renewable energy industry. Analysis 1 and 
Analysis 2 focuses on the effects of multinational renewable energy corporations on 
national policies as actors. Analysis 1 examines the behavior of multinational solar PV 
corporations to change national policies. Since multinational corporations have resources 
and capabilities to affect policies beyond their national boundaries, it is expected that 
they can be critical actors to affect national policies. Analysis 2 focuses on the political 
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interactions among multinational and domestic actors. While the first analysis examines 
the behavior of an actor, the second analysis investigates the interplay of actors to change 
a policy. Finally, Analysis 3 focuses on the change of market conditions by the 
globalization of renewable energy industry. It investigates how national renewable 
energy policies have actually changed under the changes of the global renewable energy 
market. 
 Analysis 1 answers: How have multinational renewable energy corporations 
affected national policies? The proposition is that multinational renewable energy 
corporations are more likely to engage in policymaking for favorable policies under the 
challenges of the global market. This proposition was developed based on the 
institutional theory, which will be reviewed in the Chapter 2. To answer this question, a 
content analysis of the 125 annual reports of the top 15 solar PV multinational 
corporations was conducted.  
 The research question of Analysis 2 is: How have diverse actors framed 
renewable energy trade issues? The proposition, which was also developed grounded in 
the institutional theory, is that the central domestic actors of a renewable energy field 
have framed renewable energy trade issues with a traditional environmental frame. The 
research method is a discourse network analysis. The articles from the seven U.S. 
newspapers on the U.S.-China solar panel trade were used as data. 
 Finally, Analysis 3 answers: What has caused the increasing divesity in national 
renewable energy policies? The proposition is that the growth of domestic renewable 
energy industries has caused the diversification of national renewable energy policies as 
renewable energy industries have become globalized. This is grounded in the theory of 
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policy convergence, which will be reviewed in Chapter 2. The research method is a case 
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Case Study Method 
 The details of the methods of Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 are described in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4, respectively. Since the results of the Analysis 3 are described from 
Chapter 5 to Chapter 7, the overview of the case study method is illustrated in this 
section.  
 The independent variable of the case study is the growth of solar PV industry and 
the dependent variable is the change of national solar PV policies. The study identifies a 
causal chain that links the independent variable with the dependent variable. National 
solar PV policies include all the national level policies related to solar PV such as tariffs 
and industrial policies as well as the traditional support and market-based renewable 
energy policies. Globalization of solar PV industry is an intervening variable governing 
the mechanism of interactions between solar PV industry and the policies. 
 To reveal the causal chain between solar PV industry and policies, process-tracing 
method is used. The process-tracing method is to “identify the intervening causal 
process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable and 
the outcome of the dependent variable”.19 Process-tracing can identify whether a potential 
causal variable can be ruled out in non-perfectly matched cases. Since this research 
investigates countries, which cannot be perfectly matched cases due to each country’s 
specific political, economic, and social contexts, the method of controlled comparison, 
which requires the cases similar in every aspect but one, cannot be used. Moreover, by 
examining causal paths, it enables researchers to address the issue of equifinality, which 
                                                        
19 George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
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means different causal paths that lead to a similar outcome. As this research deals with 
complicated relations between industry and policy within political and economic 
contexts, process-tracing can help to reduce the threats to internal validity.  
 Explanation building of cases by using process-tracing requires hypothesized 
intervening steps. Figure 9 shows the hypothesized causal chain. This hypothesized 
causal chain is modified repetitively during the research process to better explain cases.  
 




 Two countries are selected as cases: the United States and South Korea. It is hard 
for a single case study to be compelling because each country exists in its unique 
contexts. Therefore, two-case studies are chosen for this research. The pool of cases was 
limited to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member countries to control the effects of the lack of institutional infrastructure. Among 
these 33 countries, six countries that have multinational solar manufacturers were 
Solar PV industry grows 
Solar PV market conditions are 
changed 
Globalization of solar PV 
industry 
Industry pursues change 





selected (Table 5). Having multinational solar manufacturers means that the countries 
have developed solar PV industry. Since the independent variable of this research is the 
growth of solar PV industry, the cases were limited in the countries with developed solar 
PV industry. Those countries were divided into two groups: the countries with a big 
domestic market and the countries with a small domestic market. The U.S., Japan, and 
Germany are in the big domestic market group since each country is one of the top 10 
countries in terms of solar capacity.20 South Korea, Norway, and Canada are in the small 
domestic market group. One country was selected from each group. The size of domestic 
market was used as a criterion since it is expected to influence the degree of effect of 
globalization of solar PV industry. For the country with a small domestic market, 
globalization of the industry would more significantly influence the domestic industry 
and policies compared to the country with a large domestic market. Finally, the U.S. and 
South Korea were selected as cases considering the feasibility of data collection. 
 
Table 5. Case selection. 





Big U.S., Germany, Japan 
Australia, France, Italy, Spain, 
UK 
Small 
South Korea, Norway, 
Canada 
Austria, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, 
Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherland, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey 
 
                                                        




 Table 6 shows the differences between the U.S. and South Korea. In terms of the 
size of economy, the U.S. economy is more than ten times of that of South Korea, but the 
size of high-technology exports is similar. This shows that the economy of South Korea 
is more export-driven. Renewable energy is more developed in the U.S. than South 
Korea; the share of renewables in primary energy is 6.9% in the U.S, and 1.5% in South 
Korea. The investments in renewables of South Korea are only about 2% of the 
investments of the U.S. 
 The technical potential of solar PV is much higher in the U.S. than in South 
Korea. This shows that the potential growth of domestic market would be much bigger in 
the U.S. In South Korea, insufficient potential of solar PV has been pointed out as one of 
the barriers of solar PV development. Under these circumstances, the solar PV industry in 
South Korea has focused on manufacturing and exporting of solar PV products such as 
polysilicon, cell, module, components and equipment. As a result, in South Korea, 61% 
of the solar PV corporations are manufacturers, while it is only 21% in the U.S. Small 
domestic market and advanced manufacturing have driven Korean solar PV industry to 
export most of their products. In 2014, South Korea exported $2.3 billion, which was 
similar size of the solar PV exports of the U.S. Given that the electricity generation from 
solar PV in South Korea is only 12% of that in the U.S., the statistics of export shows that 
Korean solar PV industry is much more export-driven than the U.S. 
  
 30 
Table 6. Economics, energy, and solar PV in the U.S. and South Korea. 
 United States South Korea 
Economics  
a 
GDP (billion USD, 2015) 17,947 1,378 
GDP per capita (USD, 2015) 55,837 27,222 
Export of goods and services  
(% of GDP, 2015) 
12.6 45.9 
High-technology exports  
(billion USD, 2014) 
155 133 
R&D Expenditure  
(% of GDP, 2013) 
2.73 4.15 
Energy 
Total primary energy supply 
(Mtoe, 2014) b 
2,216 268 
Share of renewables (% in 
TPES, 2014) b 
6.9 1.5 
Investment in renewable 
energy (billion USD, 2014) c 
37 7.7 
Solar PV 
Electricity Production from 
Solar PV (GWh, 2014) b 
21,915 2,557 
The Share of Solar PV in 
Electricity Generation (%) b 
4 18 
Technical Potential (TWh) d 283,600 2,341 
Solar PV 
Industry 
Multinational PV module 
manufacturer 
Yes Yes 
The share of manufacturers in 
solar PV companies (%)e 
21% 61% 
Solar PV Exports (billion 












Others Imposition of 
tariffs on Chinese 





a Source: The World Bank, “World Bank Open Data”, http://data.worldbank.org 
b Source: IEA, 2016 Renewables Information 
c Source: REN21, Renewables 2016: Global Status Report; New and Renewable Energy 
Korea, https://www.renewableenergy.or.kr/main.do 
d Source: White Paper on New and Renewable Energy, 2012; Lopez et al. (2012).  
e Membership data of the U.S. Solar Energy Industries Association and Korea 
Photovoltaic Industry Association 




Contributions and policy implication 
 This research contributes to the literature on trade and the environment by 
analyzing a new phenomenon, the recent rise of trade and industrial policies on 
renewable energy, which conflict with the original goal of traditional renewable energy 
policies. Previous research provides good understanding of current growth of renewable 
energy installation and expanding traditional renewable energy policies in many 
countries, but it is limited in explaining countries’ increasing adoption of protectionist 
measures on renewable energy. The research also contributes to the literature on 
protectionism. Despite the concern on the rise of murky type of protectionism after the 
global financial crisis, its contexts have been less understood. This research complements 
the literature by analyzing a case of one of the forms of murky protectionism.  
 Other than these contributions, each analysis of this research makes additional 
contributions. Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 provide better understanding to the literature on 
institutional change by showing the interactions between multinational corporations and 
national policies, and by studying collaborative actions of multinational actors in an issue 
field. Analysis 3 suggests a model on the diversification of national policies under a 
globalized industry, which provides implications on the theory of policy convergence. 
 The findings of this research provide implications to the policymakers who design 
renewable energy policies. Unlike the past, it is difficult to predict the result of a 
renewable energy policy because diverse domestic and international factors affect the 
policy. Understanding these factors will be the first step to design an effective renewable 
energy policy. The findings of this work would be beneficial from this perspective. 
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Moreover, based on the understanding of the contexts of globalized renewable energy 
industry, the research contributes to suggestions about the direction of national or 
international renewable energy policy. 
 
Organization of the book 
 Chapter 2 reviews the literature on trade and the environment and the theories 
used for each analysis. Chapter 3 describes the findings of Analysis 1, which examines 
how solar PV multinational corporations have affected national policies. In Chapter 4, the 
result of Analysis 2, which investigates the political interactions regarding solar PV trade 
issue, is presented. Chapter 5 through Chapter 7 describes the result of Analysis 3. 
Chapter 5 explores the policy changes in the U.S, and Chapter 6 describes the changes in 
South Korea. Chapter 7 analyzes the mechanism of policy change by synthesizing two 
cases. Chapter 8 evaluates the propositions, and concludes with contributions and policy 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 2. Literature review 
 This chapter reviews the literature on trade and the environment, and the theories 
used for the three analyses of this research. Overall, this research aims to provide better 
understanding to the literature of trade and the environment, but each analysis uses 
different theories to answer the question of each analysis. Analysis 1 and 2 are grounded 
in institutional theory; Analysis 1 is based on the literature of multinational corporations’ 
co-evolution with institutions, and Analysis 2 is based on the concept of an issue field. 
Analysis 3 is based on the literature on globalization and policy convergence.   
 
Trade and the environment 
 The relations between trade and the environment have been an interest of many 
scholars. Many hypotheses have developed to explain the relations, and empirical studies 
have conducted to test them. There is no consistency on the effect of trade on the 
environment among these studies. Some studies showed positive effects of international 
trade, but the others revealed negative effects.  
 One of the most well-known hypothesis suggesting positive effects of trade on the 
environment is environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis. Grossman and Kreuger 
found that economic growth eventually brought an improvement of environmental quality 
after an initial phase of environmental degradation.21 They suggested three effects of 
economic growth on the environment: the scale effect, the technique effect, and the 
                                                        
21 Grossman, Gene M., and Alan B. Krueger. Environmental Impacts of a North 
American Free Trade Agreement. No. w3914. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1991. 
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composition effect. The scale effect is the increase of pollutants by the growing economic 
activities. The technique effect is the changes of technologies for production. Trade 
liberalization generates the technique effect by boosting the introduction of new 
technologies from foreign producers and by encouraging stricter environmental 
regulations under increased income level. Finally, the composition effect refers to the 
changes of composition of the economy as countries specialize in certain activities under 
trade liberalization. Grossman and Kreuger suggested that lowered trade barrier influence 
the environment by increasing these three effects. In the initial period, the scale effect 
outweighs the other two effects, but over time, the other two effects offset the scale 
effect.  
 The technique effect has been pointed out as a critical factor to offset the scale 
effect. Stern found that technical change was one of the main factors offsetting the scale 
effect through developing a decomposition model using sulfur emissions data.22 
Copeland and Taylor showed that the technique effect could reduce pollutants by more 
than the increase of pollutants by the scale effect.23 Based on these results, they suggest 
that economic growth with environmentally friendly technologies could even improve the 
environment. Bruvolle and Medin also showed that technologies played a significant role 
to reduce the increase of emissions caused by the scale effect.24   
                                                        
22 Stern, David I. "Explaining changes in global sulfur emissions: an econometric 
decomposition approach." Ecological Economics 42, no. 1 (2002): 201-220. 
23 Copeland, Brian R., and M. Scott Taylor. Trade and the environment: Theory and 
evidence. Princeton University Press, 2003. 
24 Bruvoll, Annegrete, and Hege Medin. "Factors behind the environmental Kuznets 
curve. A decomposition of the changes in air pollution." Environmental and Resource 
Economics 24, no. 1 (2003): 27-48. 
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 Openness to international trade drives faster technology diffusion.25 Frankel and 
Rose suggested the gains-from-trade hypothesis, which refers to the positive effect of the 
openness to trade.26 They proposed three possible effects. First, trade can trigger 
technological innovations. Trade speed up the adoption of advanced technologies and 
best practices.27 Second, as the public awareness of environmental issues increase, the 
environmental standards go higher. Third, multinational corporations diffuse clean 
technologies from advanced countries. 
 Empirical studies on the composition effect have mixed results, while a majority 
of the studies on the technique effect showed positive effects of it. The composition 
effect is generated since the industrialized countries tend to move to light manufacturing 
from heavy manufacturing, while industrializing countries focus on heavy manufacturing. 
Suri and Chapman examined these changes by modeling the imports and the exports of 
manufactured goods with the EKC model. They found that the exports were positively 
associated with energy use, while the imports were negatively associated.28 This 
composition effect was criticized by the claim that manufacturing activities may be 
shifted to South from North.29 In this case, the composition effect has not contributed to 
the improvement of the environment.  
                                                        
25 Reppelin-Hill, Valerie. "Trade and environment: An empirical analysis of the 
technology effect in the steel industry." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 38, no. 3 (1999): 283-301. 
26 Frankel, Jeffrey A., and Andrew K. Rose. "Is trade good or bad for the environment? 
Sorting out the causality." Review of Economics and Statistics 87, no. 1 (2005): 85-91. 
27 Frankel, Jeffrey A. "Environmental Effects of International Trade." HKS Faculty 
Research Working Paper Series RWP09-006 (2009). 
28 Suri, Vivek, and Duane Chapman. "Economic growth, trade and energy: implications 
for the environmental Kuznets curve." Ecological Economics 25, no. 2 (1998): 195-208. 
29 Stern, David I. "Progress on the environmental Kuznets curve?." Environment and 
Development Economics 3, no. 02 (1998): 173-196. 
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 Pollution haven hypothesis is connected to the criticism to the composition effect. 
It states that the differences of environmental regulations between countries lead the shift 
of pollution-intensive manufacturing from developed to developing countries.30 Since 
Pethig modeled that the country with weak environmental policy would export polluting 
goods, many studies examined if pollution haven exists.31 The results of these studies are 
not consistent. Some empirical studies found an evidence of pollution haven, while many 
other studies did not find any evidence or found counter evidence.32  
 Pollution haven hypothesis infers race to the bottom theory, which refers to the 
downward pressure of the stringency of environmental regulations to attract foreign 
investments. On the other hand, there is a hypothesis of the opposite direction, which is 
called the race to the top. Regulatory competition tends to lead more stringent 
environmental regulations rather than weaker regulations. Vogel suggested that trade may 
generate upward pressure of regulations when countries’ export markets have stringent 
                                                        
30 Cole, Matthew A. "Trade, the pollution haven hypothesis and the environmental 
Kuznets curve: examining the linkages." Ecological Economics 48, no. 1 (2004): 71-81. 
31 Pethig, Rüdiger. "Pollution, welfare, and environmental policy in the theory of 
comparative advantage." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2, no. 3 
(1976): 160-169. 
32 Eskeland, Gunnar S., and Ann E. Harrison. "Moving to greener pastures? 
Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis." Journal of Development Economics 
70, no. 1 (2003): 1-23.; Cole, Matthew A. "Trade, the pollution haven hypothesis and the 
environmental Kuznets curve: examining the linkages." Ecological economics 48, no. 1 
(2004): 71-81.; Millimet, Daniel L., and Jayjit Roy. "Empirical tests of the pollution 
haven hypothesis when environmental regulation is endogenous." Journal of Applied 
Econometrics (2015).; Dong, Baomin, Jiong Gong, and Xin Zhao. "FDI and 
environmental regulation: pollution haven or a race to the top?." Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 41, no. 2 (2012): 216-237.; Kearsley, Aaron, and Mary Riddel. "A further 
inquiry into the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the Environmental Kuznets Curve." 
Ecological Economics 69, no. 4 (2010): 905-919. 
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regulations.33 Empirical studies show little evidence of the race to the bottom.34 Rather, 
their result supported the pressure for the race to the top.35  
 Previous literature on trade and the environment do not agree on any specific 
direction of effect of international trade on the environment. Trade can improve the 
environment by driving technology innovation and the change of industrial structure, and 
by ratcheting up the stringency of environmental regulations. On the other hand, trade 
can harm the environment by increasing the scale of pollution, transferring polluting 
industry from developed to developing countries, and driving downward pressure of 
environmental regulations.  
 The rise of renewable energy suggests the positive side of international trade. 
Increasing international trade of renewable energy products have generated technology 
innovations, which enabled dramatic cost-down of some products. Moreover, increasing 
number of countries adopting renewable energy policies support the race to the top rather 
than the race to the bottom. However, the other side of renewable energy trade, the rise of 
protectionist policies, needs different perspective since it is not well understood by trade 
and the environment literature.  
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 Esty pointed out that domestic environmental regulations could act as nontariff 
barriers by using an example of the tuna-dolphin case.36 The U.S. banned tuna imports 
from Mexico since the fishing methods in Mexico did not meet the standards to protect 
dolphins. In 1991, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) declared that the 
U.S. violated GATT rules for imposing the ban. He suggested that new issues like 
climate change would increase the conflicts between domestic regulations and trade rules. 
 Renewable energy protectionism seems similar with the tuna-dolphin case, but it 
is different in that domestic trade and industrial policies conflict with the trade of 
environmental goods. In other words, the conflict in the past was environmental 
regulation versus trade policy, but the current conflict is trade/industrial policy versus the 
trade of environmental goods. The current phenomenon is less transparent and more 
complicated compared to the past conflicts between domestic regulations and trade. 
 
The rise of “murky” protectionism and green protectionism 
 Although the global financial crisis in 2007 has generated much concern on the 
rise of protectionism, no significant increase of protectionist measures was observed in 
recent years.37 Countries attempted to use trade policies to address the crisis but it was 
not very substantial compared to the degree before the crisis. The opposite direction of 
actions was also observed. Many countries reduced the degree of protection selectively 
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for some products. Governments’ use of trade policies has become heterogeneous since 
they use both restricting and liberalizing trade policies in recent years.38      
 Some argued that governments used more “murky” form of protectionist 
measures to fight against the crisis, while they did not use more traditional trade policies. 
Murky form of protectionism refers to “abuses of legitimate discretion which are used to 
discriminate against foreign goods, companies, workers and investors.” 39 This is murky 
since it is not clearly against the WTO rules. Environmental and health regulations, 
stimulus package, or license requirements can be used as this murky protectionist 
measures by providing favor to domestic products.  
 A few empirical studies show the evidence of murky protectionism. According to 
the analysis of the Global Trade Alert, less than half of the protectionist measures were 
the traditional instruments such as tariffs and anti-dumping measures after the global 
financial crisis.40 A majority of the other protectionist measures were less transparent 
instruments. Aggawal and Evenett found that the countries with more policies 
discriminating foreign interests tended to use more policies covered by weak or no WTO 
rule by investigating all state intervention in seven major economies for three years after 
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the global financial crisis.41 This suggests that WTO rules are hard to constrain 
governments’ use of protectionist measures.  
 Green protectionism is one of the forms of murky protectionism. It refers to the 
cases of governments to justify the protectionist measures by using environmental 
concerns. These policies seem like environmental policies but are driven by the desire to 
promote domestic industry against foreign competitors. As an example of green 
protectionism, Evenett and Walley took national stimulus packages on “green” 
spending.42  The U.S. stimulus legislation included funding for advanced battery systems, 
which can benefit only the U.S. manufacturers. Government procurement of 
environmental goods from domestic providers can be argued as an example of green 
protectionism. Erixon suggested that new sustainability criteria for biofuel production 
would be used to protect local producers from foreign competitors in Europe, which 
would be one of the forms of green protectionism.43 
 As for renewable energy, both the traditional protectionist measures and murky 
protectionist measures have observed in recent years. China’s industrial policies to 
promote renewable energy have led trade frictions with the U.S. and Europe.44 The U.S. 
imposed tariffs on the solar modules from China, and the EU implemented minimum 
price and a quota policy to protect domestic industry from China’s “unfair” trade 
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practices. A number of countries have introduced domestic content requirements, which 
require renewable energy developers to use domestically-produced facilities.  
 Lewis argues that renewable energy protectionism has caused by inherent 
conflicts between renewable energy support and the global trade regime.45 Since 
economic rationale was necessary to have political supports for renewable energy 
policies, especially after the global financial crisis, countries use protectionist measures 
to promote domestic renewable energy manufacturing. The environmental rational of 
these industrial policies was not enough to be justified under the global trade rules. 
Therefore, the policies have led conflicts with international trade rules.  
 Previous research showed that green protectionism has risen after the global 
financial crisis. However, it is less understood why green protectionism has increased in 
recent years although environmental policies and renewable energy policies have been 
implemented in several decades. Lewis suggested fundamental conflicts between 
renewable policies and trade rules, but many traditional renewable energy policies have 
been implemented to create demand of renewable energy sources rather than to directly 
support industry. The increase of protectionist policies is a recent trend. The cause of this 
current trend needs to be investigated to better understand the mechanism of green 
protectionism. 
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Institutional theory and institutional change: Theoretical framework for Analysis 1 and 
Analysis 2 
 Institutional theory suggests that organizational actions are the choices among 
limited options, which are determined by specific environmental conditions rather than a 
pure rational choice of the organization. In other words, organizational choices are 
shaped by institutional environments around an organization, which is called an 
organizational field. An organizational field is defined as “organizations in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar service or 
products”.46 Organizational fields are the areas for institutional life; organizations “gather 
and frame their actions vis-a-vis one another”.47   
 Central to institutional theory is the preference for certainty of organizations.48 
Organizations attempt to avoid uncertainty for their survival, which is the goal of their 
organizational actions.49 As the goal is survival rather than profit maximization, internal 
elements of organizations are legitimated by external factors than in terms of efficiency.50 
For organizations, one of the ways to avoid uncertainty is to imitate other organizations 
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that are successful or legitimate. For this reason, the greater the uncertainty of a field, the 
greater institutional isomorphism among organizations. 
 The notion of isomorphism in institutional theory is criticized due to its failure to 
explain institutional change.51 Although most firms imitate successful firms’ behaviors, 
some firms behave differently from other firms, or they attempt to change existing 
institutions. Lack of explanations for endogenous institutional changes have been 
regarded as core weakness of institutional theory.  
 “Old” institutionalism was reintroduced for some research to address this gap.52 
Old institutionalism focuses on conflicts of interests, institutional changes, and focal 
organizations, while “new” institutionalism is interested in homogeneity, persistence, and 
fields. Hoffman showed how organizational fields and institutions “coevolve” by using 
the concept of change in old institutionalism; although the options of individual actions 
are limited by organizational fields, these options evolve with the fields.53 Greenwood 
and Hinings examined the responses of organizations to institutional pressures as a 
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function of internal dynamics of organizations including interests, values, power 
dependencies and capacities.54  
 A line of studies focuses on the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” to 
address institutional change. Institutional entrepreneurs are actors who envision new 
institutions or transform existing institutions.55 As the concept focuses on the actors, it 
easily overemphasizes the heroic behaviors of specific actors, which result in ignoring 
institutional pressures on those actors. To address this weakness, Battilana, Leca, and 
Boxenbaum suggested two enabling conditions for institutional entrepreneurship: field 
characteristics, and actor’s social position.56 Field characteristics include jolts and crises, 
heterogeneity of institutional arrangements, and the degree of institutionalization. Jolts 
and crises such as regulatory change, economic and political crises, and social upheaval 
encourage the introduction of new ideas by disturbing field-level consensus.57 
Heterogeneity could be enabling conditions, since they are likely to increase internal 
conflicts. Seo and Creed also suggested that institutional contradictions such as efficiency 
gaps, nonadaptability, interinstitutional incompatibility, and misaligned interests increase 
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the likelihood of human praxis for institutional change.58 Lower level of 
institutionalization encourages the actions of institutional entrepreneurs since it increases 
uncertainty. Under increasing uncertainty, firms tend to find institutional solution since 
they are not able to solve problems under existing conditions.59   
 Under these enabling conditions, institutional entrepreneurs initiate divergent 
institutional changes. The activities of institutional entrepreneurs can be divided into two 
categories of creating a vision for change, and mobilizing actors.60 First, institutional 
entrepreneurs develop and provide a vision for change to appeal audience. Greenwood 
and colleagues suggested “theorization” as a key stage of institutional change, which 
include framing current problems and justifying solutions.61 Maguire and colleagues 
found empirical evidence of theorization in emerging fields; they showed that 
institutional entrepreneurs theorize new practices by organizing diverse arguments that 
address different interests in the fields.62 A new logic that best suit actors’ interests can be 
a powerful tool of institutional change for institutional entrepreneurs.63  
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 Institutional entrepreneurs motivate cooperation and mobilize alliance by using 
political tactics and strategies. Fields are alignments of forces, and the tensions between 
them provide rooms for strategic agency.64 From this perspective, institutional 
entrepreneurs are strategic actors rather than dominant actors with much resource. 
Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips suggested interorganizational collaboration can initiate 
institutional changes even with a lack of resources and power.65 Institutional 
entrepreneurs are embedded in fields; thus, their strategies are influenced by field 
characteristics and other actors. 
 The studies on institutional change have focused on the interactions between 
institutions and actors. Regulatory capture theory has more focused on the effect of 
private interests on regulations rather than interactions between them. Since the interest 
of this research is the effect of industry on national policies, it would be benefitted from 
reviewing the literature on regulatory capture. 
 
Regulatory capture 
 Broadly, regulatory capture is the process that special interests influence state 
intervention.66 Regulatory capture is possible because special interests, especially firms, 
have private information that is not shared with political representatives and citizens. The 
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type of regulation capture can be various including a direct subsidy, controlling over 
entry by new rivals, controlling substitutes and complements, and price-fixing.67 This can 
be costly to society. For instance, the costs of the rents caused by “political” firms ranged 
from 0.3 to 1.9 of the GDP in Pakistan.68  
 Stigler showed that regulation is acquired by an industry and is operated for its 
benefits by using several cases.69 The statistical analysis of the pattern of weight limits on 
trucks has influenced by the agricultural interests, railroads, and the public concerns. He 
also showed that the licensed occupations have higher incomes and the membership of 
the licensed occupation is more stable.  
 To explain interest group politics, Laffont and Tirole suggested a three-tier 
hierarchy model with firm, agency, and the Congress.70 The model showed that the 
agency’s discretion to determine the level of regulation was reduced when interest groups 
were better organized. The characteristic of regulations has an effect on the political 
power of interest groups. An interest group has more political power if its interest is in 
inefficient rather than efficient regulation, since the agency’s discretion is for hiding 
information from Congress, and this asymmetry makes regulation less efficient.   
 Regulatory capture happens in multiple ways. Etzioni categorized the types of 
regulatory capture and showed the evidence of each type of regulatory capture in the real 
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world.71 Special interests involve in drafting legislation, but even if a regulation has 
already drafted, special interests still dilute and weaken the regulation. They are also able 
to weaken the enforcement of a regulation without changing the regulation. With the 
decreasing public concern, special interests can affect repealing a regulation. Sometimes, 
they switch regulators if they could not affect existing regulations. Special interests also 
involve in setting rates and prices, which are higher than the market sets. To prevent 
these engagements, Etzioni suggests restricting the role of private money in public life. 
According to him, legislators are dependent on special interests due to funds. Thus, 
reforming campaign-finance law would be helpful to reduce regulatory capture.  
 Previous studies on regulatory capture focused on the relationship between the 
regulatory authority and interest groups. They tend to focus on the game between 
government and firms. Although the theory of regulatory capture well explains the effects 
of interest groups on governmental policy, it is limited in showing the political contexts 
of policymaking. In this sense, Spiller and Tommasi pointed out the importance of 
institutional environment for the behaviors of actors in policymakings.72 They suggested 
several conditions for cooperation for a stable and flexible policy. The conditions include 
small number of key actors, strong intertemporal linkage between the actors, observable 
political moves. This shows that regulations are difficult to be understood as a pure game 
of government and firm.  
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Embeddedness of multinational corporations 
 
 Current globalization of industries is raising doubts on the concept of an 
organizational field. A number of studies have suggested that an organizational field 
operates in different ways for multinational corporations (MNCs). Although 
neoinstitutional models consider endogenous changes by adopting the institutional 
entrepreneurship, they still focus on external institutional pressures, which come from 
fields. As MNCs operate across diverse national institutions and are consist of multiple 
subsidiary units, organizational fields of MNCs are hard to be defined. In other words, 
the institutional environments of them are multiple, fragmented, and conflicting each 
other rather than granted and static fields.73 Therefore, institutional pressures for MNCs 
are weak and diverse. Under multiple institutional environments, MNCs select to what 
extent they will be embedded in the environments in which they operate.74 
 In this sense, for MNCs, social environments are evolving rule system, which are 
“products of a continuous process of sensemaking, enactment, and negotiated political 
interactions”.75 Legitimacy is constructed by political processes, and power plays an 
important role in the dynamics of institutions. Powerful business and financial 
organizations can change the relationship between institutions and organizations. These 
organizations can “reverse-legitimate” institutions like institutions legitimate 
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organizations.76 In this vein, isomorphism does not help MNCs to be legitimate. MNCs 
become less homogeneous under the activities for legitimacy. 
 Focusing on the active agency of MNCs, Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan suggest 
a framework for the co-evolution of MNCs and institutions.77 They argue that new 
institutions are necessary to reduce the rising importance of “non-ergodic” uncertainty. 
According to North, the newly created institutions for reducing uncertainty of physical 
environment have generated a new set of uncertainties in human environment, although 
they reduce uncertainty of physical environment.78 For instance, the development of 
technologies has enhanced the well-being in many countries, it has generated different 
types of uncertainty by global interconnectedness. Under this new set of uncertainties, it 
is not possible to predict future based on the past. In this vein, optimal institutions are 
difficult to be lasted as environmental changes over time make those institutions be far 
from optimal. Therefore, the uncertainties that firms face now are different from those 
they faced in the past 
 According to Cantwell and colleagues, firms’ response can be categorized into 
three: institutional avoidance, institutional adaptation, and institutional co-evolution. 
Institutional avoidance is that MNCs select between given institutional environments. 
For instance, under weak institutions and poor regulations, a firm can decide to exit. The 
second type, institutional adaptation, is to adjust the MNCs’ structure to fit with 
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institutional environments. In the third type of institutional co-evolution, firms affect 
institutional environments. Co-evolution includes various efforts of firms such as 
transmission of home-country practices into other subsidiaries, and affecting institutional 
changes at the national, and supra-national levels. Under non-ergodic uncertainty, co-
evolution is more likely than adaptation or avoidance. As it is impossible to predict future 
based on the past trends, diverse experimentation is the way to address the uncertainty 
that firms face. In this sense, Cantwell and colleagues suggest that MNCs evolve more 
locally responsive, yet internationally connected governance structures.  
  
 Although co-evolution is a promising concept to explain the mechanism of 
institutional change by MNCs, the concept needs to be elaborated, as there are many 
unanswered questions such as which institutional environments MNCs change. In this 
sense, an empirical study showing the pattern of co-evolution is expected to contribute to 
elaborate it. Among the unanswered questions on co-evolution, this research focuses on 
the MNCs’ effect on national policies. In line with the literature on co-evolution, 
Proposition 1 is suggested:  
 
Proposition 1.  Multinational renewable energy corporations are more likely to engage in 
policymaking for favorable policies under the challenges of the global market. 
 
Issue fields for change 
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 Since the concept of an organizational field has not been very clear, a recent study 
suggested a systematic classification of organizational fields.79 They recommended using 
two different types of fields: exchange field and issue field. Exchange fields refer to the 
fields including a class of actors, which are alike in some respect, and their exchange 
partners. It is consistent with the traditional concept of an organizational field. Issue 
fields comprise of actors from multiple exchange fields, which participate in the fields to 
affect a specific issue. Zietsma and colleagues suggested the necessity of considering 
issue fields differently from exchange fields because the effects of issue fields on 
institutional process are different from those of exchange fields.  
   Hoffman suggested the initial idea of issue fields by arguing that organizational 
fields form around a central issue rather than a technology or market.80 His study 
empirically showed that issue field is “the center of common channels of dialogue,” 
where organizations interpret and negotiate issue.  O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer advanced 
Hoffman’s concept of issue field and suggested a theory of issue field structuration.81 
Through the case analysis of commercial banks’ environmental and social risk 
management guidelines, they suggested that issue fields evolve based on the 
infrastructure of matured exchange fields that the actors of issue fields are in. Their 
model consists of three phases. First, the central actors of existing field enlist the logic of 
the field relevant the issue and reconstruct it to serve the logic of challengers. Second, the 
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central actors use their networks and channels to diffuse the reconstructed logic. Finally, 
issue field is shaped clearly with more participants and interactions between them. 
 The model of O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer emphasized the role of central actors from 
existing exchange fields. On the other hand, Van Wijk and colleagues suggested that 
collaboration between incumbents and independent activists change organizational fields 
under challenge.82 Through the case study of sustainable tourism, they contended that the 
multiple actors shape social structure that they can co-create, and this “confluence of 
cultural and relational structuration” generates a tipping point for change. The actors’ 
agency for field changes has showed inconsistent results even in the studies of exchange 
fields. Some studies suggested that changes are initiated by low status organizations, 
while other studies found that high-status organizations initiated institutional changes.83 
 In an issue field, the other difficulty to find out who leads field change is that it is 
not clear who are central actors since actors are from multiple fields. Moreover, the 
competition in an issue field can influence the hierarchies of related exchange fields. In 
this case, the hierarchies of exchange fields become less clear. Thus, it is harder to find 
out the power relations in an issue field as well as exchange fields.  
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 The review of literature on issue fields shows that the relations of actors to change 
an issue field are not well understood. Using a network analysis can provide better 
understanding to power relations of the actors in an issue field by showing both 
competition and collaboration between actors in a quantitative way. By conducting a 
network analysis, Analysis 2 evaluates Proposition 2, which is suggested in line with 
O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer’s model. 
 
Proposition 2. The central domestic actors of a renewable energy field have framed 
renewable energy trade issues with a traditional environmental frame. 
 
Globalization and policy convergence: Theoretical framework for Analysis 3 
 Policy convergence refers to “the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the 
form of increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances”84 Many scholars 
have studied if and how globalization leads the convergence of national policies in 
diverse policy areas. These studies show inconsistent results depending on the studied 
regions, periods, and policy areas.85  
 Jänicke was one of the early scholars suggesting the effect of international 
interdependence on policy convergence.86 The role of international mechanism such as 
the United Nations and European Community has been pointed out in expanding the 
                                                        
84 Drezner, Daniel W. "Globalization and policy convergence." International studies 
review 3, no. 1 (2001): 53-78. 
85 Heichel, Stephan, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer. "Is there convergence in 
convergence research? An overview of empirical studies on policy convergence." Journal 
of European public policy 12, no. 5 (2005): 817-840. 
86 Jänicke, Martin. "Conditions for environmental policy success: an international 
comparison." Environmentalist 12, no. 1 (1992): 47-58. 
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implementation of environmental protection policies. Through the case studies of five 
environmental policy innovations, Kern and colleagues tried to find the mechanism of 
cross-national policy convergence.87 They identified a number of explanatory factors for 
policy diffusion including national factors and international dynamics. According to their 
study, increasing number of international organizations and transnational networks were 
important for policy diffusion.  
 Busch and Jorgens broadened these studies by suggesting three mechanisms of 
cross-country policy convergence.88 First, countries may modify their policies to comply 
international agreements or laws. The other mechanism is to be coerced by other nations 
to implement a specific policy. Finally, countries voluntarily adopt a policy by 
communicating through international system. These three mechanisms simultaneously 
influence the process of policy convergence. They suggested that a holistic view on 
policy change was necessary rather than selecting one particular cause of policy 
convergence.  
 Many studies suggested that domestic factors have affected policy change as well 
as international factors. Domestic factors work as “filters” of globalization pressure.89 
Kern and colleagues suggested that national capacity for action is important for policy 
                                                        
87 Kern, Kristine, Helge Jörgens, and Martin Jänicke. "The diffusion of environmental 
policy innovations: a contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy." WZB 
Discussion Paper, No. FS II 01-302 (2001). 
88 Busch, Per Olof, and Helge Jörgens. "International patterns of environmental policy 
change and convergence." Environmental Policy and Governance 15, no. 2 (2005): 80-
101. 
89 Heichel, Stephan, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer. "Is there convergence in 
convergence research? An overview of empirical studies on policy convergence." Journal 
of European Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005): 817-840. 
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diffusion.90 In this reason, advanced industrialized countries tend to be the front-runner 
countries in policy innovation. The demand for policy innovation was another national 
factor affecting policy diffusion. Their case studies showed that this was an important 
factor for diverse environmental policies in Europe. Some studies show that national 
factors caused a lack of convergence. Howlett did not find any evidence of convergence 
in environmental policies in Canada and the U.S., and suggested that this was because the 
difference of institutional and constitutional structure.91 Harrison argued that competing 
domestic interests and institutional contexts can lead policy “divergence” through the 
study of policy responses to dioxin effluents in Canada, the U.S., and Sweden.92  
 Through the review of literature on policy convergence, Holzinger and colleagues 
suggested five central factors of policy convergence.93 First, independent responses of 
different countries under the parallel environmental problems result in policy 
convergence. Although countries respond to the problems independently, similar 
environmental problems cause similar policies. Second, complying with international 
rules cause similar policies among countries. Third, when countries or international 
organizations force other countries to implement a policy, it causes policy convergence. 
Fourth, increasing economic integration leads regulatory competition, which drives 
                                                        
90 Kern, Kristine, Helge Jörgens, and Martin Jänicke. "The diffusion of environmental 
policy innovations: a contribution to the globalisation of environmental policy." WZB 
Discussion Paper, No. FS II 01-302 (2001). 
91 Howlett, Michael. "The judicialization of Canadian environmental policy, 1980–1990: 
A test of the Canada-United States convergence thesis." Canadian Journal of Political 
Science 27, no. 01 (1994): 99-127. 
92 Harrison, Kathryn. "Ideas and environmental standard‐setting: a comparative study of 
regulation of the pulp and paper Industry." Governance 15, no. 1 (2002): 65-96. 
93 Holzinger, Katharina, Christoph Knill, and Bas Arts. Environmental Policy 
Convergence in Europe: The impact of international institutions and trade. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 57 
adjustment of policies across countries. Finally, transnational communication among 
countries increases policy similarity. Among these factors, they found that complying 
with international rules and communicating through transnational network have affected 
policy convergence through empirical study of the member states of the EU. Legally 
binding policies at the level of the EU drove policy similarities. Moreover, policy 
discussions and exchange of information among countries also affected policy 
convergence. On the other hand, regulatory competition among countries was not a 
significant factor.  
 Jacobs tested the causal mechanisms of Holzinger and colleagues through 
studying feed-in tariff in Germany, France and Spain, and suggested the necessity of 
elaborating the theory.94 The study found that regulatory competition has led the 
countries to improve the framework of the feed-in tariff, although there was no evidence 
of “race to the top” in feed-in tariff. Moreover, it was found that the feed-in tariffs were 
driven more from opportunities than from problems. Although the theory of Holzinger 
and colleagues suggested that individual problem solving was driven by a similar 
problem, the study of the feed-in tariff showed that individual problem solving can be 
driven by technological advances.  
 While the increasing number of countries adopting renewable energy policies 
infers the tendency of cross-national policy convergence, the rise of different type of 
policies such as industrial policies and trade policies on renewables is not consistent with 
the literature on policy convergence. As the globalization of renewable energy industry 
introduced some challenges in countries, it may lead countries to adopt policies to 
                                                        
94 Jacobs, David. Renewable energy policy convergence in the EU: the evolution of feed-
in tariffs in Germany, Spain and France. (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
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address the challenges. According to the causal mechanism suggested by Holzinger and 
colleagues, independent problem solving of countries can lead policy convergence among 
countries. Jacobs also showed that the countries’ chasing of opportunities has led the 
convergence of feed-in tariff. In the case of renewable energy, since countries’ problem 
solving resulted in more differences in policies among countries, domestic factors may 
affect policy change.  
 Previous research suggested a number of domestic factors affecting policy change 
including national capacity, demand for policy, institutional contexts, and domestic 
interests. Among these domestic factors, this research focuses on domestic interests since 
the huge growth of industry was the most notable change in renewable energy field in 
recent years. Although the focus is the industry, the other domestic factors are also 
considered through building explanations for the rise of new policies. Moreover, the 
international factor is also considered as an intervening factor in the policy change. In 
this sense, Proposition 3 for Analysis 3 is suggested. The purpose of the research is to 
elaborate the causal mechanism of policy change rather than evaluating this proposition. 
  
Proposition 3. The growth of domestic renewable energy industries has caused the 
diversification of national renewable energy policies as renewable energy industries have 
become globalized.  
 
 This chapter reviews the literature for the three analyses of this research. Three 
analyses were designed to contribute to the literature on trade and the environment, but 
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each analysis is based on different literature. Table 7 summarizes the theoretical 
frameworks and propositions.  
 
Table 7. Summary of literature and propositions. 
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Chapter 3. Global solar market and multinational corporate actors  
 
Introduction 
 The global solar PV market has rapidly grown in recent years. Global solar PV 
installation capacity, which was less than 1GW in 1994, reached 177GW in 2014.95 
Although the solar PV installation has continuously grown during this period, the global 
solar market has experienced ups and downs, which have been caused by diverse national 
and international factors. The global financial crisis in late 2000s has negatively affected 
the governmental support for solar power as well as discouraged investors to finance for 
solar projects. Meanwhile, the global oversupply of solar products had led many solar PV 
corporations out of the business in recent years. Despite these challenges, a number of 
solar PV corporations have substantially grown into large multinational corporations 
during this period. 
 This chapter explores the dynamics of these recent changes in the global solar PV 
market and the reactions of multinational corporations to the changes. To answer the 
central question of this research, this chapter focuses on the rise of multinational 
corporations, one of the aspects of the globalization of industry. The question of this 
chapter is: How have multinational renewable energy corporations affected national 
policies? 
                                                        




 Previous literature suggests that multinational corporations “co-evolve” with their 
external environment, since social environments are “evolving rule systems” for them.96 
According to Canwell and colleagues, under uncertain environments, multinational 
corporations are likely to co-evolve with the environment rather than just adapting to the 
environment. The ups and downs of global solar market in recent years infer more 
uncertainty in the market; thus, it is predicted that co-evolution might happen. The effect 
of uncertainty on co-evolution is not the only theoretical prediction. The contradictions 
between institutions have been pointed out as one of the enabling factors for the firms to 
initiate changes of their external environment.97 Based on these theoretical predictions, 
this chapter assesses if co-evolution of multinational corporations with the external 
environment has happened in the global solar market focusing on the effect of them on 
national policies. The proposition is that multinational renewable energy corporations 
are more likely to engage in policymaking for favorable policies under the challenges of 
the global market. 
 To investigate the interactions between multinational solar corporations and the 
external environment, a content analysis of the annual reports of the global top 15 solar 
module manufacturers was conducted. A solar module, an assembly of solar cells, is a 
                                                        
96 Cantwell, J., Dunning, J. H., & Lundan, S. M. “An evolutionary approach to 
understanding international business activity: The co-evolution of MNEs and the 
institutional environment.” Journal of International Business Studies, 41 (2010), 567–
586.; Kostova, Tatiana, Kendall Roth, and M. Tina Dacin. "Institutional theory in the 
study of multinational corporations: A critique and new directions." Academy of 
Management Review 33, no. 4 (2008): 994-1006. 
97 Battilana, Julie, Bernard Leca, and Eva Boxenbaum. "2 how actors change institutions: 
towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship." The Academy of Management Annals 
3, no. 1 (2009): 65-107.; Seo, Myeong-Gu, and WE Douglas Creed. "Institutional 
contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A dialectical perspective." Academy of 
Management Review 27, no. 2 (2002): 222-247. 
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core product for solar power generation. Solar module manufacturing has rapidly grown 
and globalized in recent years; currently, the top 15 solar module manufacturers account 
for 59% of the global market share.98 The selection of global top manufacturers is natural 
given the significant influence of these firms on the global solar market. The content 
analysis of the annual reports of the firms enabled to explore and explain the changes of 
the global solar market and multinational corporations’ reactions to the changes.   
 
Data  
 Annual reports have been used by many scholars for content analysis due to their 
vast amount of information.99 The reports include both quantitative and qualitative data 
such as a CEO’s statement, financial status, strategies, market risks, and governance. As 
annual reports are one of the most important corporate tools for communicating with their 
environments, substantial efforts of top-level management are involved.100 In this sense, 
although an annual report is written by public relations department, it can be said that it 
represents the position of a corporation.  
                                                        
98 IHS, “Leading Solar Module Suppliers Extend Dominance in 2013; Chinese Still on 
Top,” http://press.ihs.com/press-release/design-supply-chain-media/leading-solar-
module-suppliers-extend-dominance-2013-chinese (April 30, 2014). 
99 Brennan, Niamh. "Reporting intellectual capital in annual reports: evidence from 
Ireland." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 14, no. 4 (2001): 423-436.; 
Lajili, Kaouthar, and Daniel Zéghal. "A content analysis of risk management disclosures 
in Canadian annual reports." Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue 
Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration 22, no. 2 (2005): 125-142.; Mio, Chiara, 
and Andrea Venturelli. "Non-financial Information About Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Policy in the Annual Reports of Listed Companies: Evidence from Italy 
and the UK." Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management 20, no. 6 
(2013): 340-358.; Niskala, Mikael, and Michael Pretes. "Environmental reporting in 
Finland: A note on the use of annual reports." Accounting, Organizations and Society 20, 
no. 6 (1995): 457-466.  
100 Bowman, Edward H. "Content analysis of annual reports for corporate strategy and 
risk." Interfaces 14, no. 1 (1984): 61-71. 
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 Unlike surveys or qualitative interviews, annual reports are not designed for 
research. Therefore, there are risks that necessary data for this research may not be 
included in annual reports. However, most annual reports address the risks and the 
business of their organizations, since those are one of main interests of the readers of 
annual reports, their shareholders. Moreover, as detailed description of risks and their 
business are required for publicly traded companies in the United States, the annual 
reports of those companies include decent quality data. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires publicly traded companies to submit annual reports, which include 
very detailed information on financial status. Domestic public firms use form 10-K, and 
foreign private issuers use form 20-F.101 These forms include a detailed description of 
risks, an overview of the firm’s business, audited financial statements, and details of 
governance.  
 The time frame of the study is the recent ten years from 2005-2014.102 The solar 
PV market has experienced many changes during this period. Since 2005, solar module 
capacity has rapidly increased until 2011. The oversupply of products became a serious 
issue in the global solar PV market since 2011. Figure 10 shows the degree of oversupply 
of solar PV module has started increasing in 2006, and sharply increased in 2011. In 
2012, the module production capacity is about twice of installed PV capacity. This 
oversupply caused a sharp drop of module prices, which made many solar PV 
corporations go out of business or file for bankruptcy. Under these circumstances, the 
                                                        
101 Although foreign companies publish annual reports under the U.S. rules, they write 
the reports as a whole company rather than as a subsidiary in the U.S. Therefore, the 
annual reports written by using form 20-F can be used as data for this study. 
102 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission amended the rule on 20-F on 
December 7, 2007. As this amendment was related to financial statements, this 
amendment does not affect the validity of the data. 
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solar module price has rapidly decreased since 2008. This significant change of the global 
solar market shows that the analysis of the recent ten years enables to understand the 
change of the external environment and the reactions of the actors in the market. 
 
Figure 10. Solar PV module production, cumulative installed capacity, and price,       
2004-2012. 
 
Source: Trends 2013 in Photovoltaic Application: Survey Report of Selected IEA 
Countries between 1992 and 2012, IEA; Renewable Energy Focus magazine, 
http://www.renewableenergyfocus.com.  
 
 The top 15 solar module manufacturers were selected based on the 2013 global 
ranking from IHS technology (Table 8). The annual reports of these manufacturers are 
publicly available except Q-cell. Since Q-cell was acquired by HanwhaSolarOne in 2015, 
its annual reports were not publicly available except 2015. Suntech has published its 
annual reports until 2012 because it was out of business in 2013. As a result, 125 annual 
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Table 8. Global top 15 solar module manufacturers, 2013. 








1 Yingli Green Energy China 1998 2007-2015 (20-F) 9 
2 Trina Solar China 1997 2006-2015 (20-F) 10 
3 Canadian Solar Canada 2001 2006-2015 (20-F) 10 
4 Sharp Japan 1912 2006-2015 (other) 10 
5 Jinko Solar China 2006 2010-2015 (20-F) 6 
6 First Solar USA 1990 2006-2015 (10-K) 10 
7 ReneSola China 2005 2006-2015 (20-F) 10 
8 Kyocera Japan 1959 2006-2015 (20-F) 10 
9 JA Solar China 2005 2006-2015 (20-F) 10 
10 Hanwha SolarOne South Korea 1997 2007-2014 (20-F) 8 
11 Sunpower USA 1985 2006-2015 (10-K) 10 
12 Suntech China 2001 2006-2012 (20-K) 7 
13 Solar Frontier Japan 2006 2009-2015 (other) 6 
14 REC Group Norway 1996 2006-2014 (other) 8 




2015 (20-F) 1 
Total - - - 125 
Note: Because an annual report describes the corporation’s status in the previous year, the 
period of 2006-2015 corresponds with the time frame of this study, which is 2005-2014. 
 
Method 
 Content analysis is defined as a technique for making inferences from texts based 
on systematic coding.103 It has been used for many organizational studies since it enables 
exploring difficult-to-study issues in management fields.104 It enables researchers to 
                                                        
103 Stemler, Steve. "An overview of content analysis." Practical Assessment, Research & 
Evaluation 7, no. 17 (2001): 137-146. 
104 Levihn, Fabian, Cali Nuur, and Henrik Blomgren. "Corporate response to climate 
change mitigation: What can we learn from annual reports of European industries?" 
International Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management 2, no. 3 (2011): 77-86.; 
Waller, David S., and Roman Lanis. "Corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure of 
advertising agencies: an exploratory analysis of six holding companies' annual reports." 
Journal of Advertising 38, no. 1 (2009): 109-122. 
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access individual and collective values, intentions, cognitions and attitudes.105 Content 
analysis can be used in a flexible way by taking quantitative or interpretive approaches. 
Frequency count of codes has commonly been used in many studies, and some studies 
have analyzed qualitative terms and themes emerged from their investigation. 
 Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were taken to analyze the changes in 
the external environment of the solar module manufacturers and their reactions to it. 
First, a structured content analysis with pre-determined codes was conducted to classify 
the risks faced by the firms in recent ten years. Second, a qualitative approach was taken 
for developing a description of the reactions of the firms to the changing environments.  
 For the structured content analysis, each risk factor in every annual report was 
assessed and classified according to the pre-determined codes. The annual reports on 
Form 10-K and 20-F include a specified format describing risks, which provides detailed 
descriptions of each risk factor. The description of each risk factor consists of a main 
statement and detailed explanation. Both the main description and the details of the risk 
factor were classified as one unit, which was the unit of analysis in this study. As a result, 
the unit of risk factor consists of a few paragraphs. Although the annual reports written in 
their own forms provide less standardized descriptions of risk factors, they also provide 
separate sections of risks. This enabled coding of each risk factor. The analysis was 
restricted to the risk section of each annual report and every text of the risk section was 
coded. 
                                                        
105 Duriau, Vincent J., Rhonda K. Reger, and Michael D. Pfarrer. "A content analysis of 
the content analysis literature in organization studies: Research themes, data sources, and 
methodological refinements." Organizational Research Methods 10, no. 1 (2007): 5-34. 
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 The codes for risks were pre-determined based on literature initially, and were 
revised during the research process. To reduce rater bias, the Weber protocol for coding, 
which has been widely referenced in the content analysis studies, was adopted.106 The 
coding categories were defined, and were tested with samples, which were 10% of the 
data. The results of the testing showed that the codes were not exhaustive and some codes 
were not accurate enough. The codes were revised based on these testing results, and they 
were tested again with the same 10% of the samples. All the data was coded with these 
revised codes. After completing coding, the reliability and accuracy were assessed again. 
Since no issue was found, the coding was completed.  
 The risks are classified according to the source of risks: internal environment, and 
external environment (Table 9). The risks from external environments are classified again 
into seven categories: competition, demand, policy, resource, supplier, technology, and 
other. The categories for the risks from external environment were initially determined 





                                                        
106 Duriau, Vincent J., Rhonda K. Reger, and Michael D. Pfarrer. "A content analysis of 
the content analysis literature in organization studies: Research themes, data sources, and 
methodological refinements." Organizational Research Methods 10, no. 1 (2007): 5-
34.;Weber, Robert Philip. Basic content analysis. (London: Sage, 1990). 
107 Meijer, Ineke SM, Marko P. Hekkert, and Joop FM Koppenjan. "How perceived 
uncertainties influence transitions; the case of micro-CHP in the Netherlands." 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74, no. 4 (2007): 519-537. 
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Table 9. Categories of risks. 
Source Description 
Internal environment 
Risks caused by internal factors such as internal 
resource and capability 
External 
environment 
Competition Risks caused by competition 
Demand Risks caused by demand or consumers 
Policy Risks caused by policy or political factors 
Resource 
Risks caused by availability of raw materials and 
other resources 
Supplier Risks caused by suppliers 
Technology 
Risks caused by new technology, the relations 
between the technology and the infrastructure, 
and the possibility of choosing alternative 
technological options 
Other Risks caused by other factors 
 
 The codes of policy risks were separated and were coded again based on the pre-
determined categories: uncertainty and contradiction (Table 10). A policy risk 
component was coded as uncertainty if a firm could not predict the direction or the effect 
of policy on the firm. If a firm predicts the effect of a policy risk component on the firm, 
the policy risk was coded as contradiction. The four categories of contradiction were 





                                                        
108 Seo, Myeong-Gu, and WE Douglas Creed. "Institutional contradictions, praxis, and 
institutional change: A dialectical perspective." Academy of Management Review 27, no. 
2 (2002): 222-247. 
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Table 10. Categories of policy risk. 
Source Description 
Uncertainty 
The direction of a policy or its effect on the 
firm is not known 
Contradiction 
Inefficiency A policy causes inefficiency of business 
Unresponsiveness 
A policy is unresponsive to the external 
environment 
Incompatibility Policies are inconsistent between them  
Conflicts of interest A policy cannot serve diverse interests  
 
 For the qualitative content analysis of the firms’ reactions to the environment, the 
author read each annual report and extracted themes. Since only a few annual reports 
provide a standardized strategy section, the author looked for the descriptions of actions 
or planned actions of the firms in the whole annual report. The extracted themes were 




Changes of the external environment of multinational solar corporations 
The results of the structured content analysis show two trends. First, the reporting on risk 
factors that solar multinationals face have continuously increased. Second, the 
corporations have identified more risk factors from policies over time.  
 
 Increasing risks 
 The analysis of the annual reports indicates that the risks of the global solar 
manufacturers had grown over time. The number of risk factors reported from the internal 
environment has almost doubled, and that of risk factors from the external environment 
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have more than doubled in recent ten years (Figure 11). The risk factors from the external 
environment have grown more sharply compared to the risk components from internal 
environment. As a result, in 2015, the number of the risk factors from external 
environment accounts for almost half of the total number of the risk factors.  
 
Figure 11. Risks by source, 2006-2015. 
 
 
 A major portion of the increasing risk factors from the external environment is 
caused by policy. Compared to the other risk components, the risks caused by policy have 
more sharply increased in recent ten years (Figure 12). The number of policy risk 
components has increased to 153 in 2015 from 52 in 2006. Another noteworthy trend is 
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Figure 12. Risks from external environment, 2006-2015. 
 
 
 The number of risk factors from demand has doubled in 2009 largely because of 
the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. Many global module manufacturers have 
described the slowdown in the market demand after the crisis in their annual reports. The 
reduced energy demand caused by economic contraction discouraged the investments in 
solar PV projects. The 2009 report of Hanwha SolarOne explains: “The current credit 
crises, weak consumer confidence and diminished consumer and business spending have 
contributed to a significant slowdown in the market demand for PV products due to 
decreased energy requirements.”  
 More direct effect of the global financial crisis on the demand was from third 
party financing. Solar project developers, the consumers or the end-users of solar 
modules, depend on third party financing to fund their projects, which require significant 
initial capital expenditures. Due to the crisis, they had much difficulty in acquiring 





















higher than the costs before the crisis. This has lowered the returns from solar projects, so 
the developers changed their investment plans or delayed the projects. As a result, the 
demand for solar products has decreased.  
 The declining demand became a more serious risk when it combined with the 
oversupply of solar products. The 2012 report of JA Solar pointed out: “Combined with 
other factors such as the European sovereign debt crisis, lack of available financing to 
solar power projects and an oversupply of solar power products, the average selling 
prices of solar power products have declined significantly.” The supply of solar products 
started growing with an increase of polysilicon supply in 2008. The limited supply of 
polysilicon, which was the core raw material of solar modules, had been one of the 
biggest entry barriers. Since this barrier became less significant after 2008, the 
manufacturing capacity of solar products has sharply grown with the entry of new 
manufacturers, and this caused the oversupply of the market. The decreasing demand has 
been a more serious risk under this flood of solar products.  
 
 Rise of “inefficient” policies 
 While the demand risk increased sharply only in 2009 and has stabilized, the 
policy risk has continuously increased over time. The increasing trend of policy risks is 
largely caused by the increasing number of policies causing inefficiency of the business 
of the corporations. Figure 13 shows the result of coding of the policy risk factors by 
source. The number of policy risk factors causing inefficiency in 2015 is almost four 
times of that in 2006.  
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Figure 13. Policy risks by source, 2006-2015. 
 
 
 Solar module manufacturers have perceived that more policies have acted as a 
barrier to conduct their business in an efficient manner. Mainly, two factors have affected 
this increasing trend of inefficiency of policies: the trade protectionist actions of 
governments and the solar module manufacturers’ expansion to project development 
business.  
 Under the struggling solar market after the global financial crisis, governments 
have introduced measures to protect domestic solar PV industry. The solar module 
imported from China was one of the main issues. On October 19, 2011, the U.S. solar 
module manufacturers filed a petition against Chinese solar module producers of selling 
their products less than the fair value with the U.S. Department of Commerce. This 
resulted in the issuance of the antidumping duty order and countervailing duty order in 















and anti-subsidy duties on imported Chinese cells and modules after a one-year 
investigation. In 2012, India has started antidumping investigations on solar cells from 
China, the U.S., Malaysia, and Taiwan.  
 China-based solar module manufacturers have showed much concern on the 
negative impact of the anti-dumping measures since a significant portion of their revenue 
is generated from outside of China. For instance, Yingli Green Energy, one of the China-
based manufacturers, had acquired more than 80% of its revenue from European market 
until 2010 (Figure 14). One of the other Chinese manufacturers, Suntech, said in its 2012 
annual report: “Any determination of duties and tariffs against importation of our 
modules into the United States and Europe could render us unable to sell modules in 
these countries that could impact our sales, business operations, competitiveness, and 
profitability.” Since the measures are decided by each government, the module 
manufacturers could not make sure if they will not be negatively impacted by the 
measures even if they believe that they did not violate any trade rules. Trina Solar said in 
its 2014 report: “Although our policy requires that all of our export sales comply with 
international trade practices, we cannot guarantee that the government agencies in the 








Figure 14. Revenue trend of Yingli Green Energy, 2006-2014. 
 
Source: Yingli Green Energy’s annual reports, 2007-2015. 
 
 Local content requirements have been another measure to protect domestic solar 
industries. The Canadian province of Ontario introduced a local content preference rule, 
which was to require the projects receiving feed-in tariffs to source certain percentage of 
equipment in Ontario. India also set a local content requirement rule in its National Solar 
Mission. Under Phase I, India required solar PV project developers using crystalline 
silicon technology to use cells and modules produced in India. In Batch I, Phase II, India 
required to use domestically produced cells and modules regardless of technology for 375 
MW of the 750 MW program. First Solar, the U.S.-based corporation, showed concerns 
about this measure in its 2015 report: “This set-aside effectively cuts the ability of First 
Solar to compete in the Batch I, Phase II program in half.” Regarding this issue, the U.S. 
government requested the WTO dispute settlement consultations with the Government of 



















 Solar manufacturers’ expansion to project development business is another factor 
influencing the increase of the inefficiency of policies. Solar project developing is related 
to many policy issues such as subsidies, permits, property rights, power purchase 
agreements, interconnection and transmission arrangements, financing, and construction. 
As the solar module manufacturers have started developing solar projects, they became to 
be exposed to more policy issues than before. 
 Around 2010, many solar module manufacturers started expanding to project 
development. Since then, the manufacturers have reported the risk factors related to 
project development. For instance, in its 2014 report, Trina described the possibility of 
non-compliance of land laws and regulations for its 120MW solar power project in 
Jiangsu Province. Although it acquired land use right for its project, it did not complete a 
series of following procedures. Trina was in the process to complete the procedure, but 
“cannot ensure that the registration process will be completed in a timely manner or at 
all.” Jinko Solar also reported significant delays in the listing of projects in the Subsidy 
Catalog, which is required to receive central government subsidies in China in its 2015 
report. The development of solar projects is highly regulated in China. According to 
Jinko solar, the solar projects in China “are governed by different laws and regulations, 
including national and local regulations relating to urban and rural planning, building 
codes, safety, environmental protection, fire control, utility transmission, engineering and 
metering and related matters.” 
 Conducting solar project development in the U.S. is also highly regulated. First 
Solar, the U.S.-based corporation, said in its 2015 report: “We may be unable to acquire 
or lease land, obtain necessary interconnection and transmission rights, and/or obtain the 
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approvals, licenses, permits and electric transmission grid interconnection and 
transmission rights necessary to build and operate PV power plants in a timely and cost 
effective manner, and regulatory agencies, local communities, labor unions or other third 
parties may delay, prevent, or increase the cost of construction and operation of the PV 
plants we intend to build.” 
 In sum, the rise of policy risks has caused by additional policies as well as 
existing policies. The newly introduced policies to protect domestic solar industry have 
resulted in increasing risks to the global solar manufacturers. Moreover, since the 
manufacturers have started expanding to a new business, existing policies have become a 
new barrier for them. 
 
The responses of the solar multinationals to the changing environment 
 The results of the qualitative content analysis reveal that the solar multinationals’ 
strategies have deeply changed after the global financial crisis. In the early days of solar 
market with high demand, the solar multinationals focused on increasing manufacturing 
capacity and securing raw materials. However, when the demand of modules has 
decreased after the global financial crisis, the solar multinationals expanded their 
business to solar project development. 
 
 Before the global financial crisis: Going upstream 
 Responding to the rapidly rising demand was the priority of the solar 
manufacturers before the global financial crisis. To accelerate production, the 
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manufacturers had focused on expanding manufacturing capacity, and securing raw 
materials.  
 Most of the manufacturers had planned to increase manufacturing capacity. In the 
2008 report, Suntech reported: “We intend to capitalize on the rapidly growing market 
demand for PV products by leveraging our access to low-cost resources and expanding 
our manufacturing capacity to grow our output and sale.” According to its intention, 
Suntech had significantly expanded its manufacturing capacity since it had launched its 
business in 2002. Hanwha SolarOne also announced its plan to expand capacity in its 
2007 report: “In order to meet the fast-growing market demands for solar products, we 
plan to significantly expand our production capacity in the next three years.” Figure 15 
shows that the manufacturing capacity of the four solar module manufacturers has rapidly 
increased until 2011. 
 
Figure 15. Solar module manufacturing capacity of four major solar manufacturers, 
2007-2014. 
 
Note: The data are from the annual reports of each firm. Among 15 manufacturers, only 



















 Securing raw materials was also very important due to the shortage of polysilicon. 
One of the key strategies of the solar manufacturers was to secure polysilicon supply and 
to form strong relationships with key suppliers of polysilicon. Yingli Green Energy said 
in its 2007 report: “Stable and reliable polysilicon supplies are critical to our long-term 
growth and profitability.” Trina Solar said in its 2007 report: “In the immediate future, 
because of the growing demand for solar power products, shortage of polysilicon and 
rising cost of silicon raw materials, we believe that the competitive arena will 
increasingly center around securing silicon supply and forming strategic relationships to 
secure supply of key components and technologies.” 
 The shortage of polysilicon has encouraged some manufacturers to expand to 
upstream. Yingli Green Energy acquired Cyber Power, a start-up polysilicon 
manufacturer, in January 2009. It expected to produce 3,000 tons of polysilicon per year 
through this acquisition. Renesola invested in Linzhou Zhongsheng Semiconductor, a 
polysilicon manufacturing company in August 2007, and started producing polysilicon in 
July 2009.  
 
 After the global financial crisis: Going downstream 
 As the prices of solar products have started decreasing, the solar manufacturers’ 
strategies have changed. Expanding manufacturing capacity became less significant. For 
instance, Jinko Solar adjusted its expansion plan, and decided to maintain its capacity at 
current level “in response to the changes in the market condition” in 2012. Moreover, 
since the supply of polysilicon has increased, acquiring raw materials also became less 
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significant. Under these circumstances, solar module manufacturers’ focus has shifted to 
downstream business. 
 Thirteen out of the fifteen solar module manufacturers have reported their 
entrance into solar project development market. Despite the different timings of entrance 
to the market, most of them have strategically expanded project development after the 
global financial crisis. Suntech has started project development in 2008 by establishing 
joint ventures. Trina has entered in the downstream market in 2009, and has announced 
that it strategically expanded the downstream business in 2013. Canadian Solar has 
expanded the business since 2012, and acquired Recurrent, a solar developer located in 
California and Texas, in 2015. Yingli Green Energy has initiated solar project 
development in China in 2012. Renesola, JA Solar, and Jinko Solar have started in 2011. 
Sharp and Hanwha SolarOne have entered in the market in 2010.  
 The U.S.-based solar manufacturers have expanded their project development 
business slightly earlier than the others. SunPower acquired PowerLight Corporation, a 
large-scale solar power system provider, in January 2007, and established system 
business segment. In 2010, it acquired SunRay Malta Holdings, a leading European solar 
power plant project developer, and created Utility and Power Plant segment, which 
included power plant project development, engineering, procurement and construction 
(EPC) services, and operations and maintenance services.  
 First Solar, the other U.S.-based module manufacturer, has actively expanded its 
project development business. Acquisition was one of the core strategies for expanding 
the business. It acquired Turner Renewable Energy, which designed and deployed 
commercial solar projects for utilities in the U.S., in November 2007. In April 2009, First 
 81 
Solar acquired the project development business of OptiSolar Inc., and in January 2010, it 
purchased some assets of Edison Mission Group’s utility-scale project development 
pipeline. In July 2010, NextLight Renewable Power, a leading developer of utility-scale 
solar projects in the southwestern U.S., was acquired. In 2013, First Solar has expanded 
its global pipeline by acquiring Solar Chile, a Santiago-based solar development 
company, and has acquired a pipeline of U.S. and Mexico assets from Element Power. 
Through these activities, First Solar completed a fully integrated systems business. 
Currently, First Solar’s business portfolio includes “project development; engineering 
and plant optimization; grid integration and plant control systems; project finance; 
advanced PV modules; inverters and power conversion components; trackers and fixed 
mounting systems; procurement and construction consulting; operations and 
maintenance; energy forecasting; and warranties and performance guarantees.” 
 As a result of the expansion of project development business, the business 
portfolio of First Solar has transformed. The net sales of the systems business has 
significantly increased since 2010 (Figure 16). Since 2012, the systems business has 
accounted for more than half of the total revenue. First Solar has transformed into an 








Figure 16. Net sales of First Solar by segment, 2008-2014. 
 
 The other companies have also rapidly expanded the share of their project 
development business. In Canadian Solar, the total solutions business, which consists 
primarily of solar power project development, EPC services, and O&M services, 
accounted for 44.5% of its net revenue in 2014, increasing from 11.5% in 2012. Trina 
completed 8 projects with the capacity of 233.3 MW as of December 2014, an increase 
from 2MW of installed system in December 2011. 
 The struggling solar module market can explain why solar module manufacturers 
have expanded to downstream business. Sharp explained the rational of changing 
business model: “ (Solar module) market conditions deteriorated even further, due to 
factors such as continuing price declines caused by excess supply and intense 
competition. In this context, with the aim of profitability, Sharp worked to change its sale 
approach from solely focusing on solar cell modules to total systems and establish a 
business model that is more resilient to changing market conditions and currency rate 















development business has rapidly increased in recent years. Trina Solar said that the solar 
project development business was strategically important because the market is “growing 
quickly in China, supported by favorable government policies.” in its 2015 report.  
 With the changes of business portfolios, the solar module manufacturers are not 
just manufacturers at this point. These corporations describe themselves as “solar energy 
company,” “global leader in PV industry,” or “global provider of solar energy solutions.” 
First Solar positions itself as to “deliver meaningful PV energy solutions to varied energy 
problems worldwide.” It planned to compete with fossil-fuel-based power generation on 
an economic basis with “minimal subsidies or incentives.” 
 
Discussion 
 The findings do not support the proposition, which was that multinational 
renewable energy corporation is more likely to engage in policymaking for favorable 
policies under the challenges of the global market. No evidence was detected that 
multinational solar corporations have attempted to engage in policymaking. Rather, they 
have been influenced by national policies and have adapted to the changes. 
  The global financial crisis has negatively affected the increasing trend of demand 
in the global solar PV market. With the oversupply of the solar products, which had 
driven by solar manufacturers’ expansion of capacity under increasing trend of demand, 
this has led declining prices of solar products. Under these circumstances, governments 
had introduced the policies to protect domestic solar industry. This has negatively 
affected the sales and profitability of multinational corporations. The decreasing 
profitability of solar manufacturing has led the solar manufacturers to expand to 
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downstream business. As they have expanded to downstream business, the manufacturers 
have faced more policy risks from diverse regulations, permitting and approval processes.  
 The multinational solar corporations have influenced by traditional renewable 
energy policies, newly introduced protectionist policies, and existing non-renewable 
energy policies. The effect of traditional renewable energy policies has not changed much 
in recent years since they have a similar degree of uncertainty all the time. However, the 
effect of the new protectionist policies have increased since more countries, especially 
big markets such as the US, the EU, and India, have introduced those policies to protect 
domestic industry recently. Meanwhile, the existing non-renewable energy policies have 
affected solar corporations differently. They were included in the policy risks of solar 
corporations as the corporations expanded to new business. The permitting and approval 
processes related to building power plants did not affect the business of multinational 
solar corporations before they expanded to downstream business, but they became critical 
policy risks since the corporations started downstream business. As a result, multinational 
solar corporations’ policy risks have expanded and diversified. 
 The literature on co-evolution of multinational corporations suggested that 
multinational corporations tended to co-evolve with the external environment under 
increasing uncertainty, but the findings of this research suggest that they tended to adapt 
to changes of the environment. Although uncertainty of policies has increased, increasing 
policies causing inefficiency of their business have been more serious risks for them. 
Under these circumstances, solar manufacturers adjusted their plans to expand 
manufacturing capacity, and expanded to downstream business.  
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 The findings show the adaptation of multinational solar corporations to the 
external environment, but they do not simply show the influence of the external 
environment on the corporations. Since the corporations have adapted to the changing 
environment, the external environment has also changed. The regulations and processes 
related to building power plants have included in relevant policies of the solar 
multinationals as they expanded to downstream business. The external environment 
changes by the adapting efforts of multinational corporations. In a broader perspective, 
multinational corporations evolve with the external environment through adapting to the 
new challenges from the environment.     
  It could be argued that multinational solar corporations might attempt to change 
policies, but they did not report those efforts in their annual reports. This study is limited 
in finding out corporate behaviors that were not reported in annual reports. Some 
corporations might engage in policymaking, but might not describe their activities in 
annual reports. It is also possible that corporations affected policymaking indirectly 
through industry associations or collaboration with other actors. These indirect activities 
may not be described in annual reports. This limitation can be partially addressed by the 
analyses in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, which will examine the interviews with the 
representatives of solar corporations. The findings of this study are revisited in the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 4. Politics in the U.S. solar PV field 
  
Introduction 
 The U.S. solar PV market has gone through significant changes in recent years. 
Most notably, the size of market has sharply grown. The annual capacity of solar PV 
installation has enormously increased to 6,212 MW in 2014 from 79 MW in 2005.109 
Currently, large utility scale projects account for a significant share of the market; in 
2014, the share of utility scale installation was approximately 60%, while it was only 3% 
in 2004. This expansion of market size has accompanied the rise of solar PV industry. 
According to the Solar Foundation, as of November 2014, the U.S. solar industry 
employed 173,807 workers, which has grown by 86% in recent five years.110 As of 
November 2015, Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA) has 572 member companies. 
 Policies have played an important role in this rapid development of the solar PV 
industry. The federal Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for solar has significantly contributed 
to the rise of solar installation by providing a 30 percent tax credit for residential and 
commercial solar projects since 2006. Other than the ITC, many federal and state-level 
policies including the Loan Guarantee Program, net-metering, and Renewable Portfolios 
Standard (RPS) have encouraged the growth of the U.S. solar industry.  
 Even under this rapid growth, the U.S. solar market has not always been stable. 
Plummeting prices of solar products in the global market have led many solar 
                                                        
109 Kann, S. et al., U.S. Solar Market Insight Report, 2013 Year-in-Review, Executive 
Summary (2013) ; Kann, S. et al., U.S. Solar Market Insight Report, Q1 2015 (2015) 




corporations to become bankrupt or be acquired by other companies in recent years. From 
2011 to 2014, 71 solar corporations went bankrupt, and 31 companies were acquired by 
other companies globally, including many U.S. corporations.111 China’s supply of solar 
products was one of the critical factors affecting the struggles of the solar market. Low-
priced solar products started being imported from China into the U.S. in 2010. The 
annual growth rate of imported Chinese solar products imported into the U.S. was 146% 
in 2010, and 115% in 2011.112 
 Under these circumstances and perceiving an unfair trade approach from China, 
the U.S. solar manufacturers became active in trying to shape trade policy to their 
advantage. In October 2011, SolarWorld headquartered in Germany, and six U.S. solar 
panel manufacturers submitted a petition concerning solar panels imported from China. 
They claimed that heavily subsidized Chinese solar panels were illegally dumped in the 
United States. As a result, the U.S. Commerce Department announced to impose 
antidumping tariff on Chinese solar panels on December 10, 2012.  
 This case is interesting in that solar companies attempted to solve a challenge in 
the market by affecting a trade policy rather than a renewable energy policy. 
Traditionally, issues of renewable energy have been discussed in the context of 
renewable energy policies such as government supports. This antidumping tariff case 
infers that renewable energy issues need to be considered in broader contexts at this 
point.  
                                                        
111 Wesoff, E., 2014. “Rest in Peace: The Fallen Solar Companies of 2014,” 
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Honoring-the-fallen-solar-soldiers 
(December 1, 2014) 
112 United States International Trade Commission, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb. 
Available at: https://dataweb.usitc.gov (Accessed April 28, 2016). 
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 This chapter investigates how diverse actors have framed the renewable energy 
trade issue through examining the case of the U.S-China solar panel trade issue. While 
Chapter 3 focused on corporate individual reactions to the external environment, this 
chapter focuses on the reactions of the domestic and international corporations as 
political groups. Chapter 3 showed that each solar multinational has tried to adapt to the 
external environment under rapidly changing market. This finding did not support the 
prediction of the multinationals’ co-evolution literatures, which was that solar 
multinationals would try to change the external environment. Solar multinationals had 
barely attempted to change the external environment at least as an individual actor. Then, 
how do they react to the changing environment as political groups? This chapter answers 
this question. Due to the significance of the U.S. market in the global solar market and 
the diversity of organizations and groups that have participated in the policy debates on 
solar trade, the U.S.-China solar trade dispute can be used as an example of corporations’ 
actions as political groups.  
 Previous literature showed that issue fields, which were created to address new 
social concern, evolve based upon the existing matured fields. In this sense, the central 
actors of matured fields frame the new problem with their logics.113  Based upon the 
literature, the proposition is suggested: The central domestic actors of a renewable 
energy field have framed renewable energy trade issues with a traditional environmental 
frame. 
 To reveal the political interactions on the U.S.-China solar panel trade issue, a 
                                                        
113 O’Sullivan, Niamh, and Brendan O’Dwyer. "The structuration of issue-based fields: 
Social accountability, social movements and the Equator Principles issue-based field." 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 43 (2015): 33-55. 
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discourse network analysis was conducted with the newspaper articles from the U.S. top 
seven newspapers. The data was restricted to U.S. newspapers under the assumption that 
influential actors on the U.S policy issue communicate with the U.S. media. The 
coalitions revealed by the discourse network analysis show the political interactions and 
framings of various actors on the U.S.-China solar panel trade issue. 
 
Trade disputes on solar panels between the U.S. and China 
 On October 19, 2011, SolarWorld and six other U.S. solar manufacturers 
submitted a petition to the U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International 
Trade Commission against Chinese solar manufacturers’ trade practices. The petition 
requested the federal government to impose duties on Chinese imports of solar cells and 
modules to offset the subsidies from the Chinese government. The petitioners argued that 
Chinese solar manufacturers benefitted from the subsidies including “massive cash 
grants; significantly discounted raw material inputs, such as polysilicon and aluminum; 
heavily discounted or free land, power and water; multi-billion-dollar preferential loans 
and directed credit; extensive tax exemptions, incentives and rebates; export assistance 
credits; and export insurance at preferential rates”.114  
 The import of solar products from China has significantly increased in 2009. 
From 2009 to 2011, the import from China has increased by more than five times (Figure 
17). Even if the rising trends of imports from all countries are considered, the growth rate 
of the import from China is noteworthy. This sharp increase has caused large trade deficit 
                                                        
114 “U.S. Solar Industry Files Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases Against 
Imports of Solar Cells and Modules from China,” http://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-
pressreleases-555.html (October 19, 2011) 
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in 2011 (Figure 18). The trade deficit with the world has generated by dramatically 
increased deficit with China.  
 
Figure 17. U.S. import of photosensitive semiconductor devices including PV cells, 
1996-2015. 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
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Source: International trade in Environmental Goods 2012 Report, Senator Ron Wyden, 
February 28, 2012; The U.S. International Trade Commission  
  
 
 In response to the petition of the manufacturers, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce released its preliminary determination on May 17, 2012. It decided that the 
crystalline-silicon solar cells from China were subject to antidumping (AD) and 
countervailing duties (CVD).  In October 10, 2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
issued its final determination, which affirmed its preliminary finding. On November 7, 
2012, the U.S. International Trade Commission determined the imposition of AD/CVD 
duties ranging from 22.5 to 255.4 percent on solar cells and modules imported from 
China.  
 On December 31, 2013, SolarWorld filed a new petition against solar products 
from China and Taiwan. Since the duties applied to panels made from Chinese solar cells, 
Chinese manufacturers were able to avoid the duties by assembling panels from cells 
produced in Taiwan. This loophole had led SolarWorld to file a new petition. In response 
to this petition, the U.S. Department of Commerce determined that the imports of solar 
products from China had been sold in the U.S. at dumping margins from 26.71 to 165.04 
percent, and those from Taiwan had been sold at dumping margins from 11.45 to 27.55 
percent on December 16, 2014. 
 In July 2015, the U.S. Department of Commerce conducted an administrative 
review of the duties on Chinese solar products, and has confirmed that it will keep the 
duties with revised rates. In January 2016, the U.S. International Trade Administration 
issued preliminary findings of the second administrative review of the duties on Chinese 
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solar products. The dumping margin was found to be at 4.53 to 11.47 percent, which was 
lower than the original dumping margin.  
 
Data and method 
 A social network analysis provides a useful tool to analyze political coalitions. It 
is a set of methods for investigating relational data. Relational data concerns the 
connections, ties, and contacts, and cannot be reduced to individual agents’ attribution.115 
In this vein, the advantage of social network analysis is to model the relationship among 
actors.116 The choice of social network analysis is natural because political interactions of 
firms are the main interest of this study. 
 The method of this study is “discourse network analysis,” which combines a 
content analysis and a social network analysis. A discourse network analysis enables to 
measure and visualize political discourses in a quantitative way. It also allows researchers 
to conduct longitudinal analysis and to build discursive structures in a bottom-up 
approach.117 As discourse network analysis identifies networks between actors, it enables 
researchers to discover different levels of coalitions rather than simply classify actors into 
coalitions.  
 The data set is established by a content analysis of seven U.S. newspapers: USA 
Today, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, New York 
                                                        
115 Scott , John, Social Network Analysis : a Handbook, (London: SAGE Publications, 
1991). 
116 Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine, Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
applications, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
117 Leifeld, Philip, and Sebastian Haunss. "Political discourse networks and the conflict 
over software patents in Europe." European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 3 
(2012): 382-409. 
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Post, The Washington Post, and New York Daily News. The newspapers were selected 
because they were either one of the top 5 U.S newspapers by circulation or one of the top 
5 U.S. newspapers by digital traffic. Multiple newspapers were used to reduce the 
possibility of missing important actors. All news articles that included five search 
terms—U.S., China, solar, panel, and trade—were obtained in the period 2009-2014 in 
LexisNexis, ProQuest, and the Archives of Los Angeles Times. The year of 2009 was 
selected as the start year as a quick review of the newspaper articles revealed that solar 
panels from China were mentioned from 2009 onwards. In total, 572 articles were 
obtained (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Number of samples by newspaper. 
Newspaper  All articles 
Samples 
Articles Statements 
USA Today 19 3 5 
Wall Street Journal  192 44 92 
New York Times 184 48 84 
Los Angeles Times 20 6 12 
New York Post 1 - - 
The Washington Post 153 22 38 
New York Daily News 3 - - 
Total 572 123 231 
 
 Each article was reviewed to assess whether it was related to the topic—the trade 
dispute on solar panels between the U.S. and China—or if it only includes the search 
terms. Even if an article was closely related to the topic, it was excluded if it did not 
include any claim of an actor on the solar panel trade issue. Through this screening 
procedure, 123 articles were selected as samples.  
 An entire article was not appropriate for the unit of analysis for this study because 
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a single article includes multiple claims from various speakers. Therefore, each claim 
from an actor was given a code as a statement. If a statement was from a representative of 
an organization, the organization was regarded as a speaker. As for a Congressperson or 
an expert, an individual was coded as a speaker. The selected newspaper articles included 
231 statements. 
 Analysis of newspaper articles could introduce a selection bias since not all actors 
release their claims. Moreover, some actors show their claims but remain anonymous. 
However, this does not critically weaken the validity of this study since being invisible or 
anonymous mean that they are less active in initiating change. As this study focuses on 
dominant actors rather than less active actors, newspaper articles can be effectively used.      
 The variables include organization and four issue categories. The organization of 
each statement is classified into 13 categories: U.S. state actors, China state actors, State 
actors in other countries, U.S. solar panel manufacturers, China solar panel 
manufacturers, Solar panel manufacturers in other countries, U.S. solar corporations other 
than panel manufacturers, Chinese solar corporations other than panel manufacturers, 
solar corporations other than panel manufacturers in other countries, U.S. industry 









Table 12. Categories for type of organization. 
Category Description 
State 
U.S. U.S. government agencies and legislators 
China China government agencies, ministries, and legislators 
Other 






The U.S.-based solar panel manufacturers or the coalitions of 
them 
China China-based solar panel manufacturers or the coalitions of them 
Other 
Solar panel manufacturers based in the countries other than the 







The U.S.-based solar corporations other than solar panel 
manufacturers or the coalitions of them 
China 
China-based solar corporations other than solar panel 
manufacturers or the coalitions of them 
Other 
Solar corporations other than solar panel manufacturers based in 





Industry associations or coalitions including more than two 
different types of organizations located in the U.S. 
China 
Industry associations or coalitions including more than two 
types of organizations located in China 
Expert 
U.S. 
Solar experts including consultants, scholars, researchers and 
investors in the U.S. 
China 
Solar experts including consultants, scholars, researchers and 
investors in China 
 
 Each statement was coded for four categories related to Chinese solar panel 
issues. The categories were developed by an open coding of sample articles. Three 
categories are about the frames of Chinese solar panels: “Chinese solar panels benefit the 
U.S economy,” “Chinese solar panels benefit the affordability of solar energy,” and “the 
trade practices of Chinese solar panels are fair.” Each category was coded whether the 
organization agree or disagree with each statement. The other category was about the 
position on policy: “The tariff on Chinese solar panels is necessary.”     
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 For coding, the software Discourse Network Analyzer was used.118 This software 
has been used for coding of texts and building social networks.119 An affiliation matrix 
with actors and policy preferences was established, and this matrix was transformed into 
an actor-by-actor matrix, which includes the number of shared policy stances between 
actors. Political coalition was derived from this matrix as a network based on the 
assumption that similarity of policy preferences encourages actors to make a coalition. 




Prominent actors in the solar panel trade issue field 
 Various organizations and individuals have revealed their opinions on the U.S.-
China solar panel trade issue. Although the solar panel manufacturers in other countries, 
who released 50 statements, were the most prominent actors, they were not very 
dominant (Table 13). Many actors in China also actively released their statements. One 
third of the statements are from the actors based in China. 
 
 
                                                        
118 Leifeld, Philip, “Discourse Network Analyzer manual,” 
http://www.philipleifeld.de/discourse-network-analyzer-dna/manual/manual.html. 
(September 23, 2012) 
119 Fisher, Dana R., Philip Leifeld, and Yoko Iwaki. "Mapping the ideological networks 
of American climate politics." Climatic Change 116, no. 3-4 (2013): 523-545.; Leifeld, 
Philip, and Sebastian Haunss. "Political discourse networks and the conflict over software 
patents in Europe." European Journal of Political Research 51, no. 3 (2012): 382-409.; 
Stoddart, Mark CJ, and David B. Tindall. "Canadian news media and the cultural 
dynamics of multilevel climate governance." Environmental Politics 24, no. 3 (2015): 
401-422. 
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Table 13. Number of statement per actor group by issue category. 
 











panels are fair 
 







































































































































































 Overall, the positions of the four groups—U.S. state actors, U.S. panel 
manufacturers, panel manufacturers in other countries, and U.S. experts—tend to be 
different from the positions of the other actors. These groups agree neither that Chinese 
solar panels benefit U.S. economy nor that the trade practices of Chinese solar panels are 
fair. The rest of the groups including U.S. solar corporations other than panel 
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manufacturers and U.S. industry associations tend to agree on both statements. This 
shows that the home country of an organization may have no correlation with its position 
on Chinese solar panels.   
 Actor congruence network supports that the home country of an organization is 
not associated with the position of the organization on Chinese solar panels. In the actor 
congruence network, two coalitions are apparent (Figure 19). The coalition in the left can 
be named as “anti-Chinese solar panel group,” which argues the harms of Chinese solar 
panels. They argue that Chinese solar panels have no benefit to the U.S. economy and 
that the trade practices concerning the Chinese panels are questionable. SolarWorld, the 
biggest black square, is a dominant actor in this coalition. Although this coalition mostly 
consists of the U.S. actors, it is led by a Germany-based corporation. On the other hand, 
the other coalition to the right includes diverse actors from the U.S. and China. This 
coalition can be named as the “pro-Chinese solar panel group,” which argues for the 
benefits of Chinese solar panels. State actors in China and Chinese solar panel 
manufacturers lead the coalition, but a number of the actors in the U.S. are included in 
this coalition. One of the main actors in the coalition is the Coalition for Affordable Solar 
Energy (CASE), which is an industry group based in the United States. CASE was 
established to fight against SolarWorld’s petition. Its members include both U.S. solar 
installers and Chinese solar panel manufacturers. Other than the CASE, a number of U.S. 





Figure 19. Actor congruence network 
 
Note: Node size is a function of statement frequency. Node color indicates the country of 
origin of each organization. Blue indicates U.S. organizations, Red indicates Chinese 
organizations, and Black indicates the organizations based on other countries. Node 
shape indicates the type of organization. Circle indicates state actors, Square indicates 
solar panel manufacturers, Diamond indicates solar companies other than panel 
manufacturers, Up triangle indicates industry association, and Down triangle indicates 
experts. 
  
 The anti-Chinese solar panel group has a single dominant actor, SolarWorld. 
SolarWorld has released 44 statements alone. Other than SolarWorld and Senator Ron 
Wyden, the actors in the anti-Chinese solar panel group were not very active. A majority 
of them released only one statement. Compared to the anti-Chinese solar panel group, the 
pro-Chinese solar panel group has more diversity. There is no single dominant actor. 
Chinese state actors, Chinese solar manufacturers, industry associations, and the U.S.-
based industry coalition actively participated in policy discussion.  
 Multinational corporations headquartered in other countries have played a critical 
role in framing the issue of Chinese solar panels in the United States. SolarWorld led the 
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anti-Chinese solar panel group, while Suntech and Yingli Green Energy were among the 
most dominant actors in pro-Chinese solar panel group. Compared to these multinational 
corporations headquartered in other countries, the U.S.-based solar corporations were not 
dominant in framing. They were divided into two coalitions. The U.S. solar panel 
manufacturers tended to be in the anti-Chinese solar panel group, and the installers 
tended to join in the pro-Chinese solar panel group.   
 
Framing in the solar panel trade issue field 
 Top 20 frequently used words in the U.S.-China solar panel trade issue shows that 
the issue was framed as an economic issue rather than an environmental issue. Any word 
related to the environment was not included in the top 20 frequently used words (Table 
14). Rather, a number of words related to economy have frequently used to report the 
U.S.-China solar panel trade issue. Trade, companies, industry, and manufacturers were 










Table 14. Top 20 frequently used words in the U.S.-China solar panel trade issue 
Word 
 
Count Weighted Percentage 
solar  1580 2.84% 
china  1146 2.06% 
chinese  979 1.76% 
trade  658 1.18% 
energy  554 0.99% 
panels  494 0.89% 
companies  486 0.87% 
industry  396 0.71% 
tariffs  382 0.69% 
panel  360 0.65% 
united  352 0.63% 
american  347 0.62% 
states  337 0.60% 
government  336 0.60% 




 The result of the network analyses is consistent with that of the word frequency 
analysis. The anti-Chinese solar panel group speaks more about the economic and 
fairness issues than about the affordability of solar energy. Figure 20-c shows that only 
two actors in the anti-Chinese solar panel group speak about the affordability issue. In 
contrast, almost all the actors in the anti-Chinese solar panel group speak about either the 
imported panels’ impact on the U.S. economy or the trade practices of the Chinese solar 
panels (Figure 20-b and 20-d). On the tariff issue, the positions of the group are not 
consistent. Some organizations agree with the tariff, while the others don’t agree or are 
















Note: Four figures are the same network with different visualization. a) visualizes the 
stances in “the tariff on Chinese solar panels is necessary.” b) visualizes of the stances in 
“Chinese solar panels benefit the U.S economy.” c) visualizes of the stances in “Chinese 
solar panels benefit the affordability of solar energy.” d) visualizes of the stances in “the 
trade practices of Chinese solar panels are fair.” Node color indicates stances in each 
category. Red indicates “No”, Blue indicates “Yes” and Black indicates “no statement 
available.” 
 
 For the anti-Chinese solar panel group, “unfair trade practices” of China was a big 
problem. On September 28, 2010, 181 members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
wrote to the president to urge the administration to deal with China’s unfair trade 
practices and dominating of the green technology sector. Senator Ron Wyden argued that 
the American solar industry had been struggling even though the demand for solar energy 
had been rapidly increasing because “China is cheating.” Representative Edward Markey 
also said “China is eating our breakfast and moving to our lunch and dinner in the 
renewable energy field.” For the actors in the anti-Chinese solar panel group, the problem 
was that China had attempted to dominate global green technology market using unfair 
a) b) 
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practices. Rather than focusing on a specific policy, they focused on framing the issue as 
an economic and trade issue. 
 On the other hand, the pro-Chinese solar panel group has been more interested in 
policy than in framings. Most of the actors announced that they were against the tariff on 
Chinese solar panels. Since most of the organizations have engaged in the debates on 
Chinese solar panels to stop litigation caused by SolarWorld’s petition, their interest was 
directly on the U.S. policy itself rather than framings for Chinese solar panels.  
 As part of their fight, they also argued against the framings of the anti-Chinese 
solar panel group. Some actors argued that the U.S. economy is benefitted from the low-
priced Chinese solar panels. For instance, Andrew Beebe, the Chief Commercial Officer 
of Suntech, a China-based module manufacturer, said a major portion of the U.S. solar 
industry is other than solar panel manufacturing: 
“Only a small proportion of the American solar industry is involved in the kind of 
manufacturing SolarWorld does, which the antidumping duties are supposed to help 
save. About 95,000 of the 100,000 solar-industry jobs in the U.S. are either with 
upstream producers of capital equipment, polysilicon and the like; manufacturers of 
complementary components such as racks; or downstream services surrounding solar-
project construction, installation and engineering” 
 Many of the U.S. actors also praised the economic benefits of Chinese solar 
panels. Lisa Jackson, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), said: 
“employing local residents to install solar panels had environmental and economic 
benefits, regardless of where the panels were made” after visiting a local solar project 
using Chinese solar panels. Tony Clifford, the chief executive of Standard Solar, a U.S. 
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solar installer, said that a trade war with China risked “to slow or halt the momentum of 
solar installation in the U.S.”  
 Chinese solar panels’ contribution to the affordability of solar energy was also an 
important aspect for the pro-Chinese solar panel group, but it was less critical compared 
to other frames. The actors in the group argued that Chinese solar panels contribute 
solving environmental problems by lowering the costs of renewable energy. The Ministry 
of Commerce of China argued, “The United States has no reason to criticize other 
countries’ efforts to try to improve humanity’s environment.” Matthew Slaughter, a 
professor at Dartmouth College said: “If the goal is to spur wide adoption of new energy 
sources, why should I care if it is produced in China, Germany, Spain, or the U.S.?” 
 Compared to the anti-Chinese solar panel group, the pro-Chinese solar panel 
group’s arguments on the fairness of trade practices were reactive rather than proactive. 
Most of the actors denied that Chinese solar panel manufacturers received unfair 
subsidies from the government. Robert Petrina, managing director of Yingli Green 
Energy America said: “We are not dumping, nor do we believe that we are unfairly 
subsidized.” The actors said that the success of Chinese solar panels is due to lower costs 
and better technology. Mark Kingsley, the chief commercial officer of Trina Solar, said 
that the U.S. tariffs “don't take into account legitimate cost-cutting that Chinese 
manufacturers have been able to achieve.” Their arguments focused on that the trade of 
Chinese solar products was fair. 
 
Discussion 
 The findings do not support the proposition, which was that the central domestic 
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actors of a renewable energy field have framed a renewable energy trade issue with the 
traditional environmental frame. The U.S.-China solar panel trade issue was framed as an 
economic and trade issue rather than an environmental issue, which has been a traditional 
frame of renewable energy, by solar multinational corporations headquartered in other 
countries. The U.S. solar corporations were not prominent in framing Chinese solar panel 
issue. They were divided into two coalitions; solar module manufacturers were in the 
anti-Chinese solar panel coalition, but the other U.S. solar corporations were in the pro-
Chinese solar panel coalition.  
 These findings show that an issue field is not necessarily dominated by the central 
actors of an existing exchange field. The findings support that an issue field is dominated 
by the actors, which have strong interests in the issue. SolarWorld initiated changes in 
existing exchange field, and an issue field was created as other organizations participated 
in the debate on Chinese solar panels. SolarWorld initiated the changes because it had 
struggled with rising competition with low-priced Chinese solar panels. Meanwhile, 
multinational corporations headquartered in China were prominent actors leading the pro-
Chinese solar panel coalition. They were active in addressing this issue since it was very 
critical for their survival in the U.S. market. Chinese manufacturers had to fight against 
SolarWorld’s petition because a policy measure to restrict Chinese solar panels was 
expected to harm the profitability of them.  
 SolarWorld and Chinese manufacturers overcame the disadvantage as a foreign 
organization by strategically collaborating with U.S. organizations. SolarWorld has led 
the Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing (CASM), whose purpose is to oppose 
“illegal trade practices” in the solar industry. Many small U.S.-based solar corporations 
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have joined in the CASM, and it represented around 240 “U.S” solar organizations as of 
2013. Chinese solar multinationals have collaborated with U.S. organizations through the 
CASE. The CASE had a number of large U.S. solar installers such as SunEdison and 
Solar City as member companies. 
 The framings of the Chinese solar panel were different from the traditional 
framing of the solar PV field. The Chinese solar panel issue was framed as an economic 
and trade issue rather than as an environmental issue. It is not addressed within the 
traditional framings of renewable energy because it introduced conflicts between 
industry’s interests and the traditional goal of solar energy. Since low-priced Chinese 
solar panels contributed to achieve the goal of reducing cost in solar energy, a policy 
measure to restrict Chinese solar panels would conflict with the goal. In this context, the 
contribution to affordability of solar energy was barely mentioned by anti-Chinese solar 
panel coalition. They framed the issue from economic and trade perspective.  
 This chapter shows that multinational solar corporations’ reactions to the external 
environment are more than adapting to changes. Chapter 3 showed that an individual 
multinational corporation tended to adapt to the environment rather than to attempt to 
change the environment. However, multinational corporations were more active in 
changing the external environment through collaborating with other actors. They framed 
a new challenge differently from the traditional frame, and collaborated with diverse 
actors from multiple fields.  
 Since this study focused on the framing of the trade issue, it is limited in 
explaining how this framing has affected a real policy change. Although the corporations 
attempted to affect policies through framing an issue, it would not necessarily influence 
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actual policy changes. Future research can complement the limitation of this research 
through investigating the relations between framing and actual policy change.   
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Chapter 5. Solar policies and industry in the United States 
 
Introduction 
 Since the 1970s, the U.S. government has promoted renewable energy sources 
through multiple policies including research and development programs, tax credits, and 
financial assistance. These policies have created, extended, and expanded through a 
number of acts in recent years. Although the policies have changed in various ways over 
time, they have a common goal, which is to increase the use of renewable energy. 
 Recently, a different type of policy has been introduced—the tariff on solar panels 
imported from China. The tariff has increased the costs of solar energy by adding a tariff 
on solar products. This policy is different from the other renewable energy policies 
currently in place in that its goal is not to increase the use of renewable energy, rather it is 
intended to fix the trade practices of renewable energy products. Moreover, while the 
other renewable energy policies have benefitted all actors in renewable energy field, the 
tariff has only benefitted solar panel manufacturers. Most of the actors in the U.S. solar 
PV field other than the manufacturers were against the tariff, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
The introduction of the tariff on Chinese solar panels shows that renewable energy 
policies are more than supports in order to increase the renewable energy installation at 
this point. 
  This chapter explores how the U.S. solar industry has affected these changes of 
national solar policies. As the U.S. solar PV industry grows, the industry has become 
more actively involved in policy issues. Solar PV corporations have influenced relevant 
policy issues through industry organizations such as the Solar Energy Industry 
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Association. They have fought for the extension of the solar investment tax credit, which 
was extended through 2021 in December 2015. Other than the investment tax credit 
(ITC), the industry has engaged in diverse policy issues such as transmission, permitting, 
and trade in federal-level as well as in state-level. Recently, the industry has engaged in 
the policymaking of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which requires electricity-generating 
units to reduce carbon emissions, to take advantage of it as an opportunity to boost the 
solar market. As the industry has pursued more favorable market conditions through 
engaging in policy issues, the boundary of relevant solar policies has been expanded to 
trade policies and climate policies.  
   In this chapter, the interactions between policies and the solar PV industry are 
explored. By using qualitative interviews, archival data, and observational data, this 
chapter describes the evolution of the federal solar policies, the changes of solar market 
environment from the industry’s perspective, and the reactions of the solar corporations 
to the market changes. Lastly, the interactions between the evolution of the policies and 
the industry are analyzed. 
 
Data and method 
 Three data sources were used for the study: qualitative interviews, archival data, 
and observational data. The interviews were conducted with 24 organizations or 
individuals in the U.S. solar PV field. Archival data on the U.S. solar policy was obtained 
from the govinfo, the online archive of the Government Publishing Office, and GovTrack, 
the website for tracking federal legislations. Observations in a number of conferences in 
the U.S. were also used as data. 
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 Two groups of actors in the U.S. solar PV field were interviewed: the executives 
and managers of solar PV corporations, and the experts of the U.S. solar PV field. The 
expert refers to an individual who has expertise on solar PV industry, market, or policy. 
A sampling frame has been set up for each group. The sampling frame for the solar PV 
corporations was set up based on the list of the members of the Solar Energy Industries 
Association. Among 450 members, non-profit organizations were excluded. Service 
providers such as consultancy or legal service providers were also excluded since they 
were not regarded as solar PV corporations given the minor share of their solar business. 
Manufacturers of components were excluded for the same reason. Among the remaining 
260 companies, 40 companies, which have participated in one of the three trade shows—
2015 Solar Power International, 2016 PV Conference and Expo, and 2016 Solar Power 
International—were selected as samples. A random individual was contacted in the booth 
of each corporation, and most of the individuals recommended meeting another person 
who could answer the interview questions. The recommended person was contacted again 
and was asked to participate to the research. Through this process, 19 representatives 
from the corporations agreed to be interviewed (see Appendix A).   
 For setting up the sampling frame for the solar experts, the organizations and 
individuals that gave their opinions on the Chinese solar panel issue, which was one of 
the most critical issues of solar PV recently, were listed. Next, the organizations relevant 
to renewable energy found by Internet search were added. After an interview, some 
interviewees recommended the experts who had expertise on the topic of the study. These 
experts were also added in the sampling frame. As a result, the list included 15 experts. 
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Each expert was contacted via email or phone call, and 5 of them agreed to be 
interviewed.  
 All the interviews were conducted in-person except one. One representative of a 
corporation agreed with an email interview rather than an in-person interview. Some 
interviewees did not agree to be recorded. In this case, the memo written during the 
interview was used as data. The interviews were conducted during the period from April 
20, 2015 to September 14, 2016. A pre-determined protocol was used for each interview, 
but the interview questions were modified according to the expertise of each respondent 
(see Appendix D). 
 Archival data was obtained from the govinfo, the online archive of the 
Government Publishing Office. All the documents related to solar policies were obtained 
through searching the title of the documents including ‘solar’ or ‘photovoltaic’ in all the 
publications from the three branches of the federal government. The results of the search 
showed 1,148 documents. After excluding duplicated documents and the documents that 
only include the search terms and were not related to solar policy, 218 documents 
remained. The documents include bills, federal registers, congressional records, and the 
documents on the U.S. codes. Since these documents did not include some important bills 
that did not include ‘solar’ or ‘photovoltaic’ in the title, additional documents were 
obtained through searching the bills including ‘solar,’ in all the enacted bills in the 
Govtrack. Through this process, 157 enacted bills were added in the dataset.  
 Finally, the memos written through observing conferences were used as data. A 
number of sessions on diverse topic related to solar PV policy and industry were 
observed in the 2015 ACORE National Renewable Energy Policy Forum, 2015 Solar 
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Power International, 2016 PV Conference and Expo, and 2016 Solar Power International 
(see Appendix C).  
 
Solar PV and industry in the United States 
 Solar energy installation has significantly increased in recent years. The share of 
solar energy in electricity generation capacity additions was only 1 percent in 2007, but it 
has increased to 20 percent in 2014 (Figure 21). Rapid increase of large utility scale 
projects has driven this dramatic rise of solar installation (Figure 22).  
 
Figure 21. U.S. electricity generation capacity additions, 2007-2014. 
 
Source: Electric Power Annual 2014; 2013; 2012; 2011; 2010; 2009; 2008; 2007, U.S. 
Energy Information Administration. 
 
 The total PV installation in 2015 was more than seventy times of the installation 
in 2005. As Figure 20 shows, the solar installation has started taking off around 2010. In 
2011, 1,919 MW of solar systems were installed, which represents 109 percent growth 
over 2010. Since then, PV installation showed sharp growth. Solar installations 






















increase of large-scale projects. In 2011, 28 projects over 10MW were installed, up from 
8 projects in 2010. While the share of the utility market was about 1 percent of the total 
PV installations in 2005, the share has increased to 57 percent in 2015. 
 
Figure 22. U.S. PV installation by segment, 2000-2015.  
 
Source: U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2013 Year-in-Review; U.S. Solar Market 
Insight Report: 2014 Year-in-Review; U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2015 Year-in-
Review. 
 
 Decreasing system costs have driven the growth of solar PV installation. As for 
the utility, the average installed PV system price has dropped to $1.3/W in 2015 from 
$3.2/W in 2011. This was possible due to the reduction of the costs of the solar products. 
The prices of wafers, cells, and modules significantly decreased during 2010-2012 
(Figure 23). Moreover, the competition among companies has been a driver of cost-down 

















Figure 23. U.S. wafer, cell, module prices. 2010-2015. 
 
Source: U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2011 Year-in-Review; U.S. Solar Market 
Insight Report: 2012 Year-in-Review; U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2013 Year-in-
Review; U.S. Solar Market Insight Report: 2014 Year-in-Review; U.S. Solar Market 
Insight Report: 2015 Year-in-Review. 
 
 As of November 7, 2015, 543 solar PV corporations were registered as a member 
of the SEIA. More than 70 percent of these corporations are service providers such as 
installers, project developers, finance institutions, and consultancy (Figure 24). The 
manufacturing of solar products such as cells and modules does not account for a 
significant share in terms of the number of the companies. Only 20 companies are 













Figure 24. Member companies of the SEIA by business. 
Source: Solar Energy Industry Association, November 7th, 2015. 
  
 
 Figure 25 also supports that manufacturing is not significant in the U.S. solar PV 
industry. In 2013, the portion of the U.S in the production of solar cells and modules is 
only about 2 percent. The total production of cell and module has sharply increased in the 
world in recent years, but it has not increased in the U.S. Figure 26 shows that the 
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Figure 25. Solar PV cell and module production, 2007-2013. 
 
Source: http://www.earth-policy.org/?/data_center/C23/; GTM Research 
  
Figure 26. Solar PV cell and module production in the U.S., 2007-2013. 
 






































 The U.S. solar manufacturing is dominated by multinational corporations 
headquartered in other countries. In 2015, among 20 cell and module manufacturers in 
the U.S., only 5 are headquartered in the U.S. (Figure 27). The manufacturers 
headquartered in China have the largest share of the U.S. solar cell and module 
manufacturing. The rest of the corporations are headquartered in Canada, Germany, 
India, South Korea, and Vietnam. 
 











Source: Solar Energy Industries Association, November 7th, 2015. 
 
 The dominance of the manufacturers headquartered in other countries was 
partially caused by the recent solar market conditions. In recent years, many solar 
manufacturers went out of solar business under the imbalance of the solar market. The 
declining demand due to the global financial crisis and the increasing supply from 

















circumstances, since 2011, numerous manufacturers including Solyndra, Helios USA, 
and BP Solar closed their U.S. production facilities (Table 15).  
 







Abound Solar 2009 2012 CO Module 
Evergreen Solar Inc. 2008 2011 MA Wafers 
Helios USA 2010 2013 WI Modules 
MEMC Southwest Inc. 1995 2011 TX Ingots 
Nanosolar 2009 2013 CA Modules 
MX Solar 2010 2012 NJ Modules 
SolarWorld Americas 2007 2011 CA Modules 
Solon America Corp. 2008 2011 AZ Modules 
Solar Power Industries 2003 2011 PA Cells, 
modules 
Solyndra Inc. 2010 2011 CA Modules 
Spectra Watt Inc. 2009 2011 NY Cells 
BP Solar 1998 2012 MD Cells, 
modules 
Energy Conversion Devices 2003 2011 MI Cells, 
modules 
Suntech 2010 2013 AZ Modules 
Sharp Solar 2003 2014 TN Modules 
Sanyo 2003 2012 CA Wafers 
Source: U.S. Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing: Industry Trends, Global Competition, 
Federal Support, Michaela Platzer, January 27, 2015. 
 
 While manufacturing has barely contributed to the solar industry development, 
installation has led the development of industry. In recent years, installation has provided 
a majority of additional solar jobs driven by massive increase of solar installations 
(Figure 28). Project development sector has also added increasing number of jobs. In 
contrast, manufacturing has provided similar number of jobs in recent years. This shows 
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that the growth U.S. solar industry is driven by the growth of service sectors rather than 
manufacturing.  
Figure 28. Solar energy employment by sector, 2010-2015. 
 
Source: The Solar Foundation, National Solar Jobs Census 2015. 
 
Federal solar policies 
 In the 1970s, there was a shift of the U.S. energy policy from oil and gas supply to 
energy conservation and alternative energy sources.120 Two energy crises during the 
1970s, the oil embargo in 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1978-1979, have drawn 
policymakers’ attention to the problems of energy markets. These issues include 
dependence on imports, energy shortages, and productivity issues. Moreover, increasing 
awareness of environmental degradation has weakened political support for oil and gas.   
 In this context, solar energy has received support from the government since the 
1970s. The first major act on solar energy was the Solar Energy Research, Development, 
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and Demonstration Act, enacted in 1974. The act said that the production of solar energy 
will help “to eliminate the dependence of the United States upon foreign energy sources 
and promote the national defense.”121 The promotion of solar energy as an alternative 
energy source began in the 1970s to solve the nation’s energy shortage.  
 In the U.S., solar energy has developed mainly based on two kinds of policy 
measures: a tax policy and research and development programs. A tax policy has been a 
main measure to develop renewable energy; the expenditure for tax policy accounted for 
about 60 percent of the total federal expenditure for renewable energy development 
(Figure 29). Research and development programs have also been a major policy measure. 
Renewable energy is one of the energy resources that the federal government has spent 
the largest amount of its R&D budget on, along with coal and nuclear power. 
 
Figure 29. Federal expenditures for energy development by source, 1950-2010.  
 
 
Source: 60 Years of Energy Incentives: Analysis of Federal Expenditures for Energy 
Development, Management Information Services, Inc., October 2011. 
                                                        
121 Solar Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1974, Public Law 
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 In 1978, four acts that include solar policies were enacted. The Energy Tax Act 
included an income tax credit to the residents who use solar, wind, and geothermal 
sources of energy. The credit was a 30 percent of the expenditure up to $2,000 and a 20 
percent of the expenditure between $2,000 and $10,000. The Act also included a 10 
percent business tax credit for investments in energy properties including solar and wind 
energy. Another two Acts authorized financial assistance programs for solar energy. The 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act empowered the Secretary of Energy to direct 
the Federal National Mortgage Association to make commitments to purchase loans and 
advances of credit relevant to installing solar energy systems. The Small Business Energy 
Loan Act empowered the administration to create a solar energy loan program to small 
business. In the same year, the Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, 
Photovoltaic and Demonstration Act  was enacted to provide more support for research, 
development, and demonstration for solar energy. The act included quantified objectives: 
1) to double the production of solar PV system each year; 2) to reduce the average cost of 
installed solar PV energy systems to $1 per peak watt by 1988; and 3) to stimulate the 
purchase by private buyers of all the solar PV systems in 1988.122 
 In 1980, under the Energy Security Act, the Solar Energy and Energy 
Conservation Bank Act was enacted. The act was to create Solar Energy and Energy 
Conservation Bank, which provided financial assistance to the expenditures for 
residential and commercial energy conserving improvements and solar energy systems. 
The purpose of the policy was to encourage the use of solar energy, and to “reduce the 
                                                        
122 Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, Photovoltaic and Demonstration 
Act of 1978, Public Law 95-590. 92 Stat. 2513. 1978. 
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Nation’s dependence on foreign sources of energy supplies.”123 Energy security was still 
a critical driver of promoting solar energy in the 1980s. 
 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the energy investment credit for solar 
energy property. In the act, the credit for solar energy was set as 15, 12, and 10 percent in 
1986, 1987, and 1988, respectively. The credit has expanded by another acts for the next 
few years. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1989 extended the credit through 
1990. In 1992, the Tax Extension Act extended the credit through 1992 again.  
 In 1989, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Technology 
Competitiveness Act was enacted to authorize “aggressive” national programs of 
research, development, and demonstration of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
technologies. The act included national goals for the national programs. The specific 
goals for PV energy systems include: 1) to improve operational reliability of photovoltaic 
modules to 30 years by 1995; 2) to increase photovoltaic conversion efficiencies by 20 
percent by 1995; 3) to decrease new photovoltaic module direct manufacturing costs to 
$800 per kilowatt by 1995; and 4) to increase cost efficiency of photovoltaic power 
production to 10 cents per kilowatt hour by 1995. Compared to the goals in the Solar 
Photovoltaic Energy Research, Development, Photovoltaic and Demonstration Act, these 
goals were much more specific. 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created one of the most important policies for 
solar energy, which was a 30 percent of business investment tax credit for the 
investments in solar energy properties. The period was from January 2006 through 
December 2007. This credit was extended for an additional year through 2008 by the Tax 
                                                        
123 Energy Security Act of 1980, Public Law 96-294, 94 STAT. 611. 1980. 
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Relief and Health Care Act 2006. In 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
included an eight-year extension of the credit through December 31, 2016.  
 This investment tax credit (ITC) was pointed out as one of the most important 
policies for solar PV industry development in the U.S. by a majority of the actors in the 
solar PV field. The ITC has helped solar technology to compete with other energy 
sources. A research manager at the Smart Electric Power Alliance (SEPA) said, “ITC is 
kind of [the] one and only incentive [that makes investment banks] all interested in 
investing in solar industries instead of others.”124 The eight-year extension of the ITC was 
especially beneficial to solar industry. The director of the GW Solar Institute pointed out: 
“The eight-year certainty of policy encouraged industry to make longer-term investment 
in terms of business plan, R&D, or large scale projects like utility-scale [projects].”125 
Other than the experts, most of the representatives of the solar PV corporations 
interviewed also mentioned that the ITC was one of the most important solar policies for 
them. 
 The solar ITC was more helpful since the timing of implementation was 
appropriate. A program manager at Solar Foundation explained, “The investment tax 
credit came at a period that was really quite well timed because from the mid-2000s, the 
German solar industry have been ramping up and increasing production and those 
companies are selling it to the solar industry or able to reach the economies of scale”.126 
The solar ITC became a more effective policy since the costs of solar was coming down 
as a result of the investments in solar PV industry in Germany and Europe. 
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 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 has introduced another important policy for solar 
energy, the loan guarantee program. The act authorized the Department of Energy to 
guarantee loans for the projects that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases” or “employ new or significantly improved 
technologies.”127 The program was to encourage commercial use of new energy 
technologies in early stages. According to the SEIA, as of August 2016, eleven utility-
scale solar power plants have received loan guarantees, whose total capacity is expected 
to be 2,700MW. 
 In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) extended much 
support for renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies. It included $16.8 
billion in funding for energy efficiency and renewable energy. As for solar energy, the act 
included a cash grant in lieu of the ITC for solar properties. It also included $6 billion in 
loan guarantees for renewable energy and electric power transmission programs. Since 
this act provides broad funding for energy technologies, it has contributed to developing 
the technologies that were helpful for expanding solar energy: “Most of the energy 
storage that are large and interesting and supported by utilities today were funded through 
ARRA and now that the utilities had gotten a taste for energy storage that serving to be 
able to get permission from their utility commissions to rate-based those types of 
technologies and start developing their own without federal support”.128 In this context, 
the ARRA has contributed to building the infrastructure for the expansion of solar energy 
as well as direct supports such as a cash grant. 
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 The solar ITC, which was expected to expire at the end of 2016, has extended 
again through 2021 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act in 2016. According to the 
act, the ITC will be 30 percent by the end of 2019, and it will be adjusted to 26 percent by 
the end of 2020, and to 22 percent by the end of 2021.  
 Table 16 summarized the major statutes for solar policy. Solar policies have been 
developed as a part of the energy policies for the nation’s “secure, affordable, and 
reliable” energy production. The overall direction of the policies was to increase the share 
of solar energy in the U.S. energy mix. The ITC has contributed this goal by reducing the 
costs of solar energy. Research and development programs have contributed by reducing 
the costs by encouraging relevant technology development. Financial assistance such as 
loan programs has lowered the barriers for the investors of solar installations. This was 
described as “confluence of policies” by one of the experts interviewed.129 Since all the 
policies has served a common goal, solar has significantly grown in the United States. 
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Table 16. U.S. statute including solar policies.  
Year Statute Purpose Solar Policy 
1974 Solar Energy Research, Development, 
and Demonstration Act 
To authorize a vigorous Federal program of 
research, development, and demonstration to 
assure the utilization of solar energy as a viable 




1978 Energy Tax Act To provide tax incentives for the production 
and conservation of energy 
Creation of tax credit 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act To reduce the growth in demand for energy in 
the United States, and to conserve 
nonrenewable energy resources produced in this 
Nation and elsewhere, without inhibiting 
beneficial economic growth 
Loan program 
Small Business Energy Loan Act To create a solar energy and energy 
conservation loan program 
Loan program 
Solar Photovoltaic Energy Research, 
Development, and Demonstration Act 
To establish during the next decade an 
aggressive research, development, and 
demonstration program involving solar 
photovoltaic energy systems and in the long 
term, to have as an objective the production of 
electricity from photovoltaic systems cost 
competitive with utility-generated electricity 




1980 Solar Energy and Energy Conservation 
Bank Act 
To increase the Nation's security by reducing its 
dependence upon imported oil. 
Financial assistance 
1986 Tax Reform Act To reform the internal revenue laws Extension of tax credit 
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1989 Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Technology Competitiveness 
Act 
To provide Federal assistance and leadership to 
a program of research, development, and 
demonstration of renewable energy and energy 




1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act To provide for reconciliation pursuant to 
section 4 of the concurrent resolution on the 
budget for fiscal year 1991 
Extension of tax credit 
1991 Tax Extension Act To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 Extension of tax credit 
2005 Energy Policy Act To ensure jobs for our future with secure, 
affordable, and reliable energy  
Creation of tax credit 
Loan guarantee 
2006 Tax Relief and Health Care Act To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 Extension of tax credit 
2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act To provide incentives for energy production 
and conservation 
Extension of tax credit 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act 
To make supplemental appropriations for job 
preservation and creation, infrastructure 
investment, energy efficiency and science, 
assistance to the unemployed, and State and 
local fiscal stabilization 
Research grant 
Loan guarantee 
2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act To make appropriations for military 
construction, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and related agencies for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 2016, and for other 
purposes 
Extension of tax credit 
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 In 2012, a different type of solar policy from these policies was introduced. On 
December 7, 2012, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the Department of 
Commerce, issued a countervailing duty order on solar cells from China. The decision 
was based on the determination of the International Trade Commission that an industry in 
the U.S. is “materially injured by reason of imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic 
cells and modules from China.”130 Since SolarWorld and six other manufacturers 
submitted petitions on October 19, 2011, the Department of Commerce has investigated 
the case of the crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from China. On December 16, 2011, 
the Department determined that the photovoltaic cells from China have been sold in the 
U.S. at less than fair value and subsidized by the Government of China.  
 On February 10, 2015, the International Trade Commission determined that an 
industry in the U.S. is materially injured by the imports of solar cells from Taiwan as well 
as China. Based on this determination, the Department of Commerce issued an 
antidumping duty order on solar cells imported from Taiwan on February 18, 2015. The 
investigation was initiated by the submission of another anti-dumping petition of 
SolarWorld regarding the imports of solar cells and panels from Taiwan on December 31, 
2013.   
 The tariff on the solar cells imported from China and Taiwan was different from 
the solar policies described above in that it serves a different goal. The tariff was 
determined to fix the “unfair” practices of international trade. In this sense, it is not 
related to the original goal of the solar policies, which was to increase solar installation. 
Rather, the tariff could be a barrier to achieve the goal because it increases the costs of 
                                                        
130 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules 
From China,” 77 Federal Register 235 (December 6, 2012) 
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solar products. The introduction of the tariff shows that the boundary of solar policies is 
expanded to trade policies from energy policies. 
 
Changes of the solar PV market environment 
 To understand the influence of the solar industry to solar policies, the recent 
actions of the industry need to be investigated. Before describing the actions, the changes 
of the external environment of the solar industry are explored in this section to better 
understand the contexts of the actions of the industry.  
 
Drivers of the growth of the U.S. solar market 
 Most of the corporations interviewed described that the U.S. solar market has 
grown very fast in the recent decade. The corporations perceived that the drivers of the 
growth were government policies, lowered cost, technological innovation, and increased 
public awareness of solar power. 
 Government policies were pointed out as one of the most important driver of the 
development of the solar market. One project developer stated: “When the government 
got involved and started creating subsidies to encourage people to use alternatives, that’s 
when the boom in the market really started to grow”.131 The policies not only opened up a 
market, but also they have influenced the market constantly. The solar corporations 
interviewed agreed that various policies have been affected the solar market and they are 
still very influential for the market conditions. The policies mentioned included the ITC, 
net-metering, the Clean Power Plan, the tariff on Chinese solar panels, Renewable 
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Portfolio Standard in several states, state-level credits, state-level domestic procurement 
requirement, and even building codes. 
   Many corporations stated that the U.S. solar market has benefitted by sharply 
decreased cost of solar systems. A module manufacturer stated: “In a short amount of 
time, the module price came down so fast. That’s why the market has grown so fast”.132 
One of the other module manufacturers pointed out that cost was a “fundamental” driver. 
The representative of the manufacturer stated: “I think mostly people go solar for 
economic reason”.133 The cost of solar has significantly decreased in recent years. A 
project developer company said that solar beats gas in terms of costs in one of its 
projects.134 Over time, the cost of solar has become more competitive compared to 
conventional energy sources. 
 Technological innovations have also contributed to the development of the solar 
market. Two corporations pointed out that the invention of financing vehicles was very 
important for the development of solar energy. One module manufacturer said that 
financing was the “biggest innovation for last years,” which has led the growth of the 
residential solar market.135 Accumulated technical experience has also positively affected 
the solar market. An installer pointed out: “Technology has advanced to the point where 
efficiencies are so high that we can build very big projects”.136 He added: “Back in 2009, 
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you wouldn’t hear about building 20MW project, which is now one of small [plants] 
what we built”.137 
 Increased public awareness of solar energy has been one of the drivers of the solar 
market development. A maintenance service provider stated: “So many more people 
know and understand the benefits of clean energy. They are willing to pay extra premium 
for that”.138 People feel solar technology is “real” now. A module manufacturer pointed 
out: “[Solar] is not theorem of science fiction. People think it as real. They see it on 
neighbor’s home. They see it on kids’ school”.139 The maintenance service provider 
added that commercials of solar technologies on TV and radio stations have led the 
enhanced awareness.140 The commercials of solar products and services have led people 
to think that solar is more commonplace and more preferred. 
 These four drivers of solar market development are connected one another. 
Government policies have contributed to lowering the cost, to encouraging technology 
innovations, and to increasing public awareness of solar technologies. Decreasing cost of 
solar, technology innovations, and the interests of the public in solar energy have led the 
government to be more interested in promoting solar energy. People want to go green 
because they have seen the technology innovations and the rise of many solar 
corporations. The U.S. solar market has grown based on the positive feedbacks between 
these drivers.  
 
The ocean of policies 
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 The ITC, a 30% tax credit for the investments in solar system, is one of the most 
important solar policies in the United States. All the corporations interviewed mentioned 
the ITC. They said that the ITC has led the U.S. solar market to grow and flourish.  
 Although most of the corporations stated the importance of the ITC in the U.S. 
solar market, no one has strongly argued for the necessity of the extension of the ITC.141 
Most of the companies said that the solar market will survive without the ITC. A module 
manufacturer said: “Even if [the] ITC were cut down to 10%, we believe we still see 
solar grow, but it could actually slow down the growth or development of solar”.142 Some 
corporations said that the effects of the ITC on their business were not very significant. A 
module manufacturer said that the ITC would not affect it directly because they don’t 
develop or sell projects, and one service provider did not see significant effect of the 
expiration of the ITC since they did not participate in the construction side.  
 Even the corporations in downstream did not strongly argue for the extension of 
the ITC. An installer said what they want was to know what is going to happen rather 
than the extension itself: “We are great to have certainty. Nothing changed, but being 
able to prepare for what might change”143 A project developer said that the extension of 
the ITC was important, but it stated that other policies including net-metering, the Clean 
Power Plan, and the design of electricity rates were also very important.144 
                                                        
141 Twelve out of nineteen firm interviews were conducted before the decision of the 
extension of the ITC in 2016.  
142 Interview #11. Even if the 30 percent ITC expired, 10 percent ITC for commercial 
projects would have been remained since the 10 percent is based on a different act from 
the act including the 30 percent ITC.  
143 Interview #21 
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 133 
 This infers that a single policy, even the most critical federal policy, does not 
transform the solar market at this point. Diverse policies across energy, trade, and climate 
policy influence the solar market in different ways. The solar corporations want solar 
friendly market institutions rather than a specific policy support. A module manufacturer 
said: “I think there will come at point where we won’t really need subsidies, but we still 
need policy that’s friendly to solar. It doesn’t have to be tax subsidy, but you need to 
have an environment [that] encourages solar”.145 A module manufacturer used the term, 
“the ocean,” when described the policy factors. The representative of the company stated: 
“Policy factors include a lot of different levels of policies including trade policy, 
permitting policy and energy policy. It’s like what makes the ocean.”146  
 Table 17 shows all the policies that were mentioned by the interviewed 
companies. Various policies including a trade policy and a climate policy have been 
pointed out as important policies for solar industry. The solar PV corporations perceive 
that various federal- and state-level policies influence the solar market in different ways. 
Multinational corporations tend to perceive more policies as important compared to 
domestic companies. Since most of domestic corporations are smaller than multinational 
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146 Observation #11. The representative of a solar manufacturer did not agree with an 
interview, but agreed with an informal talk. The quote is from the memo written during 
the informal talk. 
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Table 17. U.S. policies mentioned by the interviewed companies. 
 Federal-level State-level 
Multinational 
corporations 
• Investment tax credit 
• Tariff on Chinese solar 
panels 
• Research Fund 
• Clean Power Plan 
• Property assessed clean 
energy (PACE) financing 
• National electric codes 
• Laws and regulations in 
every state 
• Net metering 
• Electricity rate 
• Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
• Domestic content 
requirement 
Domestic corporations 
• Investment tax credit 
• Clean Power Plan 
• Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
• Net metering 
 
The impact of the globalized solar market  
 Germany and China have been two most influential countries in the global solar 
market, but each country had affected the U.S. market in different ways. Germany has 
significantly contributed to market creation and technology development. The director of 
GW Solar Institute said, “Germany has met tens of billions of dollars saying we want to 
create solar market, so they started off and now they have one third of solar in the 
world”.147 Another expert agreed with Germany’s contribution in the market: “German 
and [European] markets are already sort of taking the lead in creating demand for solar 
[in mid-2000s]”.148 
 Not only Germany contributed to the creation of solar market in the early days of 
solar PV development, but also it has contributed to solar PV technology development. 
One of the experts told a case of the U.S. companies learning from Germany: “One 
experience that happened in Germany is that they had such an aggressive policy to get 
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solar into their grid that they didn’t consider some of the electrical issues that would be 
incurred on the system by having so much solar all at once. So, they had to go back and 
retrofit their grid with advanced inverters. I am aware that utility companies in the U.S. 
saw this and they have been researching the advanced inverters”.149 
 Compared to Germany, China’s contribution to the global market is controversial. 
China came to the solar PV market in late-2000s, when solar PV technology and industry 
were rapidly growing. China manufactured solar products using existing solar 
technologies. In the words of an expert: “[China wanted] to manufacture all this 
technology or assemble it and so they spend a lot of money, probably around 15 billion 
dollars”.150   
 In late-2000s, China’s efforts focused on exporting solar products rather than on 
creating domestic demand. An expert pointed out that China targeted international market 
in the beginning of solar PV development: “China [has seen] the opportunity [in] this 
booming European clean market. That’s why they have this manufacturing sector build 
up and its initial build is for [export]. It’s not for domestic use because at that point the 
domestic solar electricity was not competitive at all with coal-fired power plants”.151 
 Huge investments on solar PV products in China have helped with reducing the 
costs of solar PV worldwide. According to the Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the 
prices of solar module have fallen by 80% during 2008-2012.152 One of the experts said 
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that this cost reduction is “directly correlated to” China’s investments in solar PV.153 He 
added that this benefitted the U.S.: “China wants to subsidize homeowners in the U.S. 
putting on [solar] panels [on their roofs]. That’s good for us. It means more business for 
us”.154 The decrease of the cost of solar products has positively affected the increase of 
solar installations in the United States.  
 However, China’s investments on solar products have harmed some part of the 
solar market since it was barely accompanied with demand creation. While Germany’s 
contribution on cost reduction was achieved by technology development, China’s 
contribution was achieved by large-scale manufacturing. Moreover, China did not make 
much effort to create domestic demand for solar PV compared to its efforts to increase 
supply. This caused imbalance of demand and supply in the global market. The demand 
for solar energy has decreased since global financial crisis in 2008 because governments 
lowered the supports for solar energy, and investors reduced or canceled financing solar 
projects. In contrast, supply has sharply increased by China’s explosive production of 
solar products. Under these circumstances, solar PV manufacturers competed in terms of 
price rather than technology. As the manufacturers have difficulty to compete with 
Chinese firms in terms of price, many solar PV corporations had gone out of the business 
from 2011 to 2013 around the world.  
  Under this circumstance, to protect their domestic solar PV manufacturers, 
governments started introducing policy measures. The EU negotiated with China on a 
quota and minimum price for solar panels imported from China. Some governments such 
as India and Canada attempted to increase the use of domestic solar products by requiring 
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purchasing domestic products or by providing incentives. The U.S. also introduced an 
anti-dumping tariff on Chinese solar products. In the U.S., maintaining domestic solar 
manufacturing was important because manufacturing plays an important role for 
economic development. An expert said that manufacturing was important, especially in 
economic recession: “For the United States, especially during the economic recession 
period, manufacturing holds a key to economic development. That’s not only about job 
creation. That’s important for political [reason], for the Congressmen. They have to win 
this vote from local workers, but fundamentally it’s a sector that can keep United States 
prestigious status in the world economy because if the world once [goes] to green 
economy or clean economy, clean manufacturing is an incessable component”.155 In this 
context, the claim for the necessity of a measure to address Chinese solar products has 
emerged and has been supported.  
 China’s investments in solar PV have caused conflicts in the global market 
because their efforts were not balanced. In many countries, solar PV markets have been 
developed by confluence of diverse policies. For instance, in the U.S., there were many 
different types of policies such as solar ITC, state-level RPS, net metering, and R&D 
supports, which have increased both demand and supply of the solar market. China’s 
approach that focused on production of solar products has increased supply of the market, 
which caused rapid changes of the global solar PV market environment. In the U.S, this 
benefited some industry groups, but it harmed the other industry groups.  
 Under these circumstances, SolarWorld, which is based on Germany, and six U.S. 
solar panel manufacturers submitted the petition concerning solar panels imported from 
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China on October 19, 2011. They claimed that heavily subsidized Chinese solar panels 
were illegally dumped in the United States. As a result, the U.S. Commerce Department 
announced to impose antidumping tariff on Chinese solar panels on December 10, 2012. 
Chinese solar panel manufacturers attempted to avoid the tariff by outsourcing some 
manufacturing in Taiwan. SolarWorld submitted another petition to deal with this issue, 
and the U.S. International Trade Commission determined that the U.S. industry is injured 
by imports of solar PV products from China and Taiwan in January 2015.  
  Module manufacturers described the period of this trade dispute as “a crisis.” A 
module manufacturer stated: “Declining prices cut a lot of margin for module 
manufacturers”.156 He added: “It was very difficult business for players even the ones that 
had big diversified asset.” It took an example of Bosch, which was a big solar 
conglomerate and had exited solar manufacturing at that time.  
 A China-based module manufacturer stated that the trade dispute has introduced 
challenges to it. It had an advantage in 2009, which was the starting year of Chinese 
manufacturers’ flooding into the U.S.: “We were able to come into U.S. with an 
incredible cost advantage over many other producers because of our scale and vertical 
integration”.157 However, the trade disputes between the U.S. and China since 2011 
caused a lot of uncertainty for the company: “It was extremely challenging. There was so 
much uncertainty. It was very difficult to price ahead for projects in pipeline because we 
didn’t know what the outcome of the case would be.” In this context, the representative 
of the company said that the trade dispute also hurt the U.S. market as well as Chinese 
solar manufacturing. The trade dispute has introduced uncertainty in the U.S. market. 
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 It was hard to figure out whether the tariff on Chinese solar panel was effective 
for solving this issue. The corporations interviewed perceived the harms of the tariff 
rather than the benefits of them. No company said that they were benefitted from the 
tariff. China-based module manufacturers pointed out the negative effects of the tariff. 
One China-based module manufacturer stated that the tariff has introduced much risk to 
them since the final rate of the tariff was decided some time after the timing of selling 
modules to the customers. The representative of the company stated: “We got preliminary 
decision to lower the tariff to about 15 percent, so all the customers asked us to fall the 
price our panels lower because they expected the final decision to maintain that lower 
rate. So the prices came down, and then the government changed mind on July”.158 
Another China-based manufacturer also showed concerns on the uncertainty coming from 
the tariff: “It’s a big uncertainty because we don’t know where that’s going. It might go 
up and down”.159 The company was extending production outside China to avoid the 
tariff, and it said that their consumers also want tariff-free modules to “reduce the 
uncertainty on their side.”  
 Even the U.S.-based corporations did not say that they were benefitted from the 
tariff.  The installers, a majority of the U.S solar corporations, did not want the tariff. The 
director of GW Solar Institute pointed out: “The bulk of [solar PV] industry do not 
support [the tariff on Chinese solar panels] because most of the industry is installers”.160 
As the tariff increased the costs of solar installation, the tariff affected negatively to 
installers. Moreover, some corporations have suffered due to the China’s reactions to the 
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tariff. A U.S.-based project developer said that the tariff has negatively affected their 
business.161 After the U.S. government set the tariff on the solar modules from China, the 
Chinese government started an anti-dumping investigation for polysilicon, which is a raw 
material for solar modules, from the U.S. and South Korea. As a result, the imports of 
polysilicon from the U.S. were banned in China. The company said that that decision has 
negatively affected their polysilicon business. 
 From non-manufacturers’ perspective, the tariff has negatively affected solar 
energy in the United States. A former analyst at the SEIA said that the trade disputes 
between the U.S. and China would weaken the competitiveness of solar power: “You 
definitely [are going to] see the price increase if [the U.S. and China] won’t be able to 
reach an agreement.” Under these circumstance, she added, “it’s [going to] be a very long 
way that solar industry to catch up with other kind of resources.”162 
 It is uncertain how the tariff has influenced the U.S. manufacturers. Since a 
majority of the U.S. manufacturers have plants outside the U.S., the effect of the tariff for 
them does not seem very significant. Only the manufacturers based in China mentioned 
the tariff as one of the significant policies during the interview. According to the 
interview data, Chinese manufacturers have absorbed the effect of the tariff by adopting 
strategies such as relocating their plants and reducing costs.163  
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Policy as a source of risks and conflicts in the market 
 Despite the rapid growth of the U.S. solar market, the solar corporations have 
perceived risks and conflicts in the market. Most of these have caused from policies. For 
the other drivers of market growth, the corporations agreed that those have been positive 
factors. Among the policies, the ITC and the tariff on the Chinese solar panels have 
introduced significant risks to the actors in the market although the degrees of impacts 
were different among them.  
 The ITC has affected mostly project developers and independent power 
producers. It has directly influenced the cost of the solar projects. Module manufacturers, 
however, said that they also have risks due to the undecided ITC extension. One module 
producer stated: “ITC might be expiring, customers rush into fulfill their projects, and 
now is a huge spike and we don’t have capacity to support it, and neither do we want to 
expand capacity to meet this demand because next year, the following year of 2017, it’s 
gonna drop. And then, what do you do with the excess of capacity?”164 The undecided 
ITC was likely to make a boom-and-bust cycle in the solar market. Since it affects the 
demand and the supply of the market, the effects have expanded to the whole solar PV 
value chain. 
 The tariff on Chinese solar panels has generated risks to solar corporations and 
conflicts between them. Although the tariff was to address the risks of the U.S. 
manufacturers in the market, it has caused new risks by introducing the possibility of the 
increase of solar cost. During the policymaking process, there was conflicts of interests 
between solar PV corporations. Even after the tariff was set as a policy, the Chinese solar 
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manufacturers have faced risks since the rate is hard to predict. Moreover, the tariff has 
caused a new risk to the U.S. polysilicon manufacturers since Chinese government started 
anti-dumping investigation on the U.S. polysilicon imports. 
 Other policies than the ITC and the tariff have also posed risks to solar PV 
corporations. Many corporations perceived risks and uncertainty caused by state-level 
policies such as Renewable Portfolio Standard, net metering, and incentives. A module 
manufacturer described state-level policies as “chaotic” since they have kept changing.165 
Many solar PV corporations have seen risks from state-level policies since the policies 
were undecided for a longer-term or the incentives have decreased. 
 
The reactions of the solar PV industry to the changing environment 
 The U.S. solar PV corporations have increased manufacturing capacity and have 
expanded their services under the dramatically rising solar market. Many corporations 
said that they have been in growth mode in recent years. A module manufacturer said: 
“We are growing our manufacturing capacity. We also plan to go on EPC in bigger 
scale.”166 An installer planned to “grow with the industry to provide manpower and 
services as needed.”167 Expanding business was a natural choice since the U.S. solar 
industry has enormously grown in recent years. 
 Reducing costs and improving the quality of products have also been important 
for the solar PV corporations. Under increasing competition in the market, pursuing 
lower-cost and better quality products have been a fundamental way to address market 
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changes for the solar corporations. Solar manufacturers have searched room for 
improvement for cost-down. A module manufacturer said that they are trying to be “more 
lean, trying to find ways of streamlining process, try to find ways to alternate more 
work.”168 However, cost-down was not the only goal for the corporations. They have 
pursued better quality of their products, and sometimes this increased the cost. A global 
solar manufacturer said that using a better quality material has increase the cost: “We are 
using a hundred percent silver paste just to boost our efficiency, and then backseat creates 
more durable products. So together it creates better electricity price for customers. Costs 
[are] up a little bit, but quality improvement is much better.”169 
 Innovation has been a leading way for the solar corporations under changing 
market environment. A module manufacturer said that innovation was what it could do 
under complex policies. The representative of the company said: “Under complicated 
policies, what we can do is cost-down and innovation. Everyone has same uncertainty. 
The thing is how aggressively do we innovate.” 170   
 Other than improving their operations and technologies, the U.S. solar 
corporations have also expanded their business. Module manufacturers have expanded to 
downstream business for “higher margin”.171 Recently, downstream business has been the 
most profitable business in the solar PV value chain. Andrew de Pass, the CEO of 
Conergy, one of the largest downstream solar companies, said that big players were 
earning money in downstream: “One can ask a question about some of the relatively three 
large publicly traded solar integrated companies: SunEdision, SunPower, [and] 
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FirstSolar, and one of the issues that research analyst can’t really figure out is where they 
are making money, and for more we understanding in many cases, they’re really not 
making money under manufacturer at all, just push to the downstream.”172 Conergy itself 
has also transformed to a downstream company from a manufacturer recently. It has 
moved to manufacturing when the Chinese corporations have flooded in solar 
manufacturing, and this has led Conergy into insolvency. After that, the company went 
downstream. Andrew de Pass said: “We focused fully as a pure play downstream 
company, and we are completely equipment agnostic.”173 
 Although almost all the module manufacturers have been interested in 
downstream business, the degree of investment has different between them. Module 
manufacturers based in China has developed and has invested in solar power plants 
mainly in China and some of other countries except the United States. The representative 
of one of the module manufacturer based in China said: “In China, we do some project 
development and EPC work and also in some emerging markets like Africa and 
Southeast Asia”.174 Two other solar manufacturers based in China also said that their 
downstream business is conducted mainly in China. One of them explained that their 
main business is still manufacturing: “This year, we are going to be selling between 4.8 
to 5GW. Out of that, less than 1GW will be downstream. So, we are not fully integrated 
to downstream. We are very different from a company such as FirstSolar”.175 
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 The Chinese solar manufacturers have not been active in developing projects in 
the U.S. because they wanted to avoid competition with utilities, which are their biggest 
customers. A Chinese module manufacturer said: “We don’t [do downstream in the U.S] 
because we don’t want to compete with our biggest customers. We think it’s a better 
strategy for us to partner with our customers, not to compete with them”.176 Utility-scale 
players have been the largest customers for the solar manufacturers. A module 
manufacturer said that 95 percent of their business is utility business in the U.S.177  
 The downstream companies have also changed their business portfolio according 
to market changes. A downstream company has focused on providing operations and 
maintenance services rather than on EPC since the solar ITC was supposed to be expired 
in 2017. The representative of the company said: “I know they are expiring in 2017 and 
so, we chose not to participate in the construction of the project. We developed a line of 
services that we can provide to the operations and maintenance [to the] company that has 
a 20-25 years of power purchase agreement”.178 He told that many of the services that his 
company provided were not its initial plans. The services have been created based on the 
demand of the market, which has changed over time.  
 A project developer said that their strategy was to have “flexibility to adapt to the 
market.”179 The company has covered multiple aspects of the solar business including 
project development, EPC, and operations and maintenance. It has adjusted its services 
for different markets and for different clients. The representative of the company said that 
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“being flexible and being open to the opportunity and being able to adapt quickly to 
changes” is important in a business like solar energy.180 
 Some corporations have moved to other countries to maintain its competitiveness 
under changing market conditions. A module manufacturer moved its headquarters to 
Vietnam from China to avoid the anti-dumping tariff on Chinese solar panels. The 
manufacturer differentiated it from other Chinese solar manufacturers by focusing on the 
U.S. and EU with their anti-dumping free products.181 Some other Chinese manufacturers 
have also ramp up its manufacturing capacity outside China. One of the Chinese 
manufacturers had exited the U.S. market due to the tariff, and decided to go back when 
the antidumping tariff has decreased recently.182  
 Compared to the efforts of adapting to the changing environment, the U.S. solar 
corporations have not been very active in initiating changes of relevant policies. Among 
the 19 research participant corporations, only one corporation was hiring a lobbyist to 
influence relevant policies. Most of them responded that they relied on the SEIA for 
favorable federal solar policies. For them, federal policies are “high-level,” which are 
difficult to involve in directly. A module manufacturer explained why the solar 
companies were not actively involving in the tariff on solar panels issue: “The process is 
so political that is beyond our control. That’s like a very high level. You need the 
government to come to the negotiating table before you can really involve the companies 
and want the governments are committed to cooperating one another”.183 
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 Although most of the individual corporations have not been actively engaged in 
policymaking, the solar industry has been active as a group. The SEIA has made much 
effort to extend the ITC through lobbying, political actions, public campaign, grassroots 
campaign and research. It has initiated dozens of Hill meetings, the lobby days for the 
SEIA member companies, and the meetings of the CEOs of the companies with 
policymakers. Through these actions, more than 10 Senate Republicans became active 
supporters of the ITC, while there were only 2 Republican Senate supporters in the 
beginning.184  The SEIA has also hosted solar-only political fundraisers for key Senators. 
It also attempted to gain supports of the public through publishing opinion editorials in 
state and local newspapers.  
 Other than affecting existing policies, the SEIA has engaged in making expected 
policies more favorable to the solar industry. The SEIA has affected the rule changes of 
the Clean Power Plan. Compared to the originally proposed rule, the final rule has 
included stricter carbon reduction goals and all solar technologies included as compliance 
options.185 The CPP also included the Clean Energy Incentive Program, which 
encourages early investments in renewable energy generation. The SEIA has led the 
working group to examine the design of the program. The solar industry saw both risks 
and opportunities in the CPP since it could be designed more favorable to natural gas 
than solar energy. Thus, the industry has motivated to engage in the policymaking 
process of the CPP.  
 The solar corporations’ individual reactions to the external environment have 
focused more on adapting to the environment rather than changing it. Although the solar 
                                                        
184 Observation #14 
185 Observation #9 
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corporations have attempted to change the relevant policies to be more favorable, the 
result of the efforts was uncertain because the policies have been affected by diverse 
factors, which could not be controlled by the solar corporations. Under these 
circumstances, a safer reaction to the environment has been adapting rather than changing 
the environment. However, the solar industry has significantly affected the relevant 
policies as a group. The SEIA has engaged in the policymaking processes for existing 
policies as well as new policies.   
 
Interactions between policies and industry 
 The solar policies have expanded in recent years, and most of them have served 
the goal originated from the energy policy, which has been the secure, affordable, and 
reliable energy. Recently, non-energy policies have introduced and have influenced solar 
PV market in the United States. The tariff on the solar panels imported from China has 
negatively affected to the original goal of the solar policies by increasing the overall costs 
of solar energy. The Clean Power Plan has designed to mitigate climate change, but has 
influenced solar PV market as the solar PV industry has involved in the policymaking 
process of it to take advantage of the policy as an opportunity. The boundary of solar 
policies has expanded quantitatively and qualitatively in the United States.  
 The solar PV industry has significantly affected the expansion of the policies 
directly and indirectly. First, the industry has engaged in policymaking processes to 
maintain existing policies, which were favorable to them. Second, under the changing 
external environment, solar corporations have initiated introducing a new policy measure. 
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Finally, the industry has affected the policy that was not designed for solar energy to take 
advantage of the policy as an opportunity. 
 The extension of the ITC is the case of maintaining existing policies. The political 
actions of the solar PV industry have significantly affected the extension of the ITC in 
2016. The SEIA has led the efforts of the solar industry to extend the ITC for more years. 
All the actors in the solar PV industry have supported the ITC because the ITC was 
favorable for all the actors in the solar PV industry. The ITC has contributed to the rapid 
growth of solar energy by reducing the costs of solar installation. By boosting the overall 
demand of solar energy in the U.S. market, the ITC has benefitted both the upstream and 
the downstream solar corporations.  
 The tariff of the Chinese solar panels was introduced in different contexts. The 
issue of the solar panels imported from China was raised by seven solar manufacturers. 
The solar PV corporations other than the panel manufacturers did not support the tariff. 
This caused conflicts among solar corporations since the tariff was expected to benefit 
some corporations, but to harm the others. Moreover, the tariff could be a barrier to 
achieve the original goal of the solar policies, which was to increase the installation of 
solar facilities.   
 As well as initiating a new policy, the solar PV industry has also engaged in the 
policymaking of a different type of policy—the CPP. The solar industry was motivated to 
engage in the CPP since it could have been a risk to them if it was designed to be 
favorable to natural gas. Moreover, the CPP could have been a chance to expand solar 
installation if the rules of the CPP were formed in favor of solar energy. Although the 
CPP did not include solar-related details in the proposed rule, it ended up including more 
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solar-related details in the final rule. Through the efforts of the solar industry, the CPP 
has become one of the important solar policies.   
 Although the solar corporations have engaged in policymaking as a group for 
common interest of the solar industry, they have also engaged in policymaking for their 
own interests. The tariff on Chinese solar panel is the case that shows that the solar 
industry does not necessarily affect policies as a common interest group. Some solar 
policies have been introduced by the political interactions and conflicts even within the 
solar industry. An expert pointed out that there is no one direct goal in the solar industry 
at this point: “It’s very much more like a chess set, where everybody is working together 
in different angles and people are sometimes have in some areas, they might have power. 
It’s not all towards one direct goal”.186 
 The U.S. solar industry has influenced relevant policies through cooperating for 
its common interest. Their efforts have significantly influenced the extension of the ITC, 
which has been the most important solar policy in the U.S., and the inclusion of solar-
relevant policies in the final rule of the CPP. However, individual corporations have also 
affected policies. The U.S. solar policies are the results of the political interactions and 
conflicts between the government and the industry, as well as among the actors in the 
solar industry.  
 
Summary 
 The U.S. solar PV corporations have perceived risks caused mostly by policies. 
Since policies have changed or have not been enacted for a longer-term, the corporations 
                                                        
186 Interview #3 
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have difficulty to plan their business. Under these circumstances, they attempted to adapt 
to the environment as well as to initiate changes of the environment to reduce risks. The 
corporations have enhanced their competitiveness by developing advanced technology 
and improving operations. They have also expanded to other business in the solar PV 
value chain to be more flexible, and have their manufacturing moved to other countries to 
be more competitive in the market. Moreover, to reduce the risks of the external 
environment, the companies have engaged in relevant policymaking process.  
 The solar corporations have become involved in policymaking in three ways. 
First, they have attempted to maintain existing favorable policies. The ITC has extended 
by the active engagement of the solar industry. Second, they asked policy measure to 
address the risks in the market. The anti-dumping tariff on Chinese solar panels is an 
example of the result of this effort. Finally, the solar industry has engaged in the policy 
that was not designed for solar, which has led to changes within the policy to be more 
favorable to the solar industry. The CPP has become more favorable through the 
engagement of the solar industry.  
 The current mix of solar policies is the results of the interactions between industry 
and policies. The solar industry has affected policy change, but it has also changed under 
a changing environment. The industry and policy has changed through interactions under 
fast changing external environment.  
 152 
Chapter 6. Solar policies and industry in South Korea 
 
Introduction 
 The government of South Korea has promoted renewable energy with various 
policies since it established the Alternative Energy Development Promotion Act in 
1987.187 Based on the policies, the share of new and renewable energy in energy 
production has increased to 4.1 percent in 2014 from 1.4 percent in 2002.188 With this 
increase of renewable energy installation, the renewable energy industry has developed. 
Many new and existing corporations have invested in renewable energy such as solar PV 
or wind energy. As of 2013, 245 companies conduct renewable energy business in South 
Korea.189  
 Since the introduction of the first renewable energy policy, the renewable energy 
policies have expanded. In the 1990s, the policies focused on supporting the relevant 
technologies through research grants. In the 2000s, the government adopted many 
policies to promote the deployment of renewable energy such as subsidy programs, feed-
in tariffs, and financial supports, as well as to promote technology development. Since 
the announcement of the national vision, “Low Carbon Green Growth,” in 2008, the 
government started introducing policies to promote the renewable energy industry as a 
                                                        
187 Alternative energy included eight renewable energy sources and three new energy 
sources. Renewable energy sources include solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, biomass, 
wind, hydropower, geothermal, marine energy, and energy from waste. New energy 
sources include fuel cell, energy from liquefied or gasified coal, and from gasified heavy 
residual oil, and hydrogen energy. This term, alternative energy, was changed to “new 
and renewable energy” later. In South Korea, renewable energy sources have been in the 
same category with new energy sources, and they were promoted under the same policy. 
188 2014 Statistics on New and Renewable Energy, Ministry of Trade, Industry, and 
Energy and Korea Energy Agency, November 2015. 
189 New and Renewable Energy Korea; https://www.renewableenergy.or.kr. 
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new growth engine for the economy. From that point, new types of policies for renewable 
energy were introduced. While the supports for technology development and the 
deployment programs have a goal to increase the installations of renewable energy, the 
new policies have a goal to support domestic renewable energy industry. For instance, 
these policies include certification programs, supports for renewable energy projects 
abroad, and government-led demonstration projects. As a result, South Korea has diverse 
policies on renewable energy, which serve different goals. 
 This chapter explores how the rise of the solar PV industry has affected the 
expansion of the national policies on renewable energy in South Korea. The case study of 
South Korea is expected to add more validation to the findings of the U.S. case study 
because the contexts of South Korea are different from those of the U.S. South Korea has 
a much smaller domestic market compared to the U.S.; therefore, it has been more 
significantly influenced by the globalization of the solar market. In a small domestic 
market, Korean solar PV industry has developed based on manufacturing. Since the 
potential of large-scale projects was limited, service providers such as installers and 
project developers were difficult to develop into large corporations. Korean solar PV 
manufacturers have exported a significant share of their products because domestic 
demand was not sufficient. Therefore, the global solar market has significantly influenced 
the Korean solar PV industry.  
 In this chapter, an explanation on the interactions between the solar PV policies 
and the solar PV industry in South Korea is developed. The qualitative interviews with 
the key actors of the solar PV field in South Korea, the observations in the seminars and 
workshops, and policy archival data were obtained and were analyzed to build the 
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explanation. The short history of the renewable energy policies, the recent changes of the 
solar PV market, and the reactions of the industry to these changes are described. Lastly, 
the interactions between policy and industry are discussed. 
 
Data and method 
 Data for this research included qualitative interviews, archival data, and 
observational data. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with 21 key 
actors of the solar PV field in South Korea. Archival data included the reports, press 
releases, and announcements from the government, which were gathered from the Policy 
Information Archive and the National Assembly Library.190 A number of the seminars 
and workshops on renewable energy industry and policy in South Korea were observed 
and the memos from them were used as data.  
 Three groups of the stakeholders in solar PV field were interviewed: 1) the 
representatives of the solar PV corporations located in South Korea; 2) government 
officials involving in Korean renewable energy policy; and 3) the experts in the solar PV 
field.191 To sample the solar PV corporations, a sampling frame was built based on the 
list of the members of the Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association (KOPIA). Among the 
78 members, the manufacturers of components or equipment were excluded since their 
solar business tended to be minor contribution to their business. From the remaining 
corporations, five of them were excluded since they officially announced that they were 
                                                        
190 Policy Information Archive, http://www.korea.kr/archive/; National Assembly Library, 
http://www.nanet.go.kr/english/ 
191 Government officials were interviewed in South Korea because there were a few key 
government officials who were in charge of high-level solar policies. In the U.S., most of 
the important policies were the decision of the Congress. Therefore, it was relatively 
difficult to find the key actors from the government to be interviewed.  
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out of solar business. The remaining 40 companies were contacted via emails and phone 
calls, and 12 companies agreed to be interviewed. The interview questions were 
communicated beforehand, and each company recommended a representative who was 
able to answer the questions. The government officials and experts were sampled 
purposively to represent the key actors of the Korean solar PV field. Specifically, the 
main speakers of the renewable energy seminars or conferences, the government officials 
who were in charge of solar policies, the people who were recommended as key actors by 
other respondents were contacted. Four government officials and seven experts were 
contacted, and three government officials and six solar experts agreed to be interviewed. 
As a result, 12 solar companies, 3 government officials, and 6 experts were interviewed 
(see Appendix B). 
 Each interview lasted from 30 minutes to 90 minutes. A pre-determined protocol 
was used for each interview, but the interview questions were modified according to the 
expertise of each respondent. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. Some 
respondents rejected to be recorded; in this case, the memo during the interview was used 
as data. For analysis, themes were developed based on the interview transcripts. Each 
transcript was coded according to the themes.  
 Archival data for policy was obtained through searching the term, “New and 
Renewable Energy” in the websites of the Policy Information Archive. The result showed 
1,524 documents. Through a review, the documents that were not related to the topic of 
the search were excluded, and the remaining 133 documents were used as data. The same 
protocol was used to search the data at the National Assembly Library, and 33 documents 
were added. The final data set include 166 documents include the press releases from the 
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government, policy news articles, statistics, and the Ministries’ reports for 
Congresspersons from 1997 to 2015. This data set was used to establish the history of 
renewable energy policy in South Korea.  
 In addition to these two data sets, a number of seminars and workshops on 
renewable energy industry and policy in South Korea were observed. Observation of key 
actors in seminars and workshops complemented the data set from the interviews by 
adding the talks of some of the high-level key actors, who was hard to be contacted for 
interviews. The observational data was analyzed by using the same themes with interview 
transcripts. 
 
Solar PV and industry in South Korea 
 Solar PV has significantly expanded in recent years. In 2014, energy produced by 
solar PV was more than 200 times of that in 2004. Although solar PV has sharply 
increased, its share in new and renewable energy production is still small compared to 










Figure 30. Energy production in South Korea, 2002-2014. 
 
Source: New and Renewable Energy Korea, https://www.renewableenergy.or.kr/ 
  
 While solar PV accounts for a small share of renewable energy, it has created a 
larger industry compared to other renewable energy sources. Figure 31 shows that solar 
PV has generated about 70 percent of the sales of renewable energy products in 2013. 
Since the mid-2000s, the number of solar PV corporations and the sales of solar PV 
products have significantly increased (Figure 32). Although the size of solar PV industry 
has shrunk in terms of sales, exports, and the number of companies in 2012 and 2013, 
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Figure 31. Sales of renewable energy products in South Korea, 2004-2013. 
 
Source: New and Renewable Energy Korea; Korea Energy Agency 
 
Figure 32. Number of Solar PV corporations, sales, and exports, 2004-2013. 
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 Manufacturing has been the base of the solar PV industry in South Korea. As of 
June 2015, more than 60 percent of the members of the KOPIA are manufacturers 
(Figure 33). Manufacturers of components and equipment accounted for 28 percent of the 
solar PV corporations. However, most of the corporations have conducted solar business 
as one of their businesses and the share of solar PV business was not significant in terms 
of revenue. Thus, these corporations tend not to be referred as solar PV corporations. 
Installers have the same issue. Many installers have entered into the solar PV market 
based on their experience in other business area, and the share of solar PV business was 
not very significant compared to the other businesses. Some corporations conduct solar 
PV projects as main business, but the size of them is small due to their short history.   
 
Figure 33. Number of members of the Korea Photovoltaic Industry Association by 
business. 
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 In this context, Korean solar PV industry has been led by large manufacturers of 
polysilicon, ingot/wafer, and cell/module. Table 18 shows that a large portion of sales in 
solar PV industry has generated from these manufacturers. The total sales of these 
products accounted for more than 80 percent of the total solar PV sales in 2010. The 
manufacturers of these products have exported a majority share of their products. Seventy 
six percent of polysilicon, cell, and modules, and sixty four percent of ingot and wafer 
were exported in 2010. In total, South Korea exported almost 70 percent of the solar PV 
products in 2010.  
 





(100 million KRW) 
Exports 
(100 million KRW) 
Exports/Sales 
Polysilicon  14,500 11,050 76% 
Ingot/Wafer  8,700 5,593 64% 
Cell  5,760 4,349 76% 
Module  20,578 15,620 76% 
Inverter  1,300 664 51% 
Component  3,560 742 21% 
Equipment  4,600 2,700 59% 
Total  58,998 40,718 69% 
 
Source: Status and Future of Solar Photovoltaic Industry, KOPIA, June 24th 2011. 
 
 In sum, although solar PV has accounted for a small share of renewable energy 
sources, it has significantly contributed to the development of renewable energy industry 
in South Korea. Korean solar PV industry has developed based on manufacturing. In a 
small domestic market, a large share of the solar PV products has been exported. 
 
 161 
National solar policies  
 In 1997, Korean government established the First Basic Plan for Technology 
Development, Application, and Deployment of New and Renewable Energy. The Plan set 
the goal of 2 percent of renewable energy in total energy production by 2006.192 To 
achieve the goal, the Plan focused on technology development in eleven new and 
renewable energy sources. Solar PV, solar thermal, fuel cell, and integrated gasification 
combination cycle (IGCC) were pursued as main investment fields since those were 
expected to be competitive globally and to significantly contribute to energy production. 
The government expected to commercialize these renewable energy technologies by 
2006. 
 The First Plan focused on technology development, but it did not include plans to 
create market for developed technologies or to build infrastructure for industry. In this 
backdrop, the Second Basic Plan for Technology Development, Application, and 
Deployment of New and Renewable Energy, which was established in 2003, included the 
plans for deployment of new and renewable energy as well as the plans for technology 
development. It pursued to develop three main technologies—solar PV, wind, and fuel 
cell—and to apply developed technologies by implementing actual projects. To increase 
the deployment of renewable energy sources, a number of plans were included such as 
renewable energy mandatory use for public buildings, home subsidy program, and a feed-
in tariff (FIT). The goal was to provide 5 percent of energy with renewable energy 
sources by 2011.193 
                                                        
192 Ministry of Knowledge Economy and Korea Energy Management Corporation. 2005 
New and Renewable Energy White Paper. 2006. p 202. 
193 Ibid., p 204-211. 
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  The FIT has significantly contributed to increasing solar PV installation since it 
was introduced in 2002. The capacity of solar PV installations has been increased to 
about 9-fold of the capacity of 2007 level in 2008 (Figure 34). There was a rush of solar 
PV installation in 2008 because the government announced that the FIT of solar PV will 
be decreased starting from October due to financial burden of the government in April, 
2008. In 2008, the government also announced that the FIT will be repealed in 2011 to 
minimize financial burden.194  
 
Figure 34. Additional capacity of solar PV plants receiving feed-in tariff, 2002-2013. 
Source: A Study on Revitalization of Citizens’ Participatory Renewable Energy, Je-Nam 
Kim, Parliamentary audit package, 2014-P-1. 
 
 On August 15, 2008, President Lee Myung-bak declared the country’s vision for 
“Low Carbon, Green Growth.” Under this vision, the Korean government aimed that 
Korea will become the world’s seventh largest green economic power by 2020 and the 
                                                        
194 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Announcement of the revision of the feed-in tariff 
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fifth largest by 2050.195 Green energy business, which includes four renewable energy 
fields—solar PV, wind, fuel cell, IGCC—was declared as a new growth engine. In this 
context, the Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) revealed its plan to promote four 
renewable energy fields by investing in technology development.196 In 2008, the Ministry 
planned to invest 194 billion KRW in renewable energy technology development, which 
was increased by 60% compared to 2007.197 After the declaration of the Low Carbon, 
Green Growth, the government spending on new and renewable energy has sharply 
increased (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35. Government spending on new and renewable energy, 2004-2013. 
 
Source: Korea Energy Agency; Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy 
 
                                                        
195 Ministry of Government Legislation, Laws on Green Growth in Korea, 11-1170000-
000341-14, 2009. 
196 Ministry of Knowledge Economy has named the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and 
Energy in 2013. 
197 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Promoting New and Renewable Energy as a New 




















 The experts of Korean solar PV field said that the effects of the Low Carbon 
Green Growth were not very beneficial to the solar PV industry although the government 
emphasized the importance of industry development. An expert from the Korea Society 
for New and Renewable Energy pointed out that the vision did not include detailed 
policies that would be helpful: “We had very strong domestic deployment programs such 
as the FIT or the RPS, so the vision was not meaningful. There was no detail about how 
to develop industry. We could not give land for free or provide loan to certain companies 
like China did. Therefore, there was no case that the government provided something to 
companies directly. There was a saying that the government would provide financing for 
exports but I don’t think that was very helpful for business”.198 A former head of the New 
and Renewable Energy Center (NREC) at the Korea Energy Agency, pointed out that 
renewable energy was marginal in Green Growth strategy: “In Korea, green energy 
included nuclear power. Green Growth was for nuclear power rather than promoting solar 
PV or wind energy”.199 
 Apparently, however, a series of plans to promote renewable energy had been 
released after the Low Carbon Green Growth. At the end of 2008, the Third Basic Plan 
for Technology Development, Application, and Deployment of New and Renewable 
Energy was released. The plan set two goals: 1) To provide 11 percent of energy with 
new and renewable energy sources by 2030; and 2) Industrialization of new and 
renewable energy as a green growth engine. The lack of advanced technologies and 
industrial infrastructure were pointed out as the problems of renewable energy 
development by the government. In 2008, the government assessed the domestic 
                                                        
198 Interview #32 
199 Interview #33 
 165 
technology level of solar PV, wind, and fuel cell as 50-70 percent of the technology level 
of advanced countries.200 Moreover, due to the weak domestic industry, South Korea had 
imported main renewable energy products from other countries. To solve these issues, 
Korean government set plans to promote industrialization of renewable energy. It 
established technology road map and product road map for each renewable energy 
technology. For solar PV, a road map for cost-down of solar PV system was set. The 
development and commercialization of advanced solar PV technologies was set as 
another goal.  
 In 2009, the MKE announced the plan for increasing the use of domestically 
produced renewable energy products.201 The Ministry planned to lead the projects to 
install domestically produced wind turbines, and to revise the certification program for 
solar products to reduce the quantity of low-priced imported products in the market. 
Moreover, to promote the exports of renewable energy products, the Ministry expanded 
the supports for domestic corporations’ participation to foreign trade shows and 
established an organization to lead the supports for renewable energy corporations’ 
development of foreign market under the Korea Trade-Investment Agency.   
 In the same year, the Ministry announced the plan to strengthen the industry 
infrastructure for renewable energy.202 To promote solar PV industry, it planned to create 
100MW-scale domestic market by the pilot implementation of the Renewable Portfolio 
                                                        
200 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Third Basic Plan for Technology Development, 
Application, and Deployment of New and Renewable Energy,” December 2008. 
201 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Establish 2009 Implementation Plan of New and 
Renewable Energy,” Press Release (April 30, 2009) 
202 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “The Plans to Strengthen the Industry Infrastructure 
for New and Renewable Energy,” August 2009. 
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Standard (RPS). To secure the sustainable growth engine for solar PV industry, the R&D 
supports for second- and third-generation solar PV technologies were expanded.  
 In 2010, the Ministry declared its goal of the fifth largest renewable energy 
economy by 2015.203 It planned to promote solar PV as the second semi-conductor 
industry, which is one of the leading export industries in South Korea. To achieve this 
goal, the Ministry planned to pursue four strategies: 1) Strategic R&D supports and 
commercialization; 2) Market creation for industrialization; 3) Promotion of export 
industry; and 4) Strengthening the base for industry growth. With these strategies, the 
Ministry expected to achieve the exports of 36.2 billion USD, and to create 1.1 billion 
jobs by 2015.  
 Although the goal was very ambitious, the solar PV industry did not feel that they 
were significantly benefitted from this policy. A former head of the NREC said: “It was 
just a rhetoric. If there is a national agenda, it should be followed by policy tools, 
measures, financing and budget plans, but there was only a slogan without tools or 
measures”.204 An executive from a solar corporation said that the R&D supports from the 
government, which were increased by this policy was not very helpful for them because 
they were struggling with shrinking exports due to the rise of Chinese manufacturers. She 
said: “R&D was an unrealistic story when we could not export our products. The 
government intended to promote industry by technology development, but that was not 
the thing that the market needed. What was necessary was to create a big market”.205 
                                                        
203 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “Investing 40,000 billion KRW, Becoming the fifth 
largest renewable energy economy by 2015,” Press Release (October 13, 2010) 
204 Interview #33 
205 Interview #38 
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 Other than the targets and R&D supports, the government has also established the 
policies to support the industry directly. In 2011, the NREC introduced the programs to 
support small and medium-sized enterprises of new and renewable energy. The programs 
included feasibility study support, international exhibitions support, international 
certificate acquirement support, new and renewable energy expert consulting center, 
hosting Korea energy show, and developing demonstration projects in foreign countries. 
Han, Jong-hyun, the head of international relations at the NREC, explained the 
background of the implementation of these policies: “The year of 2011 was the right 
timing to implement these programs since the technologies were developed, domestic 
market was saturated, the global investments were increasing, and the Korean firms 
wanted to expand their business as a new growth engine.”206  
 As part of the supporting policies for domestic renewable energy corporations, the 
Korea Energy Agency has implemented a hybrid energy project with the Asian 
Development Bank in Philippines to establish “a stepping stone for SME’s overseas 
business” since 2012.  Han, Jong-hyun said that this project helped the Korean 
corporations participated in the project with obtaining track records: “This would be 
helpful for Korean companies to participate similar projects in the future.”207 He also 
pointed out that this project showed that Korean products were good quality products that 
could be used in tropical islands. 
 The Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) was introduced in 2012. According to 
“the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and 
Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy,” which include the rules for the RPS, the 
                                                        
206 Observation #25 
207 Observation #25 
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power utilities that own plants generating more than 500MW are required to supply a 
certain percentage of the volume of electricity generation using new and renewable 
energy.208 Thirteen big power producers including six government-affiliated 
organizations are subject to the RPS. Through the implementation of the RPS, the 
government expected to significantly increase the share of renewables, to lower the costs 
of renewables through competition, and to create a large-scale renewable energy market, 
which will contribute to the development of domestic industry. To promote solar PV, 
additional annual targets for solar PV were set. A former head of the NREC, pointed out 
that domestic market expansion without financial burdens of the government was the 
most important reason to adopt the RPS: “The purpose of the RPS was to create the 
market-driven system without adding government money. The FIT requires exponentially 
increasing government supports”.209  
 Apparently, the RPS was successful to increase solar PV installation. Since the 
introduction of the RPS in 2012, the solar PV installation has enormously increased 
(Figure 36). In 2012, the installation of solar PV has been almost four times of the 
installation of the previous year. In 2013 and 2014, the installation has been twice of that 
of the previous year. This sharp increase of solar PV installation was unexpected at the 
timing of the introduction of the RPS. The government set additional targets of solar PV 
installation to promote solar PV market, but the solar PV installation has much exceeded 
the targets. Under this circumstance, the additional targets for solar PV have been a 
barrier of the expansion of solar PV rather than a driver of it.  
                                                        
208 Ministry of Knowledge Economy, “The Enforcement Decree of the Act on the 
Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of New and Renewable Energy,” 
(September 17, 2010) 
209 Interview #25 
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Figure 36. Solar PV installation, 2003-2014. 
 




 One of the experts said that the more important driver of the solar installation was 
the increase of low-priced solar PV products rather than the introduction of the RPS: 
“The prices of the products were enormously dropped due to the large-scale investments 
in manufacturing and the global financial crisis. Actually, declining prices of the products 
was one of the reasons of this trend. We do not see the introduction of the RPS as the 
driver of increasing solar installation”.210 One of the other experts pointed out another 
reason that solar PV has been more competitive than other renewable energy sources: 
“There was no other option other than solar PV. [Power utilities] could not install wind 
power due to lack of permit. The raw materials for bioenergy needed to be imported from 
other countries such as Indonesia. Fuel cells were expensive”.211  
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 Under the sharp rise of solar PV installation, the solar PV project owners had 
struggled with decreasing profits and market uncertainty. The revenue of solar PV 
projects is from System Marginal Price (SMP) plus Renewable Energy Certificates 
(RECs). The SMP has been decreased continually since 2012 (Figure 37). The prices of 
RECs have fluctuated (Figure 38). Under this circumstance, the project owners had 
difficulty to finance their projects because it was hard to predict the revenue from solar 
PV projects.  
 
Figure 37. System marginal price, 2012-2015. 
 
Source: “System Marginal Price,” Electric Power Statistics Information System, 
http://epsis.kpx.or.kr/epsis/ekmaStaticMain.do?cmd=004013&flag=&locale=KR 






















Figure 38. The prices of Renewable Energy Certificates, 2012-2016. 
 
Source: Korea Power Exchange, http://rec.kpx.info/index.jsp 
 
 Under this unexpected increase of solar PV installation, the government revised 
the targets for solar PV in 2013. The target for solar PV for 2014-2015 has increased to 
1.5GW from 1.2GW.212 Since the oversupply of the solar RECs has continued after this 
measure, the government repealed additional targets for solar PV in 2016. Since then, 
solar PV has competed with other renewable energy sources without any limitation. 
 The government also attempted to support the owners of small-scale solar PV 
projects, who had struggled with selling the RECs to power utilities under severe 
competition. The government has expanded the size of government-led auction for RECs 
from 100MW to 150MW per year, and 30 percent of the quantity of RECs were assigned 
to small-scale solar PV projects in 2013. In the first half of 2016, the government-led 
auction has increased to 210MW, and a 60 percent of the quantity of RECs were assigned 
to the projects less than 100KW. A government official who was in charge of solar 
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policies said that their focus was on the small-scale solar PV producers: “Currently, we 
focus on solar PV producers, especially small-scale producers for policymaking. They are 
having the most difficult time. We want to increase the competitiveness of the weakest 
players”.213 
 In 2014, the Fourth Basic Plan for New and Renewable Energy was released. The 
target for renewable energy has weakened from 11 percent by 2030 to 11 percent by 
2035. The government planned to shift to “public-private partnership” from 
“government-driven” renewable energy market.214 The investments from private sector 
were expected to be encouraged by designing market-friendly policies, establishing 
business models, and deregulation. The details of the RPS have been changed to allow 
more flexibility in the market. The plan also included the measures to promote domestic 
corporations to expand to overseas markets: the expansion of financial supports, 
provision of information and human resources, and international relations to find business 
opportunities for renewable energy corporations. The government planned to develop 
renewable energy projects through cooperating with the government of other countries 
and international organizations.  
 In sum, solar PV policies have expanded from supporting technology 
development to supporting industry in South Korea (Table 19). In the 1990s, the policies 
focused on R&D supports, and then in the 2000s, a number of policies to promote 
deployment were adopted. Since the announcement of the national vision Low Carbon 
Green Growth in 2008, many policies to promote renewable energy industry as a new 
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growth engine have been adopted. Government supports for domestic industry has 
expanded to the supports for exports in recent years. As a result, promoting industry has 
become a policy goal as important as the original goal of renewable energy policy, which 
is to increase the share of renewable energy in national energy mix.
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Table 19. The Policies included in the Basic Plan for Technology Development, Application, and Deployment of New and Renewable 
Energy. 
 1st Plan (1997) 2nd Plan (2003) 3rd Plan (2008) 4th Plan (2014) 
Planning Period 1997-2006 2003-2012 2009-2030 2014-2035 
New and Renewable 
Energy Target 
2% by 2006 5% by 2011 11% by 2030 11% by 2035 
Policies Technology 
development 
 R&D supports 
(solar PV, solar 
thermal, fuel cell, 
IGCC) 
 R&D supports (solar 
PV, wind, fuel cell) 
 Implementing projects 
with developed 
technologies 




 Set goals for cost 
reduction 
 Expand R&D projects 
for exports 
Deployment   Renewable energy 
mandatory use for 
public buildings 
 Home subsidy 
program 
 Feed-in tariff 
 Green Home One 
Million Program 
 Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
 Solar lease program 
 Revision of the RPS 
Industrialization    Select strategic 
technologies for 
industrialization 
 Certification program 
 Test beds for solar PV, 
wind, and fuel cells 




    Financial supports for 
export companies 
 Establish database for 
foreign market 




Changes of the solar PV market environment 
 Korean solar PV corporations described that the solar market before 2010 was 
very favorable due to low level of competition. A polysilicon manufacturer said: “It was 
a supplier’s market. The market was enormously good since there was a shortfall in 
upstream. We select customers. We sell our products to the customers only with long-
term purchase agreement”.215 An ingot and wafer manufacturer also stated that it “sold 
every product with good price” until 2010.216 Low level of competition had enabled solar 
PV corporations to gain much profit in the market. An installer stated: “It was a 
conservative market that domestic module and inverter producers won large-scale 
projects with more than tripled prices and monopolized the market”.217 
 The rise of Chinese manufacturers has significantly changed the market 
environment. Around 2009, Chinese manufacturers have started putting large-scale 
investments across all the value chains of solar PV. A solar cell manufacturer stated: 
“Chinese solar manufacturers transformed existing industry structure by vertical 
integration. They brought a deep change as they produced everything from polysilicon to 
module with large-scale and very aggressive investments”.218 To make things worse, the 
global demand for solar products has decreased after the global financial crisis in 2007 
and 2008. An ingot and wafer manufacturer stated: “Solar market has suddenly shrunk. 
The demand for solar products has continually decreased. Companies have produced 
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more, so the supply has risen. The prices have dropped and the companies had to 
compete each other”.219 
 Under these unfavorable market conditions, many Korean solar PV corporations 
have exited solar business during 2011-2013. For instance, KAM, a polysilicon company, 
was liquidated. LG Silicon was out of its wafer business. Mirinet Solar, a cell 
manufacturer, was bankrupt. Two module manufacturers, Kyungdong Solar and 
Symphony Energy, were out of solar business.220 Other than these corporations that 
officially announced that they were out of solar business, many corporations have scaled 
down their solar business after 2010.221 Samsung, one of the biggest players in Korean 
solar market, announced that it stopped investing in solar energy in 2014. 
 During this period, national policies have not been very helpful to address the 
struggle of Korean solar PV industry. The government’s R&D supports, which have 
increased after the announcement of the Low Carbon Green Growth, were not very 
beneficial for the solar corporations. A cell manufacturer said that the R&D funding from 
the government in 2010 was not beneficial at all: “We were trying hard to survive. [We 
wanted the government] to create market, even additional 1MW market, with the R&D 
money. Since China has distributed their low-priced products in Europe and the global 
market, so we could not sell our products at all. When we could not export the products, 
R&D was like a fairy tale”.222 Moreover, even when the R&D funding was successful for 
developing advanced technology, the technology has become outdated in the global 
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market at the timing of development. An ingot and wafer manufacturer said: “The plan 
was to develop an advanced technology within three years, but the technology has 
become outdated after one or two years. It would be outdated technology even if it were 
successfully developed. More advanced technology was introduced in the market”.223 
 The implementation of the RPS in 2012 was not very beneficial for the Korean 
industry, either. An installer said: “There was no big difference [after the implementation 
of the RPS]. I think it was 250MW-scale. It was too small. At that time, the global market 
size was about 10GW. There were complaints how we can promote industry with less 
than 5 percent [of the global market]”.224 A cell manufacturer said that fluctuating prices 
of the RECs made them difficult to run its business in a stable manner: “The RPS is 
market-based, so there was uncertainty in the market due to fluctuating prices. It was hard 
to acquiring financing with this uncertainty. Also, the government has kept changing 
detailed rules of the RPS. The uncertainty created by these factors became risks to us. We 
had difficulty to sell our products and to collect bills from our customers”.225 A module 
manufacturer raised another difficulty due to fluctuating prices of RECs. Since the prices 
of RECs are declining, its customers prefer low-priced Chinese modules to reduce the 
total cost: “[Domestic companies] tend to use domestically-produced products, but now it 
is more possible that they may use Chinese products because the prices of the RECs are 
suddenly dropped”.226 A corporation developing solar projects globally said that the 
declining profits due to the RPS was one of the drivers for them to go abroad. “Under the 
RPS, each power producer meets the commitment through bidding. Thus, the prices 
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should be lower and lower. The biggest change after the implementation of the RPS was 
to go abroad”.227 
 Domestic policies have been limited in promoting solar manufacturing because 
direct supports for manufacturing were not easy for the government. The policies 
promoting deployment were able to affect downstream of the solar PV value chain, but 
the effects on upstream were limited. An ingot and wafer company explained why 
government policy was limited: “National policies are more influential to downstream. 
There are a couple of steps between a power producer and us. For instance, there are LG, 
a cell manufacturer, and Hyundai, a module manufacturer, and Samsung Everland, an 
installer. If there is a policy to increase installation, it affects a power producer. Then 
Samsung Everland should use the product of Hyundai, and Hyundai should use the 
product of LG, and LG should use our product. If Samsung Everland uses Chinese 
modules, we would not benefit from the policy. This is why the government should 
consider each value chain. For instance, the government can require the use of 
domestically-produced wafers, cells, and modules for installation. If it only cares about 
the end of the chain, the power producers will use imported cheap products”.228 
 There has been no policy that directly benefitted solar PV manufacturers. The 
government official who was in charge of the Korean solar policies stated that there was 
no direct policy support for upstream solar manufacturing. Rather, the government has 
used indirect supports: “Policy supports for manufacturing can be loans or financial 
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supports. We require certified products, so there is a possibility that certified products are 
domestically-produced ones, which can be indirect supports”.229 
 Moreover, Korean government could not directly affect China’s dumping of solar 
PV products. An installer said: “The U.S. posed anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese 
products, and Europe also established a quota on them. These two players have power to 
fight against China, but Korea or Japan may have a bigger counter punch if they posed 
anti-dumping tariffs. So, we cannot do”.230 An expert from the KOPIA pointed out two 
reasons why South Korea did not solve the issue of Chinese solar products as an 
international trade issue. “First, Korean market is very small and Chinese modules 
imported were not large in quantity. Korean big solar module manufacturers export 
significant amount of their products. How did we measure the loss in this circumstance? 
Second, the petition should be from industry. A majority of the companies except cell and 
module manufacturers had no reason to submit petition because they used Chinese 
products. For Hyundai and LG, solar products are not the only export products to China. 
If they raise a dumping issue, China can do some retaliatory actions in other industry. 
South Korea trades hundred trillions KRW in a year with China. We need to consider if 
Korean government wants [an antidumping action] because of this small [solar] 
market”.231 
 Under these circumstances, for some Korean solar PV manufacturers, the policies 
of other countries were more helpful than domestic policies. Many interviewed 
corporations stated that the antidumping measures of the U.S. to Chinese manufacturers 
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had saved them. An expert from the KOPIA stated: “Korean solar cells and modules have 
been selling because Chinese products have lost their price competitiveness in the market 
due to the antidumping measure”.232 An ingot and wafer company said: “Due to the 
antidumping tariff on Chinese products, some customers are buying our products. We 
have benefitted directly and indirectly”.233 
 The solar market conditions were not favorable to downstream installers and 
project developers, either. Although the market has increased based on the RPS, the profit 
from a solar project has significantly declined. Since the total investment of a project has 
decreased due to reduced costs of products, the margin for installers has significantly 
decreased. An installer said: “The margins are decreasing, so the size of the market 
should increase. However, the domestic market was not dramatically increased”.234 In 
this circumstance, large corporations have attempted to go abroad. A project developer 
stated that they were developing projects in developing countries: “We have developed 
many projects in the Third World countries such as African and Southeast countries 
because the costs of land and human resources are low”.235 
 In sum, with the increasing competition in the global solar market, Korean solar 
PV corporations have struggled to survive. Government policies have not been very 
effective to help the survival of industry since it was hard to help manufacturers directly 
and the increase of domestic market was not enough to promote industry, even installers. 
Under this circumstance, for some Korean solar corporations, the policies of other 
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countries such as the anti-dumping measure in the U.S. were more helpful rather than 
domestic policies.   
 
The reactions of the solar PV industry to the changing environment 
 As the market environment has become less favorable to Korean solar PV 
corporations, they have reacted to the environment with multiple strategies. They have 
attempted to reduce the costs, and to develop advanced technologies to differentiate their 
products. The corporations have also expanded their business to other fields, have 
expanded business globally, and have made policy suggestions to the government.  
 Although the Korean solar PV corporations have pursued technology 
development and cost reduction continually, those efforts were not enough to guarantee 
survival in the market. Since low-prices products were flooded in the market from China, 
it was not easy to compete with Chinese manufacturers in terms of price. As of May, 
2015, the prices of Chinese solar modules are 15-20 percent cheaper than the prices of 
Korean solar modules in the EU spot market.236 Moreover, solar PV technologies were 
not very difficult for latecomers to catch up in a short time. Therefore, the developed 
technologies were not very effective to differentiate their products with those of other 
manufacturers. An ingot and wafer manufacturer said: “China also do research and 
development. It catches up advanced technologies fast. The solar technologies are not 
very advanced technology. I believe that China is able to do (catch-up)”.237 
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 Under these difficulties, the Korean solar PV corporations expanded their 
business areas. Some corporations expanded to other value chains of solar PV business. 
A polysilicon manufacturer has invested in independent power producer (IPP) business 
using the accumulated cash through polysilicon business since 2012. The interviewee 
from the manufacturer said: “IPP was relatively easy for us to do compared to other solar 
PV business because we produce and sell electricity by investment. We had much cash. 
Solar PV is all about financing”.238 An ingot and wafer manufacturer said that it also 
considered investing in IPP business, but gave up due to its financial status.239 A cell 
manufacturer has expanded its business to module manufacturing in 2011 and has 
pursued IPP business since 2012. However, it had struggled with the IPP business 
because of its low credit rating: “We want to develop large-scale overseas projects but it 
is not easy because we are a manufacturer and we have low credit rating”.240 
 Since the margins from upstream manufacturing have shrunk, most Korean PV 
corporations have attempted to expand their business to downstream. This was not easy 
because developing solar PV projects require large-scale investments. Due to the 
struggling in the declining market, Korean solar manufacturers were lack of cash to 
invest in new projects and they did not have good credit ratings to finance for the 
projects. Therefore, only a few large corporations could consider expanding to 
downstream business. Moreover, most of Korean solar PV corporations in downstream 
were mid- and small-sized firms, so they did not have sufficient resources and 
capabilities to develop large-scale projects.    
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 Korean corporations have also attempted to expand to overseas market. An ingot 
and wafer manufacturer had exported almost all the products to Europe, but after the 
global financial crisis, it has developed other markets: “We had only Europe [as a 
customer], but we have expanded to other countries to survive”.241 Expanding to overseas 
market was not always successful. A power producer has invested in solar PV projects in 
the United States, but it was not successful due to their lack of information and 
experience: “We have invested in 300 MW solar PV project in Nevada. We did not have 
much understanding of the U.S. renewable energy policy, so we invested without having 
power purchase agreement. The power purchase agreement was not successful as we 
expected. Now the conditions have much changed, so we are attempting to sell our 
share”.242 
 A project developer said that Korean solar corporations should go abroad since 
most profitable business opportunities were already gone in Korea: “The countries such 
as the U.S. and Japan have invested in many solar PV projects in Korea and have exited 
with much profits. In early days, we could have enormous profits with 1MW project, but 
now we have to do 10MW or 20MW projects. Under this circumstances, we have to go 
abroad”.243 
 Other than these efforts, Korean solar PV corporations have suggested policy 
change to the government. The research participant corporations said that they have made 
suggestions through the meetings with government officials or the industry associations 
such as KOPIA, Korea New and Renewable Energy Association (KNREA), and 
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Independent Power Producer Association. The corporations agreed that most of their 
suggestions have not been accepted by the government. Since solar policy is part of the 
energy policy, it was hard to make changes of solar policy. A cell manufacturer said: 
“Renewable energy is one of the energy sectors. Doesn’t it hard to change the top-level 
energy policy [to change solar policy]? The more the policy is up-level, it is harder to 
touch.”244 
 Solar policies in South Korea have established related to upper level government 
plans such as the National Energy Plan, the Basic Plan for Technology Development, 
Application, and Deployment of New and Renewable Energy, and the Basic Power 
Supply Plan. Moreover, renewable energy policies include multiple sources of new and 
renewable energy; therefore, it is not easy to change the details of the policy only for 
solar PV. Many research participants pointed out that the fundamental way to promote 
solar PV is to change the direction of energy policy. An installer said: “The government’s 
nuclear power-friendly policies should be changed. Of course the RPS or the FIT are 
important, but more importantly, the unrealistic pricing of electricity, and the policies 
designed to win favors from [energy-intensive] companies should be changed”.245 
 Korean solar PV corporations have attempted to adapt to the changing market 
conditions through technology development and cost reduction, but these strategies were 
limited in strengthening their competitiveness in the global market. They also looked for 
more opportunities in abroad and in other solar PV value chains, but only a few 
corporations with strong financial status and resources could be successful in expanding 
their business. Under these difficulties, they have suggested government policies for 
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more favorable market conditions, but the policies were not easy to be changed since the 
solar policies were closely related to upper-level energy policies. 
 
Interactions between policies and industry 
 Since solar PV is one of the minor energy sources, solar policies have evolved 
within the boundary of energy policy in South Korea. The policies for renewable energy 
have established based on the existing energy policies, which have designed for fossil 
energy. A former government official pointed out that renewable energy sources are 
dependent on the existing energy system: “The scale of one nuclear power plant is 1GW. 
We need three or four thousands solar PV power plants for getting 1GW. Which would 
be easier to manage, one plant or three or four thousand power plants? Renewable energy 
sources cannot move independently. In other words, it is a dependent variable”.246 The 
existing energy system has been significantly influenced by the national energy policies. 
An expert stated that the influence of the government to the energy system is enormous: 
“In South Korea, the government decides how many coal power plants and gas power 
plants by setting the supply plans. The government decides how much subsidies for solar 
PV will be spent. It also decides to stop the subsidies and to introduce the RPS in 
replacement of the FIT. In South Korea, a 90 percent [of energy system] is the 
government”.247 
 Under these circumstances, the effects of the industry into the energy policy were 
limited in South Korea. Even for the policies for renewable energy sources, the solar PV 
industry was one of many interest groups. For instance, the stakeholders of the RPS 
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include power producers, solar PV industry, wind industry, and the industries of other 
renewable energy sources. When the RPS has launched in 2012, power producers 
claimed that the target, 11 percent of energy supply by renewable energy sources by 
2030, was too challenging. This target has revised to 11 percent by 2035 in 2014. A 
government official said that they made the policy “flexible” considering the requests 
from power producers.248 The solar PV industry has also engaged in the policymaking 
process of the RPS. Around 2010, the KOPIA suggested to the government creating more 
than 500MW market in a year by policies.249 After discussions, the government 
confirmed creating 1.2GW market in four years through setting an annual additional 
target for solar PV. This shows that multiple interest groups have influenced the 
policymaking process, and solar PV industry is one of them.  
 Although the solar PV industry has hardly affect the top-level energy policies, it 
has affected some lower-level policies or the details of policies. Other than the additional 
targets of solar PV, the government has created the policies to support solar PV industry. 
As mentioned above, diverse policies have introduced to support domestic industry and 
the industry’s exports of their products. Some policies have set details considering 
domestic corporations. For instance, the Solar Lease Program requires participant 
organizations to form a consortium including a domestic manufacturer. The requests from 
the solar PV manufacturing that domestic manufacturing needs to have priorities in the 
RPS or any deployment program seem to be considered in designing this policy.250  
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 After the globalization of solar PV market, national deployment policies for 
renewable energy did not guarantee the rise of solar PV industry. Under the RPS, power 
producers are the players that directly affecting the solar PV market. Solar PV industry 
will be benefitted only if the power producers use domestically-produced products and 
services. Power producers have no reason to use domestically-produced products or 
services if they are more expensive. An expert pointed out the interest of power 
producers: “Power producers pursue their own benefits under the deployment policy. 
They can use both foreign products and domestic products. They are just playing in the 
market”.251 
 Under these circumstances, the government has ended up establishing different 
types of policies to support the solar PV industry. The government has supported the 
exports of solar PV corporations by providing resources and capabilities. These policies 
did not serve the goal of the existing renewable energy deployment policies, which was 
to increase the share of renewables in national energy mix. The goal of these policies was 
to promote domestic solar PV industry, and to boost the exports of the industry. With the 
globalization of the solar PV market, Korean solar PV policies were evolved into two 
different groups in terms of policy goal. There have been some policies to increase solar 
PV installations, and the others have established to boost domestic solar PV industry.  
 
Summary 
 Renewable energy policies have expanded in South Korea since the government 
started promoting renewable energy sources in 1980s. In early days, the policies have 
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focused on increasing the share of renewable energy in the national energy mix through 
technology development and deployment programs. Over time, diverse policies have 
been adopted to support domestic renewable energy industry, which was the goal that 
could not be served by traditional deployment policies.  
 Globalization of the solar PV market has affected this expansion of the policies in 
South Korea. R&D supports, which have much increased since 2008, were not very 
effective because other countries have developed advanced technologies earlier than 
Korean corporations. Deployment programs such as the FIT and the RPS did not directly 
benefit domestic solar manufacturing because solar projects owners could use imported 
solar products, which became much cheaper since China’s investments in solar PV.  
 Under these circumstances, the government ended up introducing different types 
of policies to support solar PV industry. Since the announcement of the Low Carbon 
Green Growth in 2008, the government has implemented diverse policies including 
certification programs, building test beds for renewable energy projects, and the supports 
for export corporations. As a result, the solar PV policies has expanded and diversified in 
South Korea.  
 These findings show that the rise of industry has influenced the expansion of 
national policies on renewables. The relation between the industry and the policies was 
not a one-way influence. Rather, the policies and the industry have changed through 
interaction. Once the government established a new policy, the industry reacted to the 
changes by the policy directly and indirectly in the changing contexts of the global 
market. Based on these reactions, the government revised the policy or introduced a new 
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policy to address the issues raised by the industry. These continuing interactions have 




Chapter 7. The evolution of solar policies 
 
Introduction 
 Chapter 5 and 6 explored the diversified national solar policies in the U.S. and 
South Korea. By synthesizing the findings of these two cases, this chapter examines how 
national solar policies have changed through the interactions with industry under rapidly 
changing global market. 
 This chapter starts with describing the changes of the global solar market and the 
domestic solar markets in the U.S. and South Korea. Next, the changes of solar policies 
in two countries and the causal mechanism of policy change are analyzed. Based on this 
analysis, the factors affecting the difference of solar policies in two countries are 
described. The next section discusses the characteristics of the recent changes of 
renewable energy policies. Finally, the limitation of the study is discussed. 
 
The global solar market and the changes of the domestic solar markets 
 The globalization of solar PV industry has accelerated by the rise of Chinese solar 
manufacturers around 2010. Since the Chinese manufacturers have exported enormous 
amount of solar products, the global solar market has deeply changed. Many solar 
manufacturers have gone out of business, and some of them have expanded their business 
to downstream to find another source of revenue. Meanwhile, as Chinese products have 
significantly lowered the cost of solar installation, global solar installation has sharply 
increased in recent years. Under this circumstance, more corporations have entered the 
downstream solar market and this has accelerated the growth of solar installation. 
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Through this recent change, a global solar PV value chain has been created. Many solar 
PV manufacturers export a significant share of their products. Large project developers 
look for projects all around the world. Many solar corporations have become 
multinational corporations. 
 Under this rapid change of the global market, domestic solar markets have faced 
risks and conflicts. In the U.S., solar manufacturers perceived much risk under rapidly 
decreasing prices of solar products. This has caused the solar trade dispute between the 
U.S. and China, which was initiated by the petition of the U.S. solar manufacturers. The 
trade dispute has introduced much uncertainty in the solar market because it was hard to 
predict which policy measure would be implemented. Moreover, since the U.S. 
downstream companies have benefitted from low-priced Chinese solar panels, the trade 
dispute has generated conflicts of interests between the upstream and the downstream 
corporations. The efforts of the solar manufacturers to reduce market risks have 
generated additional risks and conflicts in the market.  
 In South Korea, the impact of the Chinese solar products to the solar market was 
more serious than in the U.S. because Korean solar PV industry has grown based on 
manufacturing. Many corporations have reduced the investments on solar products or 
have gone out of solar business. Although low-priced Chinese solar panels have 
benefitted installers by reducing cost, the installers have not significantly grown in South 
Korea due to a small size of domestic market. Korean solar manufacturers only barely 
engaged in making policy measures to address Chinese solar panels directly like the U.S. 
manufacturers did because for most of them, solar business was only a small part of their 
whole business. Large solar manufacturers have main business other than solar PV, 
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whose products were exported to other countries including China. Therefore, they did not 
find any reason to initiate trade dispute with China. Meanwhile, small solar 
manufacturers did not have sufficient political power to directly engage in initiating a 
policy measure. Moreover, Korean government did not have a strong motivation to raise 
a trade dispute with China on solar panel issue since China is a critical trade partner 
importing many products manufactured in Korea. 
 The risks that Korean solar manufacturers have faced were not only from 
domestic market, but also from the markets of other countries. They could not compete 
with Chinese manufacturers in terms of price in the markets of other countries, where 
they exported a significant share of their products. In this sense, the reactions of other 
countries to the Chinese solar panel issue were as important as the reaction of Korean 
government. Many Korean solar manufacturers perceived that the tariff on the Chinese 
solar panels in the U.S. were more helpful for them with surviving in the market than any 
domestic policy measure. 
 Domestic solar policies have also introduced risks in domestic markets. In the 
U.S., the extension of the ITC was uncertain until the decision of multiple-year extension 
in 2016. This has generated risks to both upstream and downstream corporations. 
Downstream corporations have difficulty to make a long-term investment plan since they 
could not predict the rate of return. Upstream corporations had difficulty to address 
unstable demand in the market. There was a spike of the demand of solar products just 
before the expiration of the ITC, but solar manufacturers could not invest in capacity 
expansion because the increase of demand was because of the rush of the solar projects to 
take advantage of the ITC before expiration.  
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 Korean solar corporations have also faced uncertainty caused by domestic 
policies. After the introduction of the RPS in 2012, the profit from a solar project was not 
easy to predict due to fluctuating prices of the RECs. Project developers have difficulty in 
financing due to the uncertainty of the revenue of projects. Under this fluctuating market, 
the Korean government has changed the details of the RPS, and this has caused more 
uncertainty in the market. The change of the rules of the RPS has influenced the market; 
therefore, it became harder to predict the future trend of the solar market.  
 In sum, both the globalization of solar market and domestic policies have 
introduced risks and uncertainty to the industries in the U.S. and South Korea. The flood 
of Chinese solar products to the global solar PV market has generated much risk to the 
solar manufacturers. The reactions of the U.S. solar manufacturers have generated 
additional risks by introducing trade dispute between the U.S. and China. Since Korean 
solar PV industry is export-driven, it has been significantly affected by the trade dispute 
as well as the flood of Chinese solar panels. Domestic policies have also posed risks to 
solar corporations since they have not been consistent.  
 
Diversified policies and solar industry 
  Solar policies have diversified with the changes of the market environment in the 
U.S. and South Korea. In the U.S., the ITC has been extended for multiple years, and the 
tariffs on the solar panels imported from China and Taiwan have been introduced. 
Moreover, the solar industry has engaged in the policymaking process of the CPP. In 
South Korea, the FIT was replaced with the RPS in 2012. In addition, the policies to 
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promote industry and the exports of solar products and services have been implemented 
in recent years.   
 In the U.S., in the early days of the solar market, two kinds of policies affected the 
solar market: a tax policy and research and development programs. Over time, other 
types of policies also became important. The loan guarantee program has encouraged 
investing in utility-scale solar projects. The tariff on the solar panels from China and 
Taiwan has benefitted the domestic solar manufacturers. Recently, the solar industry has 
engages in designing and implementing the CPP.  
  Solar industry’s engagement has significantly led to this diversification of the 
policies. It attempted to maintain existing policies, which were favorable to solar 
industry. Solar industry has actively engaged in the extension of the ITC. As well as 
attempting to maintain existing policies, the industry also tried to overcome a market 
challenge through asking governmental measure to address the challenge. The tariff on 
the solar panels from China and Taiwan has introduced through the political activities of 
SolarWorld and other solar manufacturers. As the political power of the solar industry 
has grown, the industry also engaged in non-solar policies, which was expected to affect 
solar industry. The CPP was originally not necessarily favorable to solar industry, but the 
engagement of the solar industry has led to include some rules that were favorable to 
solar energy in the final rule of the CPP. Figure 39 shows the interactions between solar 









 In South Korea, the solar policies have also diversified. Since the declaration of 
Low Carbon Green Growth as a national vision, many policies to promote solar industry 
have been introduced. In the early days of solar market development, the government 
pursued both increasing solar installation and developing industry by the FIT and R&D 
support programs. However, after the globalization of the solar market, R&D support 
programs were not very helpful for solar PV industry since the manufacturers were more 
interested in surviving in the market rather than in developing technologies, which were 
for long-term growth. The solar corporations asked the government to engage in the 
international trade dispute on solar products. For the Korean solar corporations exporting 
a large share of their products, the rise of protectionism in many countries caused by the 
flood of Chinese solar panels was very risky.  
 Rather than engaging actively in the international trade dispute, Korean 
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for exporters, and built international relations for solar corporations to enable developing 
solar projects abroad. These policies were different from the original renewable energy 
policies in that they do not contribute to increase solar installation in South Korea. These 
interactions between solar industry and policies are shown in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40. Interactions between solar industry and policy in South Korea. 
 
 
 In both countries, the solar policies have diversified, and the solar industry has 
influenced this change. New types of policies have emerged because existing policies 
could not address the challenges in the solar market, and these challenges are mostly 
from the global market. In the U.S., the tariff has been implemented under the rising 
imports of low-priced Chinese solar panels. Korean solar companies have struggled under 
the international trade disputes and the policies of other countries to protect their 
domestic market. The government of Korea has introduced some measures to promote 
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implemented in the context that the industry has asked for a policy measure to address the 
international trade issue. 
 Other than asking for a new measure to address market challenges, the industry 
also attempted to maintain favorable policies and to change the detailed rules of policies. 
The U.S. solar industry has affected the extension of the ITC, and the detailed rules of the 
CPP. Korean solar PV industry has suggested to the government the necessity of 
changing the rules of the RPS since the RPS has introduced much uncertainty in the solar 
market.  
 Figure 41 shows the causal mechanism of renewable energy policy change 
developed by the cases of two countries. Globalization of solar PV industry has positively 
affected the growth of downstream solar industry, but has posed challenges on upstream 
solar industry. Under these circumstances, struggling upstream industry has attempted to 
initiate or to suggest new policies such as the tariffs, industrial policies, or the supports 
for exports. These policies are different from traditional renewable energy policies in that 
they were introduced to protect domestic industry. Meanwhile, the whole solar industry 
has engaged in policymaking to maintain existing traditional renewable energy policies, 
and to make both traditional and non-traditional renewable energy policies more 
favorable for the solar PV industry. Globalization of solar PV industry has affected these 

















Factors for policy divergence 
 As renewable energy policies have been diversified in these two countries, the 
difference in policies between them has increased. Comparing the cases suggests three 
factors affecting policy divergence between the U.S. and South Korea: solar PV industry 
structure, energy policy structure, and the importance of domestic market.  
 
Solar PV industry structure 
 While the growth of solar PV industry has been driven by downstream industry in 
the U.S., the solar PV industry in South Korea has grown based on upstream industry. 
This difference of solar PV industry structure has caused different effect of the 
globalization of solar PV industry. In the U.S., although the flood of Chinese solar 
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benefitted downstream solar corporations, which were much larger compared to 
manufacturing. On the other hand, increasing supply of Chinese solar products has 
seriously weakened Korean solar manufacturers. Due to the small size of downstream 
industry, South Korean has not benefitted much from decreasing prices of Chinese solar 
products.  
 Under the increasing supply of low-priced Chinese solar products, U.S. solar 
industry has sharply grown based on the dramatic rise of solar installation. As the 
industry became larger, it had more political power to influence policies. This helped the 
solar industry to influence relevant policies. With increased resources and capabilities, 
the U.S. solar industry has affected the extension of the ITC, and the addition of detailed 
rules favorable to solar industry in the CPP.  
 In South Korea, solar PV industry has not significantly grown because solar 
manufacturers, which accounted for a majority of solar corporations, had faced severe 
competition with Chinese manufacturers in the global market. Under this circumstance, 
many corporations went out of solar business in recent years. Although solar installation 
has sharply increased, this did not significantly contribute to the growth of solar industry 
since most of the projects were small-scale. Therefore, it was difficult for the Korean 
solar industry to have enough political power to influence relevant policies. Compared to 
the U.S., the influence of Korean solar industry to policies was less significant.  
 The difference in solar PV industry structure has caused the difference in the 
effect of the globalized solar PV industry on each country. The U.S. solar industry has 
much benefitted, but Korean solar industry has faced more challenges than opportunities. 
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This has led to a different degree of political power, which has affected the industries’ 
capacity to engage in relevant policies.   
 
Energy policy structure 
 Most of the solar PV policies have been implemented through the enactment of 
acts in the U.S., while those have introduced under the higher-level of national energy 
policies in South Korea. Since solar PV policies were a part of the energy policies such as 
the Basic Plan for Technology Development, Application, and Deployment of New and 
Renewable Energy, and the National Energy Plan, the Korean solar industry’s 
engagement in solar PV policies has been limited. The target share of solar PV in national 
energy mix were decided by the higher-level energy policies, and the policies were 
designed based on the target. On the other hand, the U.S. energy policies were less 
hierarchical. The major solar PV policies were not very closely related to other policies. 
The ITC has been introduced and extended through several separate acts. Funding and 
financial assistance for solar PV has also been implemented through the enactment of an 
act. This enabled the U.S. solar PV industry to engage in each policy issue with less 
difficulty compared to the Korean solar PV industry. 
 
Importance of domestic market 
 The U.S. government posed a direct policy measure to address flooding Chinese 
solar panels, but South Korea did not. Korean government was not motivated to introduce 
a policy measure to restrict the imports of Chinese solar panels since the size of solar PV 
industry has not significant compared to other industry sectors. Restriction on Chinese 
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solar panels was risky because it could cause any type of retaliatory actions. Since China 
is one of the biggest markets for Korean industries, a retaliatory action could harm other 
industries severely. Even large Korean solar PV corporations did not want any policy to 
restrict the imports of Chinese solar panels. For most of them, solar products are one of 
their businesses, and the share of solar business was not significant. They did not want to 
have any risk of retaliatory action due to one of their minor business area. Moreover, 
domestic market was not one of the major markets for most of the Korean manufacturers. 
As they exported almost 70% of their solar products, protecting domestic market was not 
very important for them.  
 Compared to South Korea, the U.S. domestic market was more important for the 
U.S. solar manufacturers. The U.S. is one of the largest solar PV markets worldwide. 
Therefore, protecting domestic market was a critical issue for the U.S. solar 
manufacturers for survival. In this context, SolarWorld and several other U.S. 
manufacturers have initiated introducing a new measure to restrict the imports of Chinese 
solar panels by submitting a petition.  
 
Complicated and murky renewable energy policies 
 In recent years, more policies have been included into renewable energy policies. 
Traditional renewable energy policies have been support policies such as FIT and RPS, 
which promote the use of renewable energy. Recent policies on renewables are not 
necessarily implemented to increase the use of renewable energy. The purposes of these 
policies are to fix unfair international trade practices, to promote the exports of domestic 
corporations, or to increase the use of domestically-produced facilities in domestic 
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market. Most of these policies do not contribute to achieving the goal of the traditional 
renewable energy policies.  
 In this sense, renewable energy policies are not necessarily environmental 
policies. At this point, they are environmental policies, trade policies, and industrial 
policies. Before the globalization of renewable energy industry, traditional renewable 
energy policies have been able to promote both the use of renewable energy and the 
growth of industry. However, the globalized industry has posed challenges to these 
efforts. Traditional renewable energy policies can expand the use of renewable energy, 
but they do not necessarily develop a domestic industry. Under these circumstances, 
different types of policies including industrial policies and trade policies were introduced 
to complement the traditional renewable energy policies.  
 Some of these non-traditional renewable energy policies conflict with traditional 
renewable energy policies. The policies to promote domestically-produced products may 
negatively affect achieving the goal of the traditional policies by reducing the use of low-
priced foreign products. Some non-traditional renewable energy policies could also 
conflict with global trade rules. The U.S. anti-dumping tariff on Chinese solar panels has 
caused trade dispute with China as China submitted a complaint to the WTO. Moreover, 
there are less transparent policies to protect domestic industry. Certification programs or 
government-driven renewable energy project development programs could be used as a 
policy measure to develop domestic corporations. It is not easy to find out how these 




 The causal mechanism of renewable energy policy change is limited in being 
generalized due to the specific contexts of two case countries. Since each country has its 
own political, economic, and social contexts, these two country-level case studies are not 
easily generalized. Future research can complement this limitation by expanding case 
countries, and by conducting a quantitative large N-study. Despite this limitation, the two 
cases do allow insight into drivers of firm behavior and policy response that are relevant 




Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
 This research explores how the globalized renewable energy industry has changed 
national renewable energy policies through three analyses. The findings of the three 
analyses reveal that the globalized renewable energy industry has led the diversification 
of national renewable energy policies by increasing international interactions between 
actors, by posing new challenges to domestic renewable energy industries, which were 
addressed through additional policy measures, and by introducing opportunities to the 
industries to grow, which resulted in more political power of the industries.   
 Analysis 1 shows that solar multinational corporations have adapted to the 
changes of the global market rather than attempted to change national policies. It does not 
find any evidence of the effect of an individual solar multinational corporation on 
national policies. Rather, national policies, especially the policy measures to protect 
domestic industry, have affected the risks that multinational corporations face. They 
attempted to adapt to these increasing risks by expanding their business to downstream. 
This expansion has led them to face new policy risks. 
 Analysis 2 reveals that solar multinationals have affected national policies 
through engaging in framing of a policy issue. In the U.S., the solar multinationals 
headquartered in other countries have dominated the framing of the issue of Chinese solar 
panels. Although Analysis 1 shows that an individual multinational corporation has 
barely influenced national policies, Analysis 2 identifies that it has affected national 
policies indirectly through framing.  
 Finally, Analysis 3 finds that the globalization of solar industry has affected the 
diversification of national solar policies. It changed the market conditions that solar 
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industry faced, and led the industry to initiate or suggest new policies. Moreover, the 
globalization of solar industry has led the growth of downstream solar industry by 
decreasing the costs of solar products. The growing downstream industry has 
strengthened the political power of the solar industry, which has helped the industry to 
engage in policymaking to maintain existing favorable policies, to make existing policies 
favorable, or to make non-solar policies favorable.    
 
Interpretation of the findings of Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 
 The findings of Analysis 1 have an apparent inconsistency with those of Analysis 
2. Analysis 2 finds the effect of multinational corporations on policies, while Analysis 1 
does not find it. This inconsistency arises from differences in topical focus and method, 
and therefore relates more to the scoping of the analyses than to a theoretically 
fundamental divergence. In this sense, the two outcomes provide partial complementarity 
that gives a more complete picture of firm and policy responses. Three reasons can 
explain this inconsistency.  
 First, there was difference between the analyses in terms of the focus of an 
activity for policy engagement. Analysis 1 focused on the actual engagement of 
multinational renewable energy corporations in policymaking, while Analysis 2 focused 
on framing a policy issue. Framing a policy issue is a more indirect engagement in 
policymaking compared to other engagements such as lobbying. Therefore, it can be said 
that renewable energy corporations’ engagement in policymaking was indirect rather than 
direct. In the interviews, a few multinational solar PV manufacturers said that they could 
not actively engage in the U.S. policy issues because they are a non-U.S. manufacturer. 
 206 
However, these manufacturers have participated in framing the Chinese solar panel issue 
in the U.S. This suggests that multinational corporations adopted indirect ways to engage 
in policies since their capabilities for policy engagement were limited in non-home 
countries. 
 Second, Analysis 1 does not capture the behaviors of all the multinational 
corporations since the data was limited to the annual reports of the global top 15 solar 
module manufacturers. There is a possibility that non-top 15 solar module manufacturers 
actively participated in policies. For instance, SolarWorld, the dominant actor in framing 
the Chinese solar panel issue in the U.S., was not included in the top 15 module 
manufacturers.  
 Third, the annual reports might not include all the actual activities of the solar 
module manufacturers for policy change. Since lobbying is a sensitive issue, corporations 
might attempt to avoid describing their efforts to change policies in their annual reports.   
 In this sense, the findings of Analysis 1 and Analysis 2 complement each other 
rather than conflict. In combination, they show that multinational corporations’ policy 
engagement tend to be more indirect rather than direct. They engaged in policies through 
framing a policy issue and collaborating with other actors. Moreover, less globally 
dominant multinational corporations can be more active than dominant corporations for a 
specific policy issue. While Analysis 1 focuses on the direct policy engagements of large 
multinational corporations, Analysis 2 shows broader and indirect policy engagements of 
multinational corporations including less dominant corporations. 
 
 207 
Evaluating the propositions 
Proposition 1. Multinational renewable energy corporations are more likely to engage in 
policymaking for favorable policies under the challenges of the global market. 
 
 Proposition 1 was not supported by Analysis 1. Under the challenges of the global 
market, multinational corporations tended to adapt to the changes. Analysis 1 did not find 
any evidence of the engagement of multinational solar corporations in policymaking. The 
interviews with multinational solar corporations in Analysis 3 were also consistent with 
the findings of Analysis 1. Multinational solar corporations did not actively engage in 
policymaking individually. 
 
Proposition 2. The central domestic actors of a renewable energy field have framed 
renewable energy trade issues with a traditional environmental frame. 
 
 The findings of Analysis 2 did not support Proposition 2. The trade of Chinese 
solar panel was framed by multinational corporations headquartered in other countries. 
The central actors in the U.S. solar PV field, large manufacturers and installers, were not 
actively engaging in the debates on Chinese solar panels. The issue was not framed with 
the traditional frame of the U.S. solar PV field, which was an environmental frame. 
Economic frame and international trade frame were dominant in framing the Chinese 
solar panel issue.  
 
 208 
Proposition 3. The growth of domestic renewable energy industries has caused the 
diversification of national renewable energy policies as renewable energy industries have 
become globalized.  
 
 Analysis 3 supported Proposition 3. The solar PV industry has caused the 
diversification of national solar PV policies in the U.S. and South Korea. The 
globalization of solar PV industry has influenced national policies by posing a new 
challenge to the solar PV industry. Under this circumstance, the industry has initiated or 
suggested new policies. Moreover, the globalization of solar PV industry has affected the 
growth of domestic solar industries by boosting downstream business. This has 
influenced national solar policies by increasing the political power of the solar industries. 
The industries have engaged in policymaking of both traditional and non-traditional 
renewable energy policies. 
 
Contributions to the literature 
 Overall, this research contributes to the literature on trade and the environment. 
Although the existing literature explains increasing renewable energy installation with the 
rise of international trade of renewable energy products, the rise of renewable energy 
protectionism is not well understood. The conflicts between environmental regulations 
and global trade rules were discussed, but the current conflicts between national 
industrial and trade policies on the environment with the international trade of 
environmental goods have not received much attention. This research fills this gap by 
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exploring the contexts of the recent rise of protectionist measures under the globalized 
renewable energy industry.  
 The literature on protectionism will also be benefited from this research. The rise 
of green protectionism has been a concern after the global financial crisis, but the causal 
mechanism of green protectionism has not been identified. This research fills this gap by 
suggesting the mechanism of the rise of protectionist measures in renewable energy. The 
research shows that the globalized renewable energy industry has led countries to adopt 
protectionist measures, and that national contexts have influenced countries’ adoption of 
different types of policy measures. 
 Each analysis contributes to different literature streams. Analysis 1 contributes to 
the literature on institutional change and multinational corporations by showing how 
multinational corporations interact with national policies. The literature on the co-
evolution of multinational corporations suggested that multinational corporations have 
evolved with the uncertain external environment, but the pattern of co-evolution has not 
been well understood. Analysis 1 shows that multinational corporations have interacted 
with national policies by adapting to the changing environment rather than by directly 
engaging in.  
 Analysis 2 contributes to elaborating the concept of an issue field. It shows how 
actors interact within an issue field, and which actors are dominant in an issue field. An 
issue field was not necessarily dominated by the central actors of an existing field. The 
actors with strong interest were dominant in framing of the issue by collaborating with 
other actors. The findings add understanding to the literature on an issue field by showing 
how actors collaborate and interact to lead framing of an issue field.  
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  Finally, Analysis 3 complements the literature on policy convergence. It suggests 
that globalization of industry influences the diversification of national policies through 
changing the market conditions of domestic industries as well as the industries itself. 
Analysis 3 contributes to the literature on policy convergence by revealing that 
globalization can influence policy divergence in various ways in diverse contexts. While 
existing literature tends to find the effects of multiple aspects of globalization on policy 
convergence, this research suggests that a single aspect of globalization may affect the 
changes of national policies in various ways. 
 
Policy implications 
 Under the current global renewable energy market, a single policy is difficult to 
promote both the installation of renewable energy as well as the domestic renewable 
energy industry. Traditional renewable energy policies such as FIT or RPS would 
contribute to increasing the share of renewable energy in a national energy mix, but it is 
uncertain if these policies would promote domestic renewable energy industry. 
Especially, manufacturing is hard to be promoted through policies under the globalized 
industry because existing manufacturers are producing renewable energy products with 
very competitive prices and are providing them all over the world. Therefore, a new actor 
would be difficult to compete with them.  
 Compared to manufacturing, installation is inherently local. Therefore, renewable 
energy policies can still boost domestic downstream industry. FIT and RPS could expand 
business opportunities for installers by increasing the size of a domestic market. Even if 
global project developers take advantage of the business opportunities, most of the 
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construction should be done by local installers. In this sense, boosting installation of 
renewable energy facilities could positively affect domestic industries to some degree.   
 In this context, a well-designed renewable energy policy is still able to develop a 
domestic industry even under the globalized renewable energy market. From industry’s 
perspective, the key of the renewable energy policy is to enable the industry to predict 
future market. The policy should provide a positive signal to the market, which shows 
that the market conditions will be favorable to industry. The U.S. solar corporations had 
difficulty in making investment plans due to the late decision of the extension of the ITC, 
and Korean solar corporations had been struggling with fluctuating prices of energy 
source in recent years. What they need was a consistent policy signal enabling them to 
predict the conditions of the future market. 
 Moreover, to promote renewable energy, which is more matured than the past, a 
broader perspective is necessary. The policies on electricity grid, permitting, and utility 
rates are significantly affecting renewable energy business at this point. In the early stage 
of renewable energy development, these issues were not very important since the share of 
renewable energy was negligible. Since the share of renewable energy will continuously 
increase, these issues will be more critical in the future.   
 Finally and most importantly, this research suggests a benefit from an 
international policy on renewable energy trade. The international trade disputes among 
countries on renewable energy products have been a barrier to reduce the cost of 
renewable energy. In this context, Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) has been 
negotiated among 14 countries, which represent an 86 percent of global trade of 
environmental goods, to eliminate the tariffs on environmental goods since July 2014. 
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This is expected to contribute to expanding renewable energy installation globally 
through reducing the cost of renewable energy products. Moreover, considering that 
newly adopted national trade policies on renewables have introduced different kinds of 
risks to industry, this initiative is expected to reduce risks that the industry face. In this 
sense, the EGA would encourage the development of renewable energy industry as well 
as promote the installation of renewables. 
 International policies focusing on tariffs, however, would be limited in addressing 
the rise of murky policies to protect domestic renewable energy industry. Many other 
protectionist measures other than tariffs have been implemented under the globalization 
of solar PV industry. As other renewable energy industries grow and are globalized, 
protectionist measures could increase, which would not be limited in transparent policy 
measures. Therefore, an international mechanism including broader trade issues such as 
non-tariff policies would contribute to encouraging renewable energy development.   
 
Limitation and future work 
 Some limitations of this research yield future research opportunities. First, since 
the data for Analysis 1 was limited to the annual reports of the solar PV corporations, the 
behaviors of the corporations that were not described in the annual reports were limitedly 
addressed. Although the interviews with solar multinational corporations for Analysis 3 
were able to partially complement the limitation of data, the interviews did not cover all 
the multinational corporations in Analysis 1. Interviews with all top fifteen corporations 
are expected to reveal more detailed contexts of the behaviors of solar multinationals 
under the challenges of the global market. In addition, using quantitative data such as 
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lobbying spending of the multinational renewable energy corporations would be able to 
complement the limitation of the analysis. 
 Analysis 2 shows the political interactions among actors to change a policy, but it 
is limited in revealing the actual effect of the framing on policy change. The analysis 
shows prominent actors focusing on the framing of the issue. It can be argued that the 
framing does not necessarily significantly affect policy change. Lobbying or other 
political activities could be more effective in influencing policies. Future research would 
be able to complement this analysis by investigating the actual effect of framing on 
policy change.    
 Finally, Analysis 3 is limited in generalizing due to the specific contexts of two 
case countries. Especially, to explain the global context of renewable energy, China 
needs to be included in the analysis. Future research on the renewable energy policy 
change in China would complement this research by adding a case with different political 
and economic contexts. Moreover, a quantitative large-N study on the divergence of 
renewable energy policies with diverse countries would complement this research by 
enabling generalization of the findings of this study.  
 Overall, this research explored the contexts of the recent rise of renewable energy 
protectionism. The future of renewable energy is uncertain since renewable energy is an 
issue of energy, the environment, trade, economy, and global politics at this point. The 
increasing trend of nationalism would introduce more uncertainty since national policies 
for domestic interests are expected to conflict with the increasing international trade and 
the global trade rules. The most important future work will be to observe ongoing 
discussions and actions on renewable energy trade and to provide knowledge on them.
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Appendix A. List of interviews for the U.S. case study 
 
Interview number Category Name Organization Headquarters 
Interview #1 Expert Miriam Makhyoun Solar Electric Power Association US 
Interview #2 Expert Vanessa He Solar Energy Industry Association US 
Interview #3 Expert Amit Ronen GW Solar Institute US 
Interview #4 Expert Anonymous US 
Interview #5 Expert Alexander Winn Solar Foundation US 
Interview #6 Firm - Project developer Polly Shaw SunEdison US 
Interview #7 Firm - Project developer Anonymous Germany 
Interview #8 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous China 
Interview #9 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous China 
Interview #10 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous China 
Interview #11 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Sam Yoon Hanwha Q cell South Korea 
Interview #12 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous India 
Interview #13 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous US 
Interview #14 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous Japan 
Interview #15 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Gary Conger Recom Germany 
Interview #16 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous China 
Interview #17 Firm – Cell/Module manufacturer Anonymous Vietnam 
Interview #18 Firm - Inverter manufacturer Anonymous US 
Interview #19 Firm - Inverter manufacturer Anonymous US 
Interview #20 Firm - Inverter manufacturer Anonymous US 
Interview #21 Firm - Installer Anonymous US 
Interview #22 Firm - Installer Scott Cavanagh Anar Solar US 
Interview #23 Firm - Installer Matthew Harrison Baja Construction US 
Interview #24 Firm - Installer Anonymous US 
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Appendix B. List of interviews for the South Korea case study 
Interview number Category Name Organization Headquarters 
Interview #25 Government Nam, Kiwoong 
Mirae Energy-Code Research 
Institute (Korea Energy Agency) 
South Korea 
Interview #26 Government Han, Young-Bae Korea Energy Agency South Korea 
Interview #27 Government Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #28 Expert Kim, Joojin Kim & Chang South Korea 
Interview #29 Expert Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #30 Expert Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #31 Expert Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #32 Expert Lee, Sanghoon 
Korea Society for New and 
Renewable Energy 
South Korea 
Interview #33 Expert Lee, Sungho 
Chonbuk National University 
(Korea Energy Agency/KOPIA) 
South Korea 
Interview #34 Firm - Polysilicon manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #35 Firm - Polysilicon manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #36 
Firm - Ingot and wafer 
manufacturer 
Nam, Wallace W. Woongjin Energy South Korea 
Interview #37 
Firm - Ingot and wafer 
manufacturer 
Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #38 Firm - Cell manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #39 Firm - Module manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #40 Firm - Module manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #41 Firm - Module manufacturer Anonymous South Korea 
Interview #42 Firm - Installer Jeong, Doowoon I-Solar Energy South Korea 
Interview #43 Firm - Installer Shin, Sungyong KC Solar Energy South Korea 
Interview #44 Firm - Installer Oh, Kyo-Sun LS IS South Korea 
Interview #45 Firm - Power producer Anonymous South Korea 
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Appendix D. Interview questions 
 
1. Questions for the executives and managers of solar photovoltaic companies 
1) Could you talk about your background in solar PV field? 
2) Could you describe the solar PV business in your company? When did your 
company start your solar photovoltaic business for the first time? 
3) How was the market environment when your company started the business? 
4) Could you describe the changes of market environment in recent years?  
5) How has your company addressed those changes? 
6) How do you think government policies affect the solar photovoltaic business of 
your company?  
7) Do you make suggestions on government policies? If yes, how do you do it? Do 
you collaborate with any organization (industry organizations, solar PV firms, 
other manufacturing firms) for influencing government policies? 
8) Are you satisfied with current government policies on solar energy? Which 
additional policy do you think is necessary? Or do you suggest any revision of 
policy?  
 
2. Questions for the government officials 
1) Could you talk about your background in solar PV field? 
2) Could you describe the solar PV policies that you have worked on? How the 
policy is related to other policies (such as industrial policy, energy policy)? 
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3) What was the purpose of the policy [a policy that the interviewee has engaged 
in]? 
4) What was the expected output of the policy? 
5) Which stakeholders were considered during the policymaking? Which 
stakeholders were important? 
6) How have the stakeholders reacted to the policy? 
7) How did you address those reactions? 
8) Do you have any plan to revise the policy? 
9) What do you think the ideal direction of solar policy should be? 
 
3. Questions for the experts in the solar photovoltaic fields 
1) Could you talk about your background in solar PV (renewable energy) field? How 
long have you been working in solar PV (renewable energy) field? 
2) Which policies do you think have been important for the development of solar PV 
industry in the U.S.?  
3) What do you think is the most important policy agenda of solar PV at this point?  
4) Who do you think are the most influential actors for that policy agenda?   
5) Overall, how do you think the market environment of the U.S. solar PV industry 
has changed?  
6) Which factors do you think have been important for the U.S solar PV market 
environments? 
7) Who do you think are the most influential actors in the U.S. solar PV market? 
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8) Do you see any effect of globalization of solar PV market on the U.S. solar PV 
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